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1. Special issue introduction 
 
All Authors who have contributed to this Special Issue were invited to explore 
potential new frontiers of transport research. 
Papers share two overall features: 1) they all deal with policy and institutional 
matters, and 2) they mainly focus on the issue of sustainability. 
Three cross-cutting themes emerge from the papers. 
The first theme is about the specific attention one should pay when designing 
transport institutions and policies in order to: 
- steer diverging and converging interests in a shared decision-making process (De 
Brucker et al.); 
- engage various actors in a mixed (top-down and bottom-up) and reflexive 
framework aimed at making a long-term process viable (Kemp et al.); 
- open to the understanding of those wider forces which - together with official 
actors - shape the policy-making and planning processes (Hansen). 
 
The second theme is about the relevant role played by social actors: 
- as stakeholders of multi-criteria evaluation procedures (De Brucker et al.); 
- as participants to “transition arenas” where systemic solutions to foster transport 
sustainability are dynamically managed (Kemp et al.); 
- as drivers of both incremental and radical change in transport regimes (Marletto). 
 
The third theme is about the behavioural change needed to achieve a significant 
reduction of greenhouse gasses emitted by transport activities: 
- Harwatt et al. compare the impact of two policy schemes on transport behaviour : 
personal carbon trading and fuel price increases; 
- Marletto stresses that transport behaviour is constrained by other two structural 
dynamics: the influence of the car lobby on transport policies and the exisiting 
urban structures that are essentially tailored to the car; 
- Hansen goes further by connecting transport behaviour to deeper and place-
specific cultural variables. 
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In general terms, all papers implicitly claim that a wider approach to transport 
research is currently needed. They ask for multidisciplinarity: architecture, economics,  
history, psychology, sociology, urban planning – and so forth – should all be involved. 
They ask for theoretical pluralism: prevailing or more diffused approaches should never 
overshadow new or heterodox research streams. 
As an economist, I would say that this sounds as a warning to my discipline that too 
often indulges in the sins of reductionism (that is, economics prevailing on other social 
disciplines) and mainstreaming (that is, conformism prevailing on eclecticism). Does 
the recent Nobel Prize to Elinor Ostrom (a political scientist who has contributed to 
heterodox economics) signal that the time of arrogance has come to an end? 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank this Journal’s Managing Editor and all the Authors for sharing 
this project. I also thank all anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 
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Abstract 
 
We demonstrate that multi-criteria analysis (MCA), though initially developed in the operations 
research field, can be usefully applied within the context of the stakeholder-driven or institutional 
approach to transport project evaluation. We first compare the features of the institutional and neo-
classical approaches to economic evaluation. We then identify a number of conditions to be fulfilled for 
the institutional approach to result in a social optimum that is neutral from a distributional perspective. 
Such an optimum may not have been intentionally pursued, but may eventually arise as a by-product of 
the actions of self-interested, individual stakeholder groups. We illustrate the relevance of our approach 
through a number of recent case studies. Policy makers can use our findings as an input for designing 
formal decision-making processes, geared towards including stakeholder objectives in transport project 
evaluation. 
 
Keywords: Multi-criteria analysis; Multi-criteria decision aid; Institutions; Institutional approach; 
Stakeholder. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Large transport projects usually require substantial investment funding from both 
public and private sources. They often also affect the economic and environmental 
characteristics of the locations where they are built. In many cases, large-scale projects 
affect individual stakeholder groups in idiosyncratic ways. Such stakeholder groups 
usually have a preference for voicing their views and participating in the decision-
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making processes preceding actual project approval, namely at the stage when 
alternative project alternatives or options are assessed. 
 Decision makers can choose among a large number of evaluation techniques to assess 
transport projects, including, inter alia, social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), multi-
criteria analysis (MCA), cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), regional economic impact 
study (REIS) and environmental impact assessment (EIA). The basic principles 
underlying each of these methods are very specific.  
For example, SCBA is ultimately an expression of neo-classical welfare economics, 
whereby marginal benefits (utility increases) are compared with marginal costs (utility 
losses). Values (expressed in monetary terms) are based on consumer values as 
expressed by the consumer willingness-to-pay or derived in another way (e.g., using 
revealed preference or stated preference methods).  
MCA originated in the operations research field (Charness and Cooper, 1961). Here, 
alternatives are evaluated on a set of criteria reflecting the decision-maker’s objectives, 
and ranked on the basis of an aggregation procedure. Scores achieved do not necessarily 
need to be conveyed in monetary terms, but can simply be expressed in physical units or 
in qualitative terms.  
CEA, which stems from research in the military and space industries, aims at 
selecting the least-cost alternative that achieves a predefined level of effectiveness. The 
effectiveness measure reflects the operationalisation of a specific policy objective. 
However, the policy objective itself is preset, and not subject to a critical evaluation of 
its desirability (e.g., whether benefits actually exceed costs).  
The (regional) economic impact study (REIS) bears some similarities with Adam 
Smith’s classic economics view, which focused on the role of production. The REIS 
attempts to measure the additional production (or value added) causally linked to a 
project. 
EIA became established as an evaluation tool in its own right as Goudzwaard’s (1970) 
and Hueting’s (1970) ideas of “new scarcity” were gaining ground. EIA describes the 
possible impacts a project may have on the natural environment (fauna, flora, air, soil, 
water, landscape, etc.) and on human health, so that decision makers can consider these 
effects when deciding on accepting, amending or rejecting a project. 
In recent years, several attempts have been undertaken to enhance the “participative 
character” of the above evaluation methods, see Stagl (2007) for an excellent overview. 
In each case, the intent has been to enrich the evaluation process with a substantive 
injection of stakeholder, expert and/or citizen participation. Here, “deliberative 
monetary evaluation” involves formal deliberation techniques to assign a monetary 
value to environmental impacts (Spash, 2001). “Social multi-criteria evaluation” 
combines participatory techniques and MCA to aid decision-making, thereby taking into 
account conflicting interests and multiple criteria (Munda, 2004). In the “three-stage 
MCA”, various relevant stakeholders select criteria, followed by experts presenting 
information and measuring impacts, and citizen panels exploring values by comparing 
the numerical overall results with their own holistic judgement (Renn et al., 1993). 
“Multi-criteria mapping” is an interview-based MCA, meant to elicit and document 
technical and evaluative judgements on the expected performance of alternatives (Renn 
et al., 1993). “Deliberative mapping” combines participatory techniques and MCA to 
aid decision-making (Davies et al., 2003). Finally, “stakeholder decision analysis” 
combines the use of group-level deliberation techniques and (qualitative) MCA 
(Burgess, 2000).  
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It should be noted, however, that participative evaluation processes can be introduced 
without necessarily adopting formal evaluation instruments such as MCA and SCBA. 
Typical examples of such participative processes include the French and Belgian 
systems of “débat public”, as well as the Swiss confirmative referendum.  
The present article focuses on the institutional theory approach to evaluation. First, we 
show that MCA, though stemming from operations research, can be usefully linked to 
the stakeholder-driven or institutional approach to project evaluation (section 2). 
Second, we argue that even SCBA, derived from neo-classical economics, includes 
some institutional features, albeit only implicitly (section 3). Third, we discuss the 
possibility that a stakeholder-driven approach will help achieving a social optimum 
(section 4). Finally, we assess the potential contribution of MCA to actually 
implementing a stakeholder-driven approach to transport project evaluation, building 
upon a number of recent case studies (section 5). 
 
 
2. MCA and the institutional approach to project evaluation: stakeholders as the 
linking pin 
 
There are various definitions of the “institution” concept. First, the behavioural or old 
Veblenian perspective (Veblen, 1919) defines institutions as “settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men”. Second, North (1990) defines institutions as the 
“rules of the game” Third, Hodgson (2006) defines institutions in more specific terms 
as “durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions” (Hodgson, 2006). The approach adopted in the present paper is consistent 
with the second and third definitions above. We view institutions as “decision 
procedures”, i.e., as sets of rules enabling a group or society to transform individual 
preferences into collective preferences. Although the three above definitions may on the 
surface seem rather different, they do share a number of common elements.  
A first common element is that institutions are meant to reduce - or improve control 
over - environmental uncertainty. Here, the “environment”, in the form of individual or 
stakeholder preferences needs to be understood and interpreted properly. The belief 
systems of the decision makers play an important role in the interpretative activity. 
Building upon this interpretative activity, an institution is established, e.g., through a 
sequence of actual decisions. The former activity corresponds to the internal 
representation of the institution in the decision makers’ minds, whereas the latter can be 
viewed as its external representation.  
A second commonality, largely the consequence of the first common element, is that 
institutions create both constraints and incentives guiding human behaviour (Hodgson, 
2006). Institutions do limit the options available to an individual or organization, but 
they may also trigger new types of human and organizational behaviour. By 
constraining behaviour, institutions can create a situation of socio-economic stability 
(i.e., an equilibrium). However, by providing incentives, institutions can contribute to 
moulding actors’ beliefs and preferences, as well as their capabilities and behaviour. 
Hence, institutions can trigger change and provide a pathway towards new equilibria. 
Indeed, through institutions, individual and collective beliefs and preferences co-evolve 
(North, 2005). Such co-evolution builds upon an initial equilibrium and is path-
dependent (North, 2005; Amendola and Gaffard, 1998). However, it is important to 
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understand that the formal creation or adaptation of the institution (or in our case the 
application of a decision procedure to a particular decision making challenge) does not 
lead to a permanent equilibrium, but only to a “temporary” one. A temporary 
equilibrium differs from the traditional neo-classical equilibrium, i.e., the situation 
whereby economic agents have no incentive to change their economic behaviour. 
Rather, the temporary equilibrium merely reflects a state of temporary order, i.e., a state 
of affairs providing temporary satisfaction to economic actors. During this period in 
which economic actors feel satisfied, the tension to change the state of affairs is reduced 
(weakened). Weak tension results from “concessions” made by each stakeholder 
involved in the decision making process, and from the transaction costs to be incurred in 
order to ameliorate further the present situation through new negotiations. 
The creation of a temporary equilibrium, i.e., a situation of temporary stability, can be 
considered as the public good component associated with the institution. We noted 
above that in the present paper we will focus our attention on one specific form of 
institution, namely the systematic application of a decision procedure, such as multi-
stakeholder MCA, assuming that all affected stakeholders were considered in 
establishing this procedure (see infra).  
The perceived beneficial character of an equilibrium situation is consistent with 
Commons’ (1934) old-institutionalism view that society can be described as a complex 
cluster of multiple actors (i.e., stakeholder groups) with interests that partly conflict and 
partly converge. These stakeholder groups interact among each other through a variety 
of “trade or social relations”. Such interactions trigger social conflicts and the essence 
of economics is then to suggest efficient ways to govern these conflicts. The second and 
third above views on institutions assume the presence of conflicts as well as some 
efficiency of institutions at managing such conflicts. 
In the 1980s, the strategic management literature explicitly introduced the notion of 
stakeholder and stakeholder management. Freeman (1984:86) defined a stakeholder as 
“any group or individual that can affect or is affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives”. Since then, numerous authors have expanded on the 
stakeholder concept, and stakeholder management has become a separate sub-discipline 
in the strategic management field. 
Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) can be a tool for active stakeholder management in 
cases whereby several strategic options need to be assessed, or a specific project can be 
implemented in different ways (thereby also affecting stakeholders differently). 
Effective stakeholder management through MCA adoption can take various forms. In 
principle, all relevant effects should be taken into account in an MCA. An effect is 
considered relevant if it affects the values considered important by at least one 
stakeholder in the decision making process (Roy, 1985:173-174). When all effects have 
been studied and evaluated (using criteria, criterion weights, criterion scores and an 
aggregation procedure), stakeholder issues can be studied more closely (Belton, 
2002:60). A first option is to design a traditional value structure, i.e., a criteria structure 
identical for all stakeholders, but whereby each stakeholder is given the possibility to 
enter his individual preferences through specific weights. This can be achieved e.g., 
through implementing a specific type of sensitivity analysis, called “scenario analysis”, 
see De Brucker (2000) and Macharis et al. (2006). In conventional scenario analysis, 
each scenario reflects the situation whereby only the criterion weights associated with 
one specific stakeholder point of view (e.g., an environmental or a safety point of view) 
are taken into account. The other criteria receive a weight equal to zero. This approach 
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can then be repeated for several stakeholder points of view. A second option is to design 
a value structure that – as a whole – is not necessarily shared by everyone. Here, a 
different module in the overall model is constructed for each stakeholder, whereby all 
criteria contributing to the objectives of that specific stakeholder are clustered together. 
This is the “multi-actor multi-criteria analysis” (MAMCA) approach (see, e.g., 
Macharis, 2000, 2004, 2007). With this methodology, a “layer” that includes the 
stakeholders is added to the traditional MCA model. Each stakeholder group can then 
assess the different alternatives in terms of its own objectives/criteria. 
According to Belton (2002:60) both above approaches are valuable, but the second 
approach is the most appropriate if the different stakeholder groups indeed have very 
different concerns, as manifested in different criteria sets. Here, substantial (potential) 
conflict exists among stakeholder priorities. This approach makes it possible to assess 
the extent to which stakeholder preferences are conflicting or converging. In this 
context, the MCA makes it possible to monitor and even reduce societal conflicts. 
Conflict resolution (or management) is the essence of economics, according to the old 
institutionalism view of Commons (1934). Attention to stakeholders represents the link 
between MCA and the institutionalism view. The applications described in section 5 
illustrate this link in a more concrete fashion. 
In addition, the institutional approach can be used in an evolutionary context. 
According to Arthur (1999) and Amendola and Gaffard (1998) economic structures are 
path-dependent as they can crystallize around small, random events (e.g., in the context 
of on-line services we can observe random interface improvements, new offerings, 
word-of-mouth recommendations, etc.) and lock-in behaviour, which can then trigger 
substantive policy changes. The application of MCA also embodies such an 
evolutionary element. Stakeholder preferences (and hence their priorities) are dynamic. 
For example, the MCA may identify a level of conflict on subsidiary aspects of project 
design and implementation, but with consensus arising about the principle that the 
project should be approved in some form. Decision makers may then decide to adopt a 
gradual (i.e., an evolutionary) path towards project implementation. For example, via re-
design of subsidiary project features, conflicts may be reduced, and such conflict 
reduction can then be measured by performing a second MCA after the re-design. 
Indeed, in some cases, a gradual approach may be the most appropriate to managing the 
problem at hand. Beliefs and preferences are actually endogenous and the application of 
MCA has the potential to mould these further, and to create mutual understanding, as 
expressed in Blaug’s (1992:130) statement “Decision-makers do not try to get what they 
want, rather they learn to want by appraising what they get”. In such a situation, the 
decision-making context can be very fluid, and the stability created by the institution 
ephemeral. One may therefore move very quickly from one temporary equilibrium to 
another. An example of rapid moves from one equilibrium to the next, is the gradual 
adoption of regulations restricting smoking in Belgium.1 An example of the other 
                                                 
1
 The development of smoking restrictions in public areas in Belgium represents a good example of a 
situation whereby temporary equilibria have followed one another very quickly. Such sequence of 
equilibria builds upon rapid changes in stakeholder preferences and the willingness to adapt to “good 
practices” from other countries. Pope Urban VII (1590) was the first to implement a smoking ban valid 
for Catholic churches. In 1624 a papal bull banning smoking from all catholic churches and places of 
worship was issued by Pope Urban VIII on grounds that tobacco use prompts sneezing, which too closely 
resembles sexual ecstasy. One had to wait until 1987 for such ban to be implemented for health reasons in 
all public buildings with the exception of the catering sector. The societal dialogue on a possible smoking 
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extreme (i.e., of a very stable context) is the continued survival of the essential features 
of civil (or Napoleonic) law. As regards decisions on transport infrastructure, the 
temporary equilibrium created by a decision usually lasts a number of years, typically 
five years until a single investment project is built and fully operational to 30 years in 
the context of a long-term development plan (Dooms, 2010). 
A more formal and systematic application of the stakeholder-driven MCA method as 
described above might greatly benefit the implementation of complex projects or policy 
measures. 
 
 
3. Institutional elements in neo-classical project evaluation  
 
We have argued above that multi-criteria analysis (MCA) fits well with the 
institutional approach to project evaluation. Below, we focus on institutional aspects 
present in the neo-classical approach, and in particular in social cost-benefit analysis 
(SCBA). SCBA is a static evaluation tool and the institutional elements embodied in 
SCBA are largely implicit and therefore often ignored by decision makers. 
Nevertheless, these institutional elements may strongly affect SCBA outcomes. An 
extended version of the brief analysis below can be found in De Brucker and Verbeke 
(2007). 
The traditional neo-classical approach to economics largely ignores the impact of 
institutions. An institution-free state is implicitly assumed in the neo-classical approach. 
A closer look at this approach however, suggests that the neo-classical approach builds 
implicitly on a set of important institutions, namely (1) private property rights; (2) 
markets where supply meets demand; (3) competition at the supply side (and 
                                                                                                                                               
ban in the catering industry led to a rapid sequence of events. First, as of 1990 an agreement was reached 
at the Federal level to implement partial smoking restrictions (though only rarely enforced) in restaurants 
and pubs. Here, smoking became limited to two thirds of the relevant commercial surface area in 1990 
and half of the surface area in 1992, but only for larger catering businesses with a commercial floor 
surface of more than 50 m2. This approach was augmented with a requirement for compulsory smoke 
aspiration systems for all catering businesses. Second, in 2006 a complete smoking ban was introduced 
for catering businesses that are part of a sports complex, a shopping mall or a multi-purpose room (unless 
the space for the catering activity was fully separated from the space dedicated to these other activities). 
Third, in 2007 followed a complete smoking ban in all restaurants and small snack houses, i.e., catering 
businesses with food cost inputs representing less than one third of total purchased cost inputs (i.e., food 
and beverage inputs taken together). Fourth, in 2010 the smoking ban was extended to all snack houses 
and a Federal law was adopted that will extend the smoking ban to all catering businesses, including pubs, 
by 2014 at the latest. However, on 15 March 2011, the Belgian Constitutional Court determined that the 
distinction made (even though only a temporary one, i.e., until 2014) between pubs serving snacks and 
those serving no snacks constitutes a violation of the principles of non-discrimination embedded in the 
Belgian constitution. As a consequence of this decision, smoking will be restricted to secluded smoking 
rooms within all catering businesses in Belgium, including all types of pubs, as of 1 July 2011. The 
smoking room will need to be completely secluded from the remainder of the business, and have four 
walls, a roof and a door, ànd it will need to be a self-service area only. In addition, the smoking room will 
need to respect specific limits regarding surface area and it will need to contain an air ventilation system. 
In the future, further regulatory changes are likely, as a societal dialogue may start regarding further 
limits to smoking, e.g., in private hotel rooms, flats for the elderly, private cars and private houses where 
children or cleaning staff may be present. In a final stage, severe restrictions or even a complete ban may 
be imposed on the sale and import of tobacco, which already exists in a few countries (e.g. Bhutan). 
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competition law); (4) a well-functioning price mechanism and (5) a unit of account (a 
“numéraire”). As SCBA is based on the concept of willingness-to-pay (to obtain a good 
or property), the institution of property rights is essential. Property rights can only be 
traded in a market. However, markets do not always emerge spontaneously, but 
sometimes may need to be created artificially (e.g., markets for tradable pollution rights 
or surrogate markets constructed just for the purpose of valuing a specific good). Even 
when markets emerge spontaneously, a minimum level of regulation may be necessary. 
Markets are only able to produce a Pareto optimal equilibrium price, if competition law 
safeguards the presence of competition. The presence of a generally accepted numéraire 
such as the Euro is also essential to SCBA. 
At the project level, when performing an actual SCBA, some additional institutions in 
the sense of “decision procedures” or “rules of the game” implicitly play an important 
role. First, interpersonal utility comparisons are always made at the project level. In 
SCBA, the main decision criterion is usually the project’s net present value (NPV) (or a 
criterion related to NPV). The NPV is a single, synthetic criterion, supposed to include 
all relevant effects expressed in monetary terms. The actual monetary values considered 
in the SCBA are derived from the consumers’ willingness-to-pay and do not require the 
selection of additional weights for the different cost and benefit categories. Here, the 
NPV criterion directly follows from the Hicks-Kaldor criterion (Hicks, 1939:711 and 
Kaldor 1939:550). The Hicks-Kaldor criterion views a project as welfare increasing if 
the individuals experiencing an increase in utility (i.e., the “winners”) can compensate 
the individuals experiencing a decrease (i.e., the “losers”), and are still left with a higher 
utility level than before project execution. Applying this criterion requires interpersonal 
utility comparisons and at the same time implicit trade-offs are performed among 
project effects, though policy makers are not always aware of this. In the case of public 
sector projects, the NPV accrues to members of society, more specifically to particular 
stakeholder groups. In contrast, with private sector investments, the NPV (associated 
with additional profit) accrues to the shareholders. Most public sector projects (save for 
very general projects, such as universal health care in society), have clear distributional 
impacts, leading some stakeholders to “win” at the expense of others, thereby being 
“conflict sensitive”.  
Another institutional element embedded here is that the decision itself to perform a 
SCBA has institutional significance. Many projects, though having potential net 
benefits, are never taken into consideration or do not even come to the conceptualization 
phase, precisely because the potential benefits and costs are not assessed. Conversely, 
projects executed without a formal SCBA may result from the political willingness to 
provide benefits to particular stakeholders, with the costs borne by society at large. Ex 
post, project execution may in turn influence the NPV of other substitute projects.  
An interesting example in this context is the project regarding the upgrading and 
reactivation of the old international railway called “Iron Rhine”2 linking the port of 
                                                 
2
 The name “Iron Rhine” stems from the fact that this railway link was once considered an alternative to 
navigation on the river Rhine. The “Iron Rhine” railway connects Antwerp in Belgium to Duisburg in the 
German Ruhr area, through the Dutch province of Limbourg via Lier (BE), Herenthals (BE), Mol (BE), 
Neerpelt (BE), Weert (NL), Roermond (NL) and Mönchen-Gladbach (DE). The right of transfer through 
the Dutch province of Limbourg (i.e., that part of Limbourg east of the river Meuse) was guaranteed to 
Belgium by the then major powers (i.e., France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia) and laid down 
in the Separation Treaty of 1839, recognizing the independence of Belgium. The railway was opened in 
1879 and continued to be a succesful and busy railway until the eve of the first world war. After the first 
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Antwerp in Belgium with its hinterland in the Ruhr area in Germany, through the Dutch 
province of Limbourg. The debate regarding this project is highly complex and touches 
upon international and politically sensitive issues, which have their origins in the 
Principles of Separation of the former United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, as 
laid down in the subsequent Separation Treaty of 1839. A more detailed description of 
the history, the complexities and the nature of this issue can be found in Witlox (2006). 
A SCBA was recently performed for this project (Delhaye et al., 2009). The decision 
to establish a commission of independent experts (and to perform this SCBA) was the 
consequence of a decision rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague to which both countries (Belgium and The Netherlands) decided to submit their 
conflict. The overall result (i.e., from the international point of view) of this SCBA is 
negative, though the NPV from a Belgian perspective is positive. One reason for this 
poor result is the presence of spare capacity on competing railway routes (inter alia, the 
Montzen route), so that the project does not attract much traffic from the highly 
polluting road mode. In addition, the investment cost is very high because of the 
environmental and safety guarantees asked for by The Netherlands. However, the main 
reason for the negative outcome is likely that particular prior decisions were taken in the 
past regarding the provision of transport services and the design of a particular (rail) 
infrastructure network in the Netherlands, largely guided by political motives and 
unrelated to the NPV outcomes of specific projects. The rail links competing with the 
Iron Rhine rail project, namely the Montzen route,3 the Brabant route4 and the more 
recent Betuwe route5 were implemented in the past either without formal SCBAs, or, in 
the case of the Betuwe route, notwithstanding serious criticism from the Dutch Court of 
Auditors and a number of Dutch academics. The former projects were implemented 
mainly to satisfy concentrated stakeholder interests, within a broader institutional 
                                                                                                                                               
world war, it continued to be used on a rather modest scale since a competing line, namely the Montzen 
route (see infra) was built by the German occupying force in 1917. Finally, the Iron Rhine rail link ceased 
to operate, as part of the infrastructure was dismantled by the Dutch government in 1997. 
3
 The Montzen route connects Antwerp (BE) to the German Ruhr area via Lier (BE), Aarschot (BE), 
Diest (BE), Hasselt (BE), Tongeren (BE), Visé (BE), Montzen (BE) and Aachen (DE). This line was 
constructed during the first world war by the German occupying force for military purposes, since this 
line avoids the passage over the Dutch (i.e., neutral) territory. After the first world war the latter route 
continued to be used, although it is about 50 km longer and more hilly than the Iron Rhine route. The 
reasons were that with the Montzen route one could avoid one border passage, that it generates more 
revenue for the Belgian railway company (as it is a longer journey) and that it passes through the Walloon 
region of Belgium where the handling of trains creates economic activity and jobs for that region. 
4
 The Brabant route is an existing railway route south of the new Betuwe route (see infra) and connects 
the port of Rotterdam (as well as the more southernly located ports of Vlissingen and even partly 
Antwerp) to the hinterland in the German Ruhr area via Breda (NL), Eindhoven (NL), Tilburg (NL), 
Venlo (NL), Viersen (DE). The Brabant route is actually saturated and the construction of the new 
Betuwe route (see infra) reduces congestion on the former route. However, the reactivation and upgrading 
of the old Iron Rhine rail link would have served this same purpose, if it had been built (i.e., upgraded and 
reactivated) before the Betuwe route was built (which was not the case). 
5
 The Betuwe route is named after the Betuwe region (i.e., a fruit-growing region in The Netherlands) 
through which it passes. It is a new railway link recently constructed, more or less parallel to the already 
existing track in the same region (which was called “Betuwe line”). The Betuwe route connects the port 
of Rotterdam (NL) with its hinterland in the German Ruhr area. The Betuwe route was bundled most of 
the time with the motorway A15 and goes over Goringem (NL), Tiel (NL), Elst (NL), Zevenaar (NL) and 
Emmerich (DE).  
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context allowing for this to occur. For instance, the recent decision of the Dutch 
government to implement the Betuwe route was based on strategic motives, in particular 
its expected benefits for the port of Rotterdam, at the expense of competing foreign 
ports such as Antwerp in Belgium, which interestingly would have benefited most from 
the Iron Rhine project. In the more distant past, the old Montzen route was built for 
military purposes during World War I. Hence, the Belgian government wanting to 
safeguard the competitiveness and the future of the port of Antwerp (in terms of 
providing to shippers a selection of good hinterland connections with multiple transport 
modes, including rail) can do little more than pushing for the implementation of the Iron 
Rhine project, even in the face of disappointing SCBA outcomes. Here, Witlox (2006) 
correctly concludes that the case of the Iron Rhine is intrinsically an issue of 
international (port) competition.  
Any SCBA implicitly includes a number of institutional elements, but ultimately, it 
does remain an unsatisfactory, static evaluation tool, unable to accommodate fully the 
dynamics of complex decision-making processes, especially those processes that trigger 
institutional change through moulding beliefs and preferences. 
 
 
4. Does the institutional approach guarantee a societal optimum? 
 
In the institutional approach outlined above, stakeholders are considered the main 
drivers of decision-making processes. Two critical comments should be made here. 
First, stakeholder objectives are seldom converging, e.g., in the case of transport 
projects the objectives of the logistics sector are often opposed to those of 
environmental pressure groups. However, increased convergence of stakeholder 
objectives can occur. For example, the objectives of environmental pressure groups may 
converge with those in the logistics sector if an infrastructure project is re-designed to 
allow simultaneously for better logistics efficiency and lower externalities (e.g., as in 
replacing a new bridge project with high atmospheric, noise and visual pollution by a 
tunnel, as is the case for the present ringroad extension project in Antwerp). The 
question can therefore be asked whether a substantial amount of conflict necessarily acts 
as an impediment or can in some cases actually improve project design and 
implementation, i.e., improve the project and the decision-making associated with the 
project. Second, some stakeholder groups may be more powerful than others. The 
(temporary) institutional equilibrium resulting from the counterbalancing power of the 
various stakeholders’ actions is not necessarily distributionally neutral. More powerful 
stakeholders in society may try to institutionalize a (temporary) socio-economic 
equilibrium that provides them a (temporary) distributional advantage. They may try to 
do this either directly, through the implementation of specific projects benefiting them, 
or more indirectly, through influencing the design and organization of the institutions 
meant to evaluate and decide on projects.  
De Brucker and Verbeke (2007) describe in greater detail the above issues. They 
conclude that a manageable level of conflict can function as a catalyst for creative 
stakeholder involvement, learning and possibly project re-design, thereby potentially 
moving project implementation from a win-lose to a win-win situation, see also Mullins 
(2005:904-905). When applying MCA, creativity may be enhanced when value-focused 
thinking (Keeney, 1996) is applied. This implies that a set of relevant values (to be 
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measured by criteria) is made explicit at the outset. These values may be conflicting. In 
a following step, projects are “constructed”. This means that one proactively searches 
for projects that are acceptable to all stakeholders. This is done through an iterative 
learning process. Here, projects are not considered as exogenous since they too evolve 
in the learning process. The learning process is at least partly driven by the concern for 
reducing conflict. 
On the issue of the possible distributional bias of institutions, De Brucker and 
Verbeke (2007) described a number of mechanisms that can reduce the rent-seeking 
behaviour of strategically positioned actors or stakeholders (see also Knight, 1998:40ff). 
These mechanisms act on two levels, namely at the level of the institution itself (i.e., 
regarding the design of the “rules of the game”) and at the level of project evaluation in 
particular (i.e., when “playing the game”). These general mechanisms address problems 
related to transaction costs, uncertainty, cross-cutting effects, competition and state 
intervention. In this respect, the role of a third party such as the state or a state agency is 
very important in order to enhance the bargaining power of weak stakeholders, 
especially in the context of project evaluation. This can be achieved through (1) 
protecting free association, (2) establishing rules or criteria for recognizing the 
bargaining rights of specific stakeholder groups; (3) establishing stakeholder 
recognition procedures to give standing to affected stakeholders.  
Knight (1998:203) argues that poorly organized stakeholders typically turn to the state 
for formal protection, whereas powerful stakeholders prefer to negotiate in an 
unconstrained market. Hence, the trade-off from the government’s perspective is either 
to design very restrictive rules that protect negatively affected stakeholders against the 
externalities created by new infrastructure development or, alternatively, to allow these 
stakeholders, such as environmental protection groups, to mobilize against project 
developers, to voice their concerns and possibly to influence the outcome of the project 
evaluation, thereby reducing the need for formal rules. 
Finally, the role of sensitivity analysis should not be underestimated. Sensitivity 
analysis and scenario analysis can play an important role in detecting significant 
distributional consequences. Sensitivity analysis can be performed to identify the impact 
of changing policy weights. For example, one can change the weights associated with 
the criteria viewed important by a specific stakeholder and observe whether this has a 
substantial impact on the final outcome, see the next section.  
To conclude, the excessive power of some stakeholders can be counterbalanced if 
each stakeholder can effectively participate in the decision-making process. When 
designing formal decision procedures aimed at accommodating stakeholders’ 
objectives, this issue should be given special attention. The state can act as a network 
hub to provide and organize a forum for stakeholder discussion and debate, i.e., a forum 
for balancing stakeholders’ power and to ensure that each stakeholder group has equal 
rights and opportunities to let its views be known. The role of the state as a network hub 
also consists of further investigating possible distributional consequences of projects 
(e.g., through extensive sensitivity analysis in MCA). The institutional approach has the 
advantage that the conflicting interests among stakeholders become more explicit 
(“ordered complexity”) and that they can, therefore, be better controlled, monitored and 
moulded. As is the case with democracy, the collective benefit of this approach does not 
result from individual actions by stakeholders; rather, it is a by-product of a process 
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whereby individual actors or stakeholders pursue their own, selfish ends.6 None of these 
actors or stakeholders pursues the public good, but through acting in a pluralistic forum, 
collective benefits may ultimately arise as a by-product of this process. The outcome of 
this process can be viewed as “agreed upon subjectivity” or “subjectivity made 
objective”. A parallel can also be drawn with markets. Individual participants in markets 
(producers and consumers) pursue their own selfish ends (e.g., profits), but when 
considering all their actions together, an optimum may emerge as a by-product, 
provided that the price mechanism works efficiently, and that power asymmetries and 
other market imperfections do not arise. The institutional approach (using MCA) has the 
additional advantage, as compared to the neoclassical approach (using SCBA), that it 
can better accommodate the dynamics of complex decision processes and that it can be 
used as a trigger for change and for the moulding of beliefs and preferences, as well as 
the ensuing behaviour of actors. 
 
 
5. Applications of the institutional approach to transport project evaluation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the sections above, we have argued that stakeholders play an important role in the 
institutional approach to transport project evaluation. In addition, stakeholder relations 
can be managed more effectively using MCA. Hence, MCA adoption can be considered 
an important element in the institutional approach to transport project evaluation. There 
are, however, a large number of MCA methods and approaches, and not all of them are 
equally appropriate in the context of an institutional approach. The important building 
blocks of an MCA method that would make it fit well with the institutional approach 
include (1) the possibility to design a value structure (and associated criteria) allowing 
effective stakeholder management, e.g., because criteria sets can be directly linked to 
specific stakeholders); (2) sufficient flexibility, thereby allowing interactive and 
constructivist processes whereby various stakeholders can truly participate in the 
decision making process and “construct” together a solution acceptable to all (thereby 
also achieving what can be called “subjectivity made objective”) and (3) high 
transparency to policy makers, stakeholders and the public at large, in terms of how 
applying specific values, criteria and impact measures have led to a final outcome 
(“ordered complexity”). 
In the following sections, we present a few case studies, with a focus on the issue of 
stakeholder management, which is critical to the institutional approach. For technical 
details on the MCA adopted, see Macharis et al., (2007).  
 
                                                 
6 This way of thinking is consistent with the view on institutions underlying Schotter’s (1981:5) definition 
of economics: “Economics is the study of how individual economic agents pursuing their own selfish 
ends evolve institutions as a means to satisfy them”. In this definition, intentional design and the pursuit 
of distributional advantage are assumed to exist on behalf of the stakeholders. It is, therefore, the task of 
an external actor (such as the state or a state agency) to organize a pluralistic forum where the powers of 
various stakeholder groups effectively counterbalance each other. 
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5.2 Case study 1: the IN-SAFETY project 
 
The IN-SAFETY7 project is an EU funded research project under the sixth framework 
programme in which 29 partners from 12 different countries participated. A number of 
work packages were carried out by the authors of this article whose contribution 
consisted of prioritising a number of highly innovative alternatives (or tools) aimed at 
increasing road safety by creating a more forgiving road (FOR) and more self-
explaining road (SER) environment. A self-explaining road (SER) is a road that is 
constructed in such a way that it evokes and stimulates correct driving behaviour and 
therefore diminishes the chance on driver errors (Theeuwes and Godthelp, 1992). A 
forgiving road (FOR) is designed in such a manner that it counteracts or prevents 
driving errors and minimizes the negative effects of those driving errors (Wegman and 
Aarts, 2005). In the IN-SAFETY project, a number of proposals that can contribute to 
the development of a more SER and FOR environment were compared and ranked in 
order to determine their implementation priority. 
As the main objective of the present contribution is to illustrate how the objectives of 
stakeholders can be adequately captured and assessed in a MCA, we will mainly focus 
on (1) the design of a stakeholder-driven value structure; (2) the generation of 
alternatives based on value-focused thinking; and (3) the exploration of the (diverging) 
stakeholder priorities. For other, more technical issues such as the technical aspects of 
the alternatives studied, the actual generation of priorities (deriving criterion scores, 
weights and aggregating these), see the entire project deliverable (Macharis et al., 2008) 
and some chapters in a book dedicated to this topic (De Brucker et al., 2011 and 
Dangelmaier et al., 2011). 
 
• The design of a stakeholder driven-value structure 
 
After a number of technical workshops and extensive discussions with experts, policy 
makers and representatives from stakeholders, a value (criteria) structure as shown in 
Figure 1 was developed. This hierarchy of criteria was constructed according to the 
principles of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) of Saaty (1977, 1986, 1988, 1995). 
However, it was the policy makers (and stakeholder representatives) who ultimately had 
the last word in the decision regarding the final structure of the criterion tree.  
The top level of the evaluation tree shown in Figure 1 represents the focus or overall 
objective, namely creating benefits by making the road environment more forgiving and 
more self-explanatory. At the second level, three groups of main stakeholders are 
considered, namely (1) the users, (2) society/authorities and (3) manufacturers. Within 
each group of stakeholders, a number of subcategories was identified, such as drivers, 
fleet owners and emergency centres (for the main category “users”), road managers and 
authorities (for the main category “authorities”) and vehicle manufacturers, equipment 
manufacturers, system providers and content providers (for the main category 
“manufacturers”). As regards these subcategories, it turned out to be unnecessary to 
include them as separate groups, since the preferences of these subgroups were not 
substantially different from each other and since some of these subgroups did not feel 
compelled to organize themselves so as to exert a substantial influence on policy 
                                                 
7
 IN-SAFETY is the abbreviation for “INfrastructure and SAFETY”. 
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making. On the third level, the criteria are listed that are considered relevant by these 
main stakeholders. The lowest level shows the alternatives to be prioritised. 
 
USERS 
drivers/fleet owners/emerg.centr. 
SOCIETY/AUTHORITIES 
road managers / authorities 
MANUFACTURERS 
car man./equip.man./syst.prov./content prov. 
Driver 
comfort
Full user 
cost 
Driver 
safety 
Travel time 
duration 
Network 
effic. 
Public 
expend. 
Overall 
safety 
Environm. 
effects 
Socio-pol. 
acceptance 
Investm. 
risk 
Liability 
risk 
Techn. 
feasib. 
OVERALL BENEFITS OF FORGIVING AND 
SELFEXPLAINING ROADS 
Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 … Scen. n 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 4 
 
Figure 1: Decision hierarchy for the prioritisation of FOR and SER scenarios. 
Source: The authors and IN-SAFETY project team, based on the AHP (Macharis et al., 2008:23). 
 
It should be noted that the second stakeholder (at level 2) in Figure 1 in fact represents 
the point of view of public policy makers in general. The subsystem that is formed by 
this stakeholder and all its lower level elements is the most important one, since it 
represents the overall societal point of view. The two remaining subsystems, formed 
respectively by the users (i.e., the demand side of the market) and the manufacturers 
(i.e., the supply side) and their lower level elements, are also important, but in another 
context. Successful implementation of alternatives by public policy makers (i.e., the 
middle subsystem) is indeed only possible if the decisions made or the options chosen 
by these public policy makers are in accord with, at least to a certain extent, with the 
interests of the other stakeholders. If this is the case, then the pursuit of public policy 
objectives will be facilitated by the actions taken by the other stakeholders and it will be 
easier for public policy makers to have their preferences implemented. This way of 
using stakeholder management as facilitating (or hindering) public policy 
implementation is fully in line with the actual definition of the concept of “stakeholder” 
by Freeman, as referred to in section 2 above. The MCA to be performed, therefore, 
needs to be designed in such a way, so as to be able to investigate the extent to which 
the solutions chosen within the second subsystem (public policy view) are compatible 
with the solutions preferred by the users and the manufacturers, and whether this 
compatibility needs to be improved (or not), using a specific implementation path 
designed for this purpose. The essence of this approach is that the priorities derived 
from the public policy perspective are taken as the starting point for further analysis. In 
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the further analysis, differences are explored, and a comparison is made with the other 
two stakeholders’ priorities. However, there need not be a formal aggregation of the 
different stakeholders’ priorities, e.g., through calculating some average. In a perfect 
market (which is the standard assumption in neo-classical economics), the priorities 
derived at the demand side of the market would be expected to be fully consistent with 
the ones derived at the supply side, and government or public policy intervention (this is 
the middle subsystem in Figure 1) would not be an important issue. It is thus assumed 
that what would be good for individual users would also be good for society. This is 
definitely not the case here and several reasons can be identified for this situation. First, 
there are a number of external effects, such as effects on safety (including third party 
safety effects, such as effects on pedestrians and cyclists) and environmental effects, 
etc. Second, infrastructure and also safety have the character of a public good, which 
can only be financed with government funds, to be allocated by public policy makers. 
Third, there may be bounded rationality challenges, and consumer preferences may be 
inconsistent over time. When deciding on the type of goods to buy, consumers often 
have a preference for goods resulting in immediate but short-lived benefits, and 
associated with large costs or sacrifices in the future (e.g., road accidents). These future 
costs or sacrifices are often underestimated at the time the decision is made. This means 
that market intervention by public policy makers is required here. Fourth, the tools or 
systems analysed are highly innovative and the market for them still has to be 
developed. In such cases, government incentives or an active supply side policy by 
government can be instrumental to stimulating and forming the institutional structures 
of this evolving market. The decision-making problem public policy makers are 
confronted with is, therefore, not a simple but a complex one and the hierarchical 
structure developed here (Figure 1) should be viewed as an attempt to order this 
complexity. 
 
• The development of a set of alternatives 
 
The development of a set of alternatives to be prioritised was done using a two-step 
procedure. Given the highly innovative character of the alternative systems to be 
developed, a type of value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1996) was applied in the first 
phase. In this first (or conceptualisation) phase a set of preliminary alternative scenarios 
was generated, by combining the six main causes for accidents, namely (1) excessive 
speed in unexpected sharp bends, (2) speeding in general, (3) violation of priority rules, 
(4) wrong use of the road, (5) failure when overtaking and (6) insufficient safety 
distance, with three dimensions, along which scenarios can be developed namely (1) the 
vehicle, (2) the infrastructure and (3) the vehicle-infrastructure interface. By doing so, a 
total of 18 generic categories of potential alternatives were obtained. These should be 
considered as alternative venues for the design of innovative systems. For each 
category, some typical examples were identified, as shown in Table 1. The first row of 
Table 1 represents the three dimensions; the first column reflects the six top errors and 
the remaining cells represent typical examples the 18 alternative ways of developing 
potential alternative scenarios. 
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Table 1: Generation of alternatives by combining errors and dimensions along which tools can be 
developed. 
Dimension 
Error 
In-vehicle Infrastructure-based Cooperative (vehicle-
infrastructure) 
Too fast in 
unexpected 
sharp bends 
Unexpected sharp bends 
registered red in a 
digital map of the 
navigation-system are 
presented to driver 
Vehicle is ‘analyzed’ 
(e.g., speed), VMS 
signals the danger of the 
bend depending on the 
actual speed 
Electronic beacons (special 
reflection posts) give 
additional information on dis-
plays in the vehicle about the 
road (e.g., warning: sharp 
bend) 
Speeding Speed alert system 
functioning by 
recognition of traffic 
signs 
Speed limit is presented 
to driver by VMS under 
consideration of special 
environmental 
circumstances 
Speed alert system, based on 
digital maps containing legal 
speed limits with additional 
info on recommended safe 
speed 
Violation of 
priority rules 
Traffic sign recognition Traffic signs Traffic light status 
information emission to car 
Wrong use of 
the road 
LDWA (Lane Departure 
Warning Assistant) 
Audible delineation Adaptive LDWA; Sensitivity 
of LDWA is adapted in spe-
cial conditions (road 
works,tunnels) 
Failure when 
overtaking 
Blind spot detection 
warning driver if a 
vehicle is approaching 
from behind 
Separation of lanes by 
rumble strips where 
overtaking is forbidden 
Cooperative system warning 
of oncoming vehicles by 
vehicle-to-vehicle 
communication 
Insufficient 
safety distance 
Advanced Cruise 
Control (ACC) 
Fog detection warning 
system; VMS warning 
ACC set by local on-site 
weather system: Dynamic 
ACC 
Source: IN-SAFETY project team (Macharis et al., 2008:21). 
 
On the basis of a preliminary prioritisation of these potential systems in terms of 
stakeholder objectives (see below) and after extensive discussions with experts, a set of 
more concrete implementation scenarios8 was selected for final prioritization in the 
step 2. These systems are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 We adopt the term “scenario” because each system studied is described in terms of a number of 
parameters such as road type, traffic conditions, etc., as compared to a “reference scenario”, see Macharis 
et al., (2008:38ff). 
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Table 2: Summary of a detailed scenario description. 
No./ Name Description Type of 
system 
Data needed 
for operation 
Data collection 
for operation 
Condition 
requirement 
Reference 
scenario for 
evaluation 
Main 
contributing 
factor for 
target 
accidents 
Pilot 
studies 
1. In-car 
Variable 
Message Signs 
(VMS) info 
(dynamic legal 
speed limit 
motorways) 
Self-explaining 
system  
Dynamic speed 
limit based on 
weather and 
traffic 
conditions 
Roadside 
VMS  
Warning 
into vehicle 
Current speed, 
environmental 
data, traffic 
volume/flow 
Vehicle sensors, 
roadside sensors 
Reliable 
detection 
systems, 
algorithms for 
calculating safe 
speed 
(A) Current 
state 
(B) Roadside 
VMS, dynamic 
speed limit (no 
info into 
vehicle) 
Inappropriate 
speed on 
motorways 
Greek, 
Italian, 
German 
pilots 
 
2. In-car 
school  
bus ahead  
warning 
Self-explaining 
system 
Warning when 
school bus 
stops ahead 
Warning 
from bus 
into vehicle 
Vehicle 
location, 
school bus 
location 
Vehicle 
equipment for 
vehicle-to-
vehicle 
communication 
Reliable 
detection 
systems, 
reliable radio 
transmitter & 
receiver  
No in-vehicle 
warning 
 
Not detecting 
school children 
after leaving or 
before entering 
a school bus 
Swedish 
pilot 
3. In-car 
curve speed 
warning 
(rural roads) 
Self-explaining 
system  
Safe curve 
speed 
calculated 
based on curve 
geometry and 
weather 
conditions 
Vehicle 
autonomous 
Current speed, 
curve 
geometry, 
environmental 
data, vehicle 
characteristics 
Digital maps, 
vehicle sensors 
Reliable 
updated data 
basis for 
infrastructure 
conditions, 
algorithms for 
calculating safe 
speed 
No in-vehicle 
warning 
Inappropriate 
speed in curves 
on rural roads 
- 
4. In-car lane 
departure  
warnings  
(LDWA) 
(motorways) 
Forgiving 
system  
Lane departure 
warnings based 
on lane 
markings + 
road side 
beacons in 
work zone 
Warning 
into vehicle  
 
Lane markings, 
speed, local 
conditions 
(e.g., road 
works) 
Vehicle sensors 
(LDWA) 
Road side 
beacons 
(adaptive 
LDWA) 
Lane markings, 
reliable 
detection 
systems 
(A) No lane 
departure 
warning 
(B) Rumble 
strips no 
measures at 
road works 
Lane departure  
on motorways 
Swedish, 
German,  
Greek 
pilots 
5. Overtaking 
assistant 
“blind spot 
vehicle 
detection” 
(more than 
1 lane per 
direction) 
Forgiving 
system 
Warning when 
overtaking 
while vehicle 
approaching 
from behind 
Vehicle 
autonomous 
Position and 
speed of 
vehicle 
approaching in 
blind spot, 
current speed  
Vehicle sensors 
for detection of 
vehicle behind 
Reliable 
detection 
systems 
No overtaking 
assistance 
Overseeing 
vehicle 
approaching 
from behind 
while 
overtaking 
- 
6. Overtaking 
assistant 
oncoming 
vehicle 
detection 
(1 lane per 
direction) 
Forgiving 
system  
Warning when 
overtaking 
with oncoming 
traffic 
Vehicle-to-
vehicle 
communi-
cation 
Location and 
speed of own 
vehicle and 
oncoming 
traffic 
Vehicle sensors, 
equipment for 
vehicle-to-
vehicle 
communication 
Reliable 
detection and 
communication 
systems 
No overtaking 
assistance 
Overseeing 
oncoming 
traffic while 
overtaking 
- 
Source: IN-SAFETY project team (Macharis et al., 2008:37). 
 
• Deriving and exploring the stakeholder priorities 
 
Stakeholder priorities were derived in both steps of the IN-SAFETY project according 
to the criteria set shown in Figure 1. Experts derived scores at the lowest level of the 
value structure, i.e., when comparing actions (at level 4) in terms of their contribution to 
criteria (shown at level 3). As regards the level of the criteria (level 3), priorities or 
weights (i.e., the relative importance of the stakeholders’ objectives) (shown at level 2) 
were derived by the stakeholders themselves. To this end, the pairwise comparison 
mechanism of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) of Saaty (1977, 1986, 1988, 1995) 
was used. This is an interactive tool whereby respondents (i.e., stakeholder 
representatives) compare the elements at a lower level (i.e., the criteria) in terms of their 
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contribution to a higher-level element (i.e., stakeholder objectives) using a nine point 
scale. These pairwise comparisons are then aggregated so as to obtain local and global 
relative priorities. This was done using the eigenvector method underlying Saaty’s AHP 
method. 
At the end of the first step (which was related to the evaluation of alternative venues 
for the design of the innovative systems), we obtained a prioritisation in terms of the 
three actors or stakeholders. By doing so, it was possible to assess the degree to which 
the preferences of the stakeholders (users and manufacturers) are conflicting or 
converging and to which extent they are compatible with the priorities in terms of a 
public policy point of view (stakeholder “society”). The conclusion from the latter point 
of view was that alternatives focused on speeding are considered the most desirable. 
However, these systems are not considered desirable from the point of view of the 
manufacturers or users. Manufacturers consider the autonomous, infrastructure-based 
alternatives (e.g., traffic signs, separation of lanes by rumble strips, VMS signalling the 
danger of the bend, audible delineation, etc.) to be the most desirable. This is mainly 
caused by the liability problems involved in vehicle alternatives, which is the most 
important criterion for the manufacturers. Users most often rank the vehicle-related 
alternatives (e.g., advanced cruise control, lane departure warning assistant) at the 
bottom (with the exception of alternatives regarding bends and failure while 
overtaking). To a large extent, this is caused by the costs accruing to the user, and also 
to the relatively smaller effects on driver safety, as these are the most important criteria 
for the user. 
The insights obtained at the end of the first phase were then used to select a set of 
more concrete implementation scenarios. These were also submitted to a prioritisation 
in terms of the different stakeholder objectives (in step 2). The most striking conclusion 
from the final prioritisation in step two is the high discrepancy among stakeholder 
priorities for some scenarios, whereas for other scenarios this discrepancy was rather 
low. For instance, for scenario no. 6 (overtaking assistant with oncoming vehicle 
detection) and scenario no. 3 (safe curve speed warning), discrepancy is high. These 
scenarios are considered to be good in terms of societal objectives, but not in terms of 
manufacturers’ objectives. Manufacturers consider the risk associated with these 
scenarios as too high, in particular the liability risk, but also the investment risk and the 
risk of technical non-feasibility. Although this scenario has some market potential, it is 
not likely to hit the market in the near future. Further research is, therefore, needed to 
make this application more reliable and to reduce the risks associated with it. Here, 
policy makers should consider what measures could be taken to address the 
manufacturer’s hesitations with respect to the possible liability risks. 
A scenario receiving a good overall priority from the various stakeholders is, 
however, scenario no. 1 (VMS info into vehicle). This scenario will, therefore, more 
easily be implemented in the market through market forces, without the need for 
substantial governmental intervention.  
Another striking conclusion is obtained regarding the scenario no. 2 (school bus ahead 
warning), ranked at the bottom from society’s point of view. Accidents with children 
running out of a school bus only represent a small portion of the total number of 
accidents. Manufacturers, however, consider this scenario as being low risk. 
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5.3 Case study 2: the DHL project 
 
Another interesting case study is the possible operating and infrastructural extension 
of the air freight carrier DHL9 at Brussels (Zaventem) International Airport (Dooms et 
al., 2007a; Dooms et al., 2007b). This case was a highly conflictual one and was 
discussed extensively in the Belgian press during the period spanning September and 
October 2004. The Province of Flemish Brabant commissioned the study, and wanted to 
use the results as an input into a strategic decision-making process regarding the 
location of DHL’s future activities. A multi-stakeholder perspective was explicitly 
pursued, as the decision to be taken would have a substantial impact on the economic 
and natural environment. The stakeholders identified below were in a position to 
influence substantially the achievement of the company’s objectives. 
The alternative strategies to be evaluated using a multi-actor MCA were: (1) a pan-
European consolidation strategy with Brussels (Zaventem) airport as a super-hub, 
concentrating all European traffic at Brussels airport, whereby an environmental permit 
allowing for 35,000 night flights per year would be required, (2) a West-European 
expansion strategy with Brussels as one of the multi-hubs (requiring a permit for 25,000 
night flights per year), i.e., with the continuous existence of capacity in other regional 
sub-hubs in Europe; and (3) the further development of DHL in an external super-hub, 
which implied the relocation of the DHL hub from Brussels International Airport to e.g., 
Leipzig in Germany and a downgrading of the Brussels airport to a spoke in the DHL 
network (requiring only 13,000 movements a year). 
The stakeholders identified in this case study were: (1) the air freight carrier DHL; (2) 
the airport operator BIAC (Brussels International Airport Company); (3) the Belgian 
Government; and (4) the local community affected by the project. DHL was interested 
in criteria such as proximity to the market, market share growth and international 
logistics optimization. BIAC was interested in profitability, diversification of the traffic 
portfolio, high value-added activities, balanced growth and positioning of the airport. 
The government was interested in socio-economic criteria (value added, employment, 
regional competitiveness) and ecological objectives (health costs for government). The 
local community was interested in local employment and minimizing health impacts. 
A prioritization of the three alternative strategies in terms of each separate stakeholder 
was performed through the MCA. The application of this methodology clearly 
highlighted the conflictual nature of the decision-making context, in particular regarding 
the role of the Belgian government. As regards the super-hub position, the ranking in 
terms of the local community’s objectives turned out to be diametrically opposed to the 
ranking in terms of DHL’s objectives. The final results of this study turned out to be 
highly sensitive, which means that changing the weights of the criteria (or changing the 
stakeholder perspective) resulted in a vastly different final ranking. An interesting 
conclusion was related to the introduction of different time horizons into the analysis. 
With a 2012 time horizon, the global preference10 was for the multi-hub expansion, 
whereas a time horizon expanding to 2023 meant a shift of the global preference 
towards the super-hub choice. Such a shift was due to the capacity constraints faced by 
                                                 
9
 The abbreviation DHL stands for “Dalsey, Hillblom and Lynn”, founders of the DHL company. 
10
 In this case, the global preference was simply measured as the unweighted average preference of the 
various stakeholder groups considered. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 47 (2011): 3-24 
 
 
21 
DHL and BIAC in the short run that could be alleviated in the post-2012 period. On the 
basis of these findings it was concluded that the government had to provide a legal-
institutional framework with a time horizon stretching to 2023 that could secure the 
long-term growth of DHL’s activity (in terms of number of night flights allowed), 
especially after 2012. Without such a framework, the hub-activities of DHL would be 
relocated to another airport. In the short run, towards 2012, the MCA showed that 
Brussels airport had to be protected as a node in DHL’s multi-hub network. 
Another complication in this case was that “the government” in fact consisted of 
several layers of public agencies, namely the Belgian federal government, the 
governments of the Flemish and Brussels regions, the province and various 
municipalities. As it took too long to achieve a consensus among these different 
governments DHL finally decided to opt for the external super-hub choice in Leipzig. 
When interpreting the DHL case through an institutional lens, as outlined in earlier 
sections of this paper, it becomes obvious that the absence of an adequate institutional 
framework was an essential factor in this case. The key problem regarding night flights 
in Europe is that the institutional framework (in particular as regards acceptable noise 
level standards) is not uniform across countries or regions within countries. Each 
country and region applies different standards. Such differences in standards are even 
used by some governments to attract airport activities to their region. Once again, this is 
an example (just like in the Iron Rhine case referred to in section 4) of the institutional 
framework influencing the performance of a company as well as the results that would 
be obtained by using neo-classical evaluation instruments such as private investment 
analysis (PIA) or social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA). On a more positive note, it 
should be emphasized that the institutional framework is subject to change, and that 
neo-classical concepts such as (changes in) marginal utility can influence the 
institutional equilibrium in the future. For instance, in the case of the DHL company, 
which relocated its main hub to Leipzig, the extra activity (and ensuing income and 
jobs) were very much welcomed by the local population and the government of that 
region, as income levels per capita are rather low there. However, as income levels rise 
in the Leipzig region in the future, it can be expected that the preferences of the local 
population and government may change. The marginal utility of a higher income will 
decrease (as income becomes less scarce), whereas the marginal utility of enjoying 
environmental amenities may increase (as these become more scarce). Here, changes 
measured in terms of neo-classical concepts (or instruments) also affect the broader 
institutional context. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have shown that multi-criteria analysis (MCA), and in particular the multi-actor 
multi-criteria analysis can be usefully applied within an institutional approach to project 
evaluation. Stakeholders represent the linking pin between MCA as an evaluation tool 
and the institutional approach to project assessment. Institutional aspects are also 
present in the conventional, neo-classical approach to project evaluation, in particular 
when applying social cost-benefit analyses (SCBA), but only implicitly, so that they are 
usually neglected. In the MCA, however, institutional aspects are made explicit. This 
holds especially for the degree to which stakeholder preferences are conflicting or 
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converging. A well-designed implementation path (e.g., based on government 
incentives or a social marketing campaign) for alternatives characterized by diverging 
stakeholder priorities can increase the implementation potential of these alternatives. 
Indeed, stakeholder preferences are mostly dynamic and path-dependent. Hence, from 
an evolutionary perspective, the level of conflict may be lower in a second-round 
application of the MCA. In order to guarantee that the institutional approach, in 
particular the application of MCA, would lead to a social optimum that is 
distributionally neutral, state intervention is important. The latter should, inter alia, 
increase the bargaining power of weak actors. Only in such a case will a collective 
benefit or public good emerge (as a by-product) from the individual actions of self-
interested stakeholders. We illustrated this stakeholder-driven, institutional approach 
through the use of some recent case-studies.  
The more systematic application of a carefully designed, stakeholder-driven MCA as 
described in this contribution can improve substantially the quality of decision-making 
processes. Large transport projects associated with substantial conflicts in terms of 
diverging stakeholder objectives would greatly benefit from a more systematic 
application of such a method. Indeed, just as it is now a legal requirement to assess a 
project’s impact on the natural environment, one could argue that it should be 
mandatory to assess its impact on stakeholder objectives. In the realm of environmental 
project effects, the tool of (strategic) environmental impact assessment (S)EIA aims to 
“create” more effective alternatives that provide a better fit with the natural 
environment. Stakeholder impact analysis could have a similar effect on the 
“environment” (or community) of stakeholders. By bringing together all stakeholders in 
a carefully designed forum, and through applying the method presented in this paper, it 
may become much easier to construct and implement solutions acceptable to the 
community of stakeholders, thereby creating value added for society as a whole. 
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Abstract 
 
In this article we present a model for transforming a car-based mobility system into a more sustainable 
one. It is based on visions of sustainable mobility, the use of strategic experiments and special 
programmes for system innovation, to complement transport policies such as road pricing, emission 
standards and so on. The article does three things: it describes the model of transition management as a 
model for transformation and where it comes from, it offers recommendations for mobility policy derived 
from transition thinking, and it discusses the uptake of transition thinking in policy and practice. The 
conclusion is that transition management helps various actors to be more engaged with long-term change, 
but that a process of re-institutionalisation is needed to make serious progress to systems of mobility 
which combine user benefits with societal benefits. 
 
Keywords: Sustainable mobility; Transition management. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Road transport produces a number of problems which have proven difficult to deal 
with: emissions, congestion, noise, unsafety, landscape fragmentation and dependency 
on oil. To deal with these problems transport experts have proposed several solutions: 
support of cleaner cars, road pricing and other forms of mobility management, higher 
fuel prices and other measures to internalize external costs, promotion of public 
transport and non-motorised forms of transport, traffic and transport information, 
promotion of teleworking and the use of urban planning and spatial planning limiting 
the need for transport (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999; Banister et al., 2000; Rietveld 
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and Stough, 2004; Banister, 2005; Docherty and Shaw, 2007; Holden 2007; Banister, 
2008). 
With regards to safety and non-CO2 emissions some successes have been achieved 
through regulations. Attempts to promote public transport and reduce car traffic 
however have more or less failed. It has proved impossible in car-based societies to 
create transport systems that are attractive for users and attractive for society as a whole 
in the sense of reduced negative impacts. Given that most of the problems are related to 
automobility, the question arises whether the existing transport system can be 
transformed into something more sustainable. 
In this article we present a model for transforming a car-based mobility system into a 
more sustainable one. It is based on visions of sustainable mobility, the use of strategic 
experiments and special programmes for system innovation, to complement transport 
policies such as road pricing, emission standards and so on. The model for 
transformation is transition management. According to those involved in its creation, 
transition management is a new mode of governance that aims to resolve persistent 
problems in societal systems, including a policy model to influence long term societal 
change (Rotmans et al., 2001; Rotmans, 2005, 2003; Loorbach 2007; Loorbach & 
Rotmans, 2006; Kemp and Loorbach, 2005). The basic premise is that sustainable 
development requires transitions: non-linear processes of social change in which a 
societal system is structurally transformed (Rotmans, 2003). 
In this article we set out to do three things: i) we offer a discussion why something 
like transition management is needed for sustainable mobility, ii), we present research 
findings based on a multilevel transition perspective, and iii) we offer a discussion of 
experiences with transition management in the Netherlands in the area of transport: 
what it is doing and also what it is not doing. 
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we offer a discussion of why it has 
proved so difficult to change car-based forms of mobility and why a different approach 
may be needed, one that is more forward-looking, informed by visions, and adaptive, 
evolving with experiences and which deals with issues of lock-in. In section 3 we 
present the model of transition management and recommendations about mobility 
policy based on transition thinking. In Section 4 we look at how transition thinking is 
being taken up by various actors in the Netherlands. We describe the rise of transition 
concepts in the Dutch policy arena, how these concepts were integrated in various 
research and development programs, and how these applications are being monitored, 
evaluated and studied. We study this in three contexts: national energy policy, national 
mobility policy, and an innovation programme for sustainable mobility in the 
Netherlands. In the last section, we give a summary of our findings. 
 
 
2. The need for a transition approach dealing with lock-in 
 
In the EU passenger cars account of three quarter of total passenger transport; this 
share is believed to stay constant according to the Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport of the EU in their memo “Keep Europe Moving” of June 2006. 
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Figure 1: Expected evolution of modal split in passenger transport 2000 -20201. 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/transport_policy_review/doc/2006_transport_policy_review_memo_en.pdf. 
 
Car use is facilitated by many factors: car ownership, the decline of public transport, 
the possibility to combine different tasks such as going to work, dropping off children at 
school, picking them up and filling the trunk of the car with groceries, to name just 
three factors. Car use co-evolved with life style changes and was facilitated by 
government policies and motor car associations. Car use came with all kind of problems 
including problems for car users. Car users became aware of those problems but in 
general, people have been disinclined to give up the use of cars because they pollute, 
contribute to global warming and degrade urban life. They are even disinclined to give 
up their car when the use of cars creates problems for themselves, such as time losses 
from congestion and high costs. As Sheller (2004: 236) writes: “Cars will not easily be 
given up just (!) because they are dangerous to health and life, environmentally 
destructive, based on unsustainable energy consumption, and damaging to public life 
and civic space. Too many people find them too comfortable, enjoyable, exciting, even 
enthralling. They are deeply embedded in ways of life, networks of friends and sociality, 
and moral commitments to family and care for others”.2 
Many policies have been formulated and implemented to restrict and reduce the side-
effects of cars. Road traffic deaths per million passenger miles have fallen in many 
countries but the level of casualties is still high (in 2005 in the EU 43358 people were 
killed in road accidents, down from 50396 in 2001).3 The compulsory use of the 
catalytic converter helped to reduce hydrocarbon emissions and nitrogen oxide 
emissions but the use of the catalytic converter increased fuel use and CO2 emissions. 
The Euro 5 standards for cars will further restrict emissions, from both petrol and diesel 
cars, of carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and 
particulate matters (PM), which are considered harmful to human health. The tighter 
standards apply as of September 2009 for new models of cars and as of January 2011 
for all new cars.4  
                                                 
1
 An overview of differences in transport modes can be found in Eurostat’s Panorama of transport 2009. 
An explanation of those differences goes beyond the scope of this paper. Such differences are caused by 
transport policy in any simple way. Transport policy is co-evolving with mobility needs and patterns. 
2
 The dominance of the internal combustion engine is an important cause for the carbon lock-in (Unruh, 
2000). Cheap fossil fuels are a factor in the dominance of the ICE, there is a symbiotic relationship. Lock-
in can only be understood systemically. 
3
 http://www.etsc.eu/documents/copy_of_copy_of_copy_of_Road%20deaths%202001-2005.pdf. 
4
 http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/euro-5-emissions-standards-cars/article-133325. 
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In almost all rich countries the share of public transport (railways, busses, metro) has 
fallen, and, as shown in Figure 1, DG energy and transport of the European Commission 
expects it to fall to even lower levels in the next ten years in Europe, despite large 
amounts of public support.  
Having failed at achieving a modal split, governments have pushed alternative engine 
cars. One of the strongest push for this has been in California where the California Air 
Resource Board created a market for zero emission vehicles through commercialization 
regulations. The promotion of zero emission vehicles was part of the regulatory 
programme Low Emission Vehicles which started in 1990. The Mandate requires that 
by 1998 at least 2% of the vehicles offered for sale in California should be Zero 
Emission Vehicles (ZEVs), increasing to 5% in 2001 and 10% in 2003.5  
In this particular case the regulator (being a quasi-independent board) wanted to 
jumpstart a market for electric vehicles for air quality reasons and industrial policy 
reasons. Officially CARB took a technology-neutral approach to achieving emissions 
control (Hoogma, 2000, p. 253) but in reality the board engaged in technology issues 
and was willing to push for certain technology solutions as the following statement 
shows: 
 
We purposefully push technology as part of our regulatory programme and 
that’s what we do with clean cars, clean fuels. We’ve approached it from a 
systems standpoint because we kept getting the argument by the auto makers, 
we’re not going to do this until we get the fuel, and the fuel folks are saying 
we’re not going to do this unless there’s the cars (interview, Air Resources 
Board, 30 march 1993 by Grant, emphasis added by the authors). 
 
The mandate was a unique phenomenon, occurring in a region subject to severe 
problems of air pollution. The regulators were led into believing that electric vehicles 
were close to commercial use, mistakenly as it turned out. In effect, the Mandate created 
a window of opportunity for battery electric vehicles but did not lead to a sizable market 
for such vehicles. In the 1996-2001 period, the Mandate has been revised three times (in 
March 1996 when the 1998-2002 requirements were dropped, in 1998 when ZEV 
credits could be earned through partial electric vehicles and in 2001). Industry efforts 
shifted towards hybrid electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles, which appear to be the 
beneficiaries of the window of opportunity created by the Mandate. The mandate was an 
enlightened attempt at forced commercialisation, which more or less failed.  
Today battery electric cars are back on the policy agenda. In the last 1.5 year, several 
governments have expressed a willingness to support the introduction of electric cars 
(Israel, Denmark, the UK, The Netherlands). In a sense, innovation support and 
emissions control always has proven easier than to reduce motor car traffic. At the local 
level, however, several cities did engage in active transport policy aimed at 
discouraging car use in problem areas (mostly city centres) in the form of one way 
streets, parking restrictions and tariffs, traffic calming measures, bus lanes, special 
infrastructure for bicycles and the use of road pricing. Some of the measures, such as 
the congestion charge scheme introduced in the centres of London, received a great deal 
of attention. Light rail systems have been introduced in cities such as Bordeaux and 
Grenoble, quite successfully it seems. On the whole, policies efforts have resulted in 
                                                 
5
 The 1998 requirements correspond with 30,000-40,000 vehicles. CARB expected that by 2010 70% of 
all vehicles in southern California would be electric (Hoogma, 2000, p. 258). 
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only small reductions in car-based mobility, which continued to grow in Europe 
(Eurostat, 2009). 
Rather than discussing particular initiatives to make transport more sustainable we 
want to offer an explanation why it is to so difficult to change car-based mobility 
systems (first goal). And we want to present ideas for changing car-based mobility 
systems based on transition thinking, which holds that governments should be 
concerned with creating a different regime for mobility, based on visions of sustainable 
mobility. 
The reason that car-based mobility is so dominant is not because cars help you to get 
quicker from place A to B, or that it is the cheapest form of transport; quite often both 
things are not true. For short distances walking and bicycles are cheap alternatives and 
for long-distances high-speed trains and airplanes (i.e., collective modes of travel) are 
often quicker alternatives. Most car users own a car but cars can be rented on a per ride 
basis, people may share rides, cars could be used by others, and they may be used for 
certain trips only. 
Why then does this not happen? It is impossible to give an exhaustive explanation for 
this, but the reasons have to do with the need for multiple changes: in infrastructure, 
economic incentives, better public transport (light rail and fast trains), public transport 
services (for example, dial-a-ride services), public bikes being available for use, and the 
decision to no longer own a car but to rent it, something which would encourage a more 
selective use of cars. Other alternatives are underdeveloped and less well represented in 
the political process. Intermodal mobility depends on the intermodality of transport 
systems such as the presence of P+R, the existence of traveling and traffic information 
systems that inform people about how they may reach their destination with the help of 
different modes of transport but intermodality is weakly developed and not forcefully 
supported. There is no association for it. Car drivers don’t ask for it and as a public 
transport user you would have no idea who to turn to for this. Even when people in their 
everyday life use different modes of transport (often in combination), presently there is 
no regime for intermodal travel, there are no organisations one can turn to, no one 
assumes responsibility for services towards this end, transport systems are not organised 
towards this end. Equally, there are no powerful actors behind slow modes of transport. 
Bicycling associations have no political clout. Car users are not asking for this; even 
those who are unhappy about the many negative effects see it as a necessary evil. We 
are locked into the use of cars. 
 
 
3. Transition research about mobility 
 
The issue of creating alternative regimes that are more desirable from a welfare point 
of view is something that is central to work by “transition researchers”. In the last eight 
years a literature developed in which the term transition is defined and in which 
possibilities for managing transition are examined. The first study to do so was the 
ICIS-MERIT study “Transitions and transition management” in the Netherlands 
(Rotmans et al., 2000). 
The work of Frank Geels and his Eindhoven colleagues Johan Schot, Rob Raven and 
Geert Verbong on socio-technological transitions is one trajectory of scholarship 
(Geels, 2002, 2004, 2005; Geels and Kemp, 2006; Geels and Raven, 2006, 2007; Geels 
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and Schot 2007, 2008), to be distinguished from the scholarship on societal transitions, 
developed by Jan Rotmans and Derk Loorbach first at ICIS, later at DRIFT, and the 
work by SPRU researchers Adrian Smith, Andy Stirling and Frans Berkhout (Berkhout 
et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2005; Smith and Stirling, 2010).6 
What unites the various transition approaches is that transitions are viewed as the 
outcomes of developments at the micro, meso and macro level. The micro level is the 
level of practices, situated in a context of product regimes, regulatory regimes, science 
and research regimes (conceptualised as meso structures), and the overall macro 
landscape of values, infrastructures etcetera as the broader context (Geels, 2002, 2005; 
Rotmans, 2005; Grin et al., 2010). A graphical presentation of the three levels is given 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Multiple levels as a nested hierarchy. 
Source: Geels (2002, p. 1261). 
 
According to the scheme, novelties emerge in niches, particular domains of use, actor 
constellations and geography. The novelty may be a new practice, a new technology or 
special government intervention. These niches are part of a broader world. What 
happens in the niche is shaped by external developments. For example, the use of 
bicycles or electric cars is shaped by the road infrastructure, priority rules, fiscal 
measures, climate change societal concerns and the economics of using other means of 
transport. These developments not only shape the willingness of individuals to engage 
in the use of a bicycle or electric car but also shape the expectations and strategies of 
companies and government. 
Novelties must compete with well-developed alternatives. In the transition 
perspective this competition is conceptualised as a niche-regime interaction process. In 
transport there is a regime of automobility and a separate regime of public transport. 
There are also taxis and there is intermodal travel and bicycle use but these are not 
regimes in themselves in the sense that there are powerful actors behind them and that 
they have an element of autonomy. The regime notion is a difficult notion for empirical 
                                                 
6
 Important contributions in the form of commentaries have been made by Shove (2004), Meadowcroft 
(2007), Shove and Walker (2007, 2008)  
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research. Truffer et al (2008, p. 1361) define a regime as a “a mutually aligned, 
established set of technological artefacts, use patterns, institutional contexts, 
regulations, infrastructures etc. that prevail for delivering a specific service, e.g. 
personal mobility”. 
A useful attempt to determine whether something is a regime or not, is offered by 
Holz et al (2008). They distinguish 5 characteristics of a regime: 1) there is a clear goal 
in the sense of functionality for users and society that is being fulfilled (such as the 
function of mobility), 2) many things are being combined and aligned with each other, 
3) stability (actors do not suddenly orient themselves to something completely 
different), 4) there is no central actor in charge or everything, and 5) several regime 
dimensions have relative autonomy (technology, users/markets, policy, science, culture) 
(Holz et al., 2008).7 
The third level of the multilevel perspective is the sociotechnical landscape. The 
landscape is the wider context of practices and regimes. It is being composed of 
infrastructure and other physical aspects (houses, cities, ...), systems of governance, 
political associations, regulations, societal values, beliefs, societal concerns, the issues 
selected for attention, the media, and prices and incomes, social security and so on 
(c.f., Geels, 2002, 2005) – as general background variables for transport and the car 
mobility regime. 
A visual representation of multilevel interaction is given in figure 3. 
The multilevel perspective is an attempt to take account of processes of mutual 
shaping and the cumulative nature of change, leading to dominant practices, types of 
knowledge and organisations. Transitions are viewed as the outcome of pressures on 
product regimes (cultural criticisms, regulations) and the development of alternative 
systems, elements of which are originating in niches, but breaking out of these thanks to 
learning economies, support from various actors (including incumbent companies, 
politicians, civil society) and various processes of alignment. The focus is stability and 
change. To explain stability the notion of regime is used, which says that we are locked 
in car-based modes of transport because societies have adapted themselves to their use 
in terms of car ownership, infrastructure, training and knowledge, regulations, practices 
and cultural acceptance.8 
                                                 
7
 The term regime is preferred over the more widely applied concept of a system. The reason for 
preferring the regime concept is that the system concept has a much more technical connotation and is 
rather functionalistic, thus overlooking the ways in which automobility is reproduced socially (by 
interests, ways of thinking and social practices) as well as technologically: “To speak of a system is to 
convey the impression of something autopoietic, a set of interlocking features which reinforce each other, 
and where elements in the system emerge for functional reasons, to correct ‘imbalances’ or to ‘improve 
performance’ of the system as a whole. (…) While this may work as a metaphorical description, as an 
explanation it leaves crucial features out of the picture. The notion of system tends to underplay collective 
human agency in the production of automobility and to avoid the political questions about the shaping of 
the automobile ‘system’. (…) We therefore propose to speak not of a system, but of a regime of 
automobility. Speaking of a regime allows us not only to emphasize the systemic aspects of automobility 
but also to bring out the relations of power that make this system possible. At the same time, it attempts to 
avoid the sense of closure in the notion of system, where its internal relations, feedback mechanisms, 
create a closed loop reproducing its logic relentlessly” (Böhm et al., 2006, pp. 5-6). 
8
 The regime concept also helps to explain why public transport did not developed into mobility 
organizations offering a variety of mobility services, and why they did little to improve the quality of 
services in terms of experiences: they were locked into a functional way of thinking of running busses, 
trains and trams rather than offering mobility services. High speed trains are a positive development by 
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Figure 3: A dynamic multi-level perspective on system innovations. 
Source: Geels (2002, p. 1263). 
 
The systemic perspective of transition studies requires a certain holistic view that 
acknowledges the interaction between human and non-human aspects. The influence on 
societal systems is not only economical, ecological and technological, but also social, 
cultural, institutional and political. Cultural change interacts with technical change 
through social processes in a sociotechnical and economic landscape, in which policy is 
not an exogenous force but part and parcel of the change process it seeks to manage. As 
societal systems are complex (e.g. interactions at the micro-level have unintended 
effects at the macro-level) and open (i.e. adaptive to the systems’ surroundings), these 
systems have certain dynamics of their own which no actor or group of actors can 
control. 
The transition perspective has been applied retrospectively in a case-study on the 
transition from sailing ships to steam ships (Geels, 2002, 2004) and two studies about 
car mobility: the development of the Dutch highway system (Geels, 2007) and the 
societal embedding of cars in Dutch society (Geels and Schot, 2008). Therein the 
                                                                                                                                               
containing various attractive features for users: sensations of high speed, comfort, possibilities for 
relaxation, electric sockets for laptops and other electronic devices, restaurant services and quiet coaches 
in which GSM use is forbidden. 
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authors note the role of a car association and the role of buses and mopeds facilitating 
car use by allowing people to gain experience with motorized transport, thus ‘wetting 
the appetite’ for cars as an interesting explanation. A prospective application of the 
transition perspective is Elzen et al. (2004) where the authors come up with two 
scenarios for future passenger transport, one based on green cars, and one based on 
customised mobility. 
An early attempt to apply transition management ideas to the field of mobility policy 
was made by transition researchers Kemp and Rotmans (Kemp & Rotmans, in: Elzen et 
al.: 2004). The authors criticised Dutch policies on sustainable mobility for being too 
oriented on technological fixes, for being too fragmented and opportunistic, with 
experiments being carried out more or less ad hoc, without a coherent future vision and 
without sustainability considerations (Kemp and Rotmans, 2004, p.154). Transition 
management was proposed as a new mode of governance to orient policy and societal 
interactions in the field of mobility more towards transitional change. The authors made 
a plea to orient policy more towards long-term “solutions” (development paths) that are 
attractive from a user and societal sustainability point of view. The following list of 
guiding visions was proposed as areas worthy of sustained policy support: 
 
1. Customised mobility: the selective use of cars in combination with other modes of 
transport; individualised public transport, mobility centres and organised car 
sharing would be part of this trajectory. 
2. Mobility management: the management of traffic streams through highway entry 
control, road pricing, cars automatically following each other at short distance 
using sensors and safety control, information services, electronic zone access 
management systems using transponders (devices that transmits a predetermined 
message in response to a predefined received signal) to control access to city 
centres, parking policy, possibly the use of tradable mobility credits where people 
get mobility rights which they can either use or sell.  
3. Cleaner cars: low-emission internal combustion cars, electric vehicles (hybrid 
vehicles of full electric vehicles powered by batteries or fuel cells,) urban cars, 
long-distance energy efficient cars with gas turbines. 
4. Underground transport: this may take various forms including the radical option 
of vacuum pipes for transporting capsules 
5. Teleworking: working from home or a local ‘telecentre’, using modern computer 
communication, and teleconferencing, reducing the need for commuting but, as a 
rebound effect, possibly leading to increased travel outside work.  
6. Spatial planning limiting the need for transport: compact cities, the (re)location of 
office buildings close to (public) transport nodes. 
 
The authors not only looked at technology but also at policy and governance. In terms 
of policy and governance, the authors argued for the use of: 
 
− long-term goals and sustainability visions; 
− social experiments with promising technologies and creation of niches for 
promising technologies; 
− flexible programmes for system innovation; 
− the institutionalisation of a long-term innovation agenda based on ideas from 
innovative outsiders (Kemp & Rotmans, 2004; pp. 158-161).  
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The publications of Elzen et al and Kemp and Rotmans were first attempts at applying 
transition thinking to the issue of sustainable mobility. In the KSI programme 2004-
2010 further work was done on transition management as a model of reflexive 
governance for sustainable development (Kemp and Loorbach, 2006, Loorbach, 2007, 
Rotmans and Loorbach, 2009). This model came to be known as the “DRIFT” model of 
transition management for the reason that Rotmans, Loorbach and Kemp worked or 
have worked at DRIFT. 
Evaluating, 
monitoring and 
learning
(monitoring)
Developing 
sustainability 
visions and joint 
strategies 
(agenda)
Mobilizing actors and executing 
projects and experiments 
(experiments)
Problem structuring and  
organizing multi-
actor network 
(arena)
Transition 
Management
Cycle
 
Figure 4: The Transition Management cycle. 
Source: Loorbach (2007). 
 
The model of transition management is a model of multilevel governance (Loorbach, 
2007), which tries to “modulate” evolutionary processes of variation, selection and 
retention (Kemp et al., 2007). As explained in Loorbach (2007), the model of transition 
management makes use of “bottom-up” developments and “top-down” long-term goals 
both at the national and local level. Visions of sustainability are being explored, in an 
adaptive manner, using experiments and programmes for system innovation. The basic 
philosophy is goal-oriented modulation: the utilisation of ongoing developments for 
societal goals. Transition management does not consist of a step plan but uses certain 
broad heuristics, which are depicted in the Figure 4. 
Visions of sustainability are explored in transition arenas, involving actors from 
government, business and civil society interested in transitional change. The 
government has a role as process manager, dealing with issues of collective orientation 
and adaptation of policy. It also has a responsibility for the undertaking of strategic 
experiments and programmes for system innovation. The basic idea behind transition 
management is to start a process of change, which is oriented towards the creation of 
new regimes. Policy choices are made “along the way” on the basis of learning 
experiences at different levels. 
Behind transition management are the following elements, as identified by 
Meadowcroft (2007): 
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− making the future more clearly manifest in current decisions, by adopting longer 
time frames, exploring alternative trajectories, and opening avenues for system 
innovation (as well as system improvement). 
− transforming established practices in critical societal subsystems within which 
unsustainable practices are deeply embedded. 
− developing interactive processes where networks of actors implicated in a 
particular production/consumption nexus can come together, develop shared 
problem definitions, appreciate differing perspectives, and above all develop 
practical activities. 
− linking technological and social innovation, because both sorts of change are 
necessary if society is to move on to a more sustainable pathway. 
− ‘learning-by-doing’, developing experiments with novel practices and 
technologies, because it is only by initiating change that we can learn the potential 
(and the limits) of different approaches. 
− tailoring support for technologies to the different phase of the innovation cycle. 
− encouraging a diversity of innovations (‘variation’) and competition among 
different approaches (selection) to fulfil societal needs. 
− assigning an active role to government in mobilizing society to orient change in 
desired directions. 
 
Transition management complements existing policy and seeks to change it. It does 
not necessarily intend to replace mainstream policy; the two processes can ‘co-exist’ 
with transition management acting as a “meta-level instrument to transition a regular 
policy context” (Loorbach, 2007: 272), for example by starting with a “strategic 
transition arena on a small scale to explore alternative visions in an area where 
innovation and innovative visions are scarce” (ibid: 291). This is also referred to as the 
‘two-track approach’9. With time, patience, and a bit of contingency, the transition 
movement may spread out and have transformational influence on the mainstream 
policy. While this type of ‘transitioning’ aims primarily at (government) policy, it also 
affects ongoing projects at operational levels, as one ‘transitioning strategy’ is to “build 
on existing projects and experiments to transition these and by broadening and scaling-
up and (re)defining visions” (ibid: 291-292: emphasis added). 
To us the model is an attractive model for sustainable mobility policy. We think that 
the reliance on evolutionary processes of variation and selection and retention is 
appropriate for sustainable transport policy which should have a forward-looking 
element but also has to evolve with practical experience. Planning based on anticipatory 
rationality has been shown to produce many undesirable results (March and Olsen, 
1995; Scott, 1998). At the same time, some element of planning is required to inject 
collective goals in the market process, which is oriented towards short-term economic 
gains instead of longer-term optimality (Kemp and Soete, 1992). To avoid the 
‘modernistic mistakes’, one might start with acute problems (Lindblom, 1959; 
Meadowcroft, 2005) such as congestion, noise and urban air pollution. A difference 
with existing policy is that one does not seek those problems individually, through 
particular measures, but looks for systemic solutions. 
                                                 
9
 ‘Transitioning’ and the ‘two-track approach’ are much less elaborated than the full-fledged TM-model, 
and are currently being studied both theoretically and empirically by Van der Bosch and Van Raak. 
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Systemic solutions can be developed in close interaction between stakeholders from 
different backgrounds. Many transition initiatives in the field of sustainable mobility in 
the Netherlands are currently undertaken in partnerships between business, government 
and universities (see for instance Etzkowitz 2003). These partnerships require effort and 
input from all partners, which places government sometimes in a double role. On the 
one hand, they are involved in the reproduction of the regime (for instance, through road 
extension projects in the case of automobility), on the other hand, the government takes 
part in initiatives to change the regime. Although this may represent challenges for the 
partners, in practice it does not always result in trouble. When it goes well, major 
benefits arise from this partnership. The involvement of social, political, economic, ánd 
scientific partners means support for change is likely to be much higher than for 
changes developed in individual settings. This relates closely to transition management 
concepts such as the transition arena. Governmental policy is part and parcel of the 
process of change. In the Netherlands transition thinking has been used by the national 
government, which is why it is important to look at how it has been used and what it has 
achieved so far.  
 
 
4. The use of Transition Management thinking in three domains 
 
Originally the ‘transition to sustainable mobility’ was subsumed under the transition 
to sustainable energy, one of the three ‘necessary transitions’ mentioned in the 4th 
Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan in 2001. Subsequently, ‘transition-to-
sustainable-mobility` emerged as a combination of words that has been increasingly 
used throughout the Netherlands. Besides the research community around transition 
studies and transition management, a variety of policy-makers, business-representatives 
and NGO-representatives refer to this ‘transition to sustainable mobility` in both written 
and spoken word. One can distinguish between four main settings in which the concept 
of transition (management) appears in relation to sustainable mobility: a) national 
mobility policy, b) transition research on sustainable mobility, c) the Dutch ‘energy 
transition’ and d) the innovation programme Transumo (Avelino & Kemp, 2008). In 
this subsection we shortly discuss how the concept of transition (management) appears 
in these settings. The aim is to give an overview of how transition management 
concepts emerged in Dutch mobility policy, how researchers and practitioners attempted 
to apply these concepts to the mobility sector, and how these concepts subsequently 
manifested itself in various policy documents, research programmes and innovation 
projects. 
 
4.a. The Ministry of Transport and Dutch Mobility Policy 
 
Details of the use of transition management by the Ministry of Transport and Water 
are described by Nooteboom (2006), who states that the support for transition 
management initially was weak within the Department for Transport of the Ministry. 
Instead of creating a transition platform, an ‘innovation board’ (‘Innovatieberaad’) was 
established informally in 2001 by a handful of civil servants. It was an informal network 
(until 2004), with no budget and little decision-making power. In the first 3 years they 
focused their attention on organizing an EU conference for which they developed a set 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 47 (2011): 25-46 
 
 
37 
of ‘roads to sustainable mobility’. The network was widened to include representatives 
of the ANWB (a Dutch organisation representing the interests of road users and 
tourists), Toyota, Shell, and an environmental NGO. The mind map representing these 
‘roads to sustainable mobility’ was perceived by the members of the innovation board 
as a breakthrough (Nooteboom, 2006, p. 124). The innovation board allowed for 
informal discussions and mutual learning. The members were careful not to cause 
tension with the Ministry, Shell or the automotive industry. Only the members of the 
innovation board, and sometimes their superiors, could see the significance behind the 
scenes of the innovation board (Nooteboom, 2006, p. 125). 
The ‘transition to sustainable mobility’ was mentioned in the cabinet’s Mobility 
Policy Document (‘Nota Mobiliteit’, hereafter referred to as the Policy Document). This 
Policy Document was developed, presented, discussed, adapted and formalised between 
2004 and 2006 in cooperation between the Ministry for Transport and Water (V&W) 
and the Ministry of Housing, Land-use Planning and Environmental Management 
(VROM). It discusses (amongst others) the transition to sustainable mobility and 
mentions transition management as an innovation strategy for the long term, which the 
cabinet chooses in order to “achieve sustainable mobility (…) with a long-term time 
horizon and – related to that – innovation programmes (…) for the short-term”. 
In September 2004 the first section of the Mobility Policy Document mentioned the 
transition concept seven times, introducing it under the chapter on “quality of life and 
sustainable mobility”, with the following text: 
 
The environmental policy of the past 30 year showed good results on many 
fronts. Great environmental improvements have been initiated for motorised 
mobility. However, one cannot say that the bottlenecks will disappear for all 
environmental issues. The goal for the long-term (2030-2050) is that the 
harmful effects of mobility on its surroundings will be brought back to nearly 
zero. This cannot succeed if we keep holding on to the current state of the 
technology. Especially since traffic and transport will still increase 
considerably. The only way to bridge this gap is through a transition to a 
completely new concept for our traffic and transport system. That does not only 
involve large scale innovation in the field of fuel and motor technology, but also 
organisational and societal innovations, that together bring about a world-wide 
system innovation in the field of transport. (p. 118). 
 
In May 2005 the second section was published, which contained the results of the 
public comment and advisory trajectories. In September 2005 the third section – also 
known as the ‘Cabinet’s position’– of the Policy Document on Mobility was published. 
Therein the use of the word ‘transition’ almost doubled (from 7 to 13 times). This was 
mostly due to the addition of text boxes with several ‘future visions’ for 2030 (e.g. 
congestion policy in 2030, public transport in 2030, logistics in 2030, and etcetera). In 
each future vision the ‘transition paths’ towards that future vision were specified. The 
language of ´transition` and ´sustainability` was mostly used in relation to energy and 
climate policy. 
More than half a year later, in April 2006, the fourth part of the Policy Document on 
Mobility was published. The title of the official English translation (June 2006) is 
‘Officially adopted Policy Document’. Interestingly, while the earlier versions explicitly 
mentioned the ‘transition to sustainable mobility’, this shorter ‘officially adopted’ 
Policy Document no longer mentions the word ‘transition’. The word sustainable is 
reduced to only four usages. From this one may draw the conclusion that there is not a 
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strong commitment to transition management for sustainable development at the level 
of national mobility policy. 
In the white paper 'Mobiliteitsaanpak' of October 2008, an investment agenda 
framework document about mobility policy, the term “transition” enters again.10 A 
discourse analysis of this document learned that the term transition is used once, far less 
than the terms sustainability (‘duurzaam’) and sustainable (‘duurzame’) which are used 
14 and 15 times. In this document the term “innovation” is used 35 times. What this 
shows is that the terms sustainability and transition come and go. Both terms suffer 
from fluctuating and fragile degrees of attention. 
What this also demonstrates is that, despite the fluctuations, the Ministry is involved 
with transition management and sustainability. Given the rather recent and still ongoing 
development of TM this is noteworthy, as applying an approach that still possesses the 
uncertainty of all new scientific approaches is risky for a ministry. Application of TM at 
the Ministry is not highly elaborate, or intensively applied. It is one of several 
perspectives that play a role in policy. From interviews with, among others, project 
leaders of innovation programme Transumo and employees of the Ministry it appears 
that a certain interest in sustainable mobility and transition concepts exists, but that this 
interest is coupled with concerns about the downsides of these matters. Sustainability 
and, especially, transition management are often seen as too abstract, too vague, and too 
normative for application in everyday practice. On the other hand, the awareness that a 
long-term perspective is needed for the needed reforms of the mobility sector also 
means that these concerns have not led to a strict rejection of TM. One thing that this 
teaches us is that TM has to connect better with the needs and language of national 
government, and hence make the application of TM more structural. 
 
4.b. The Dutch Energy Transition 
 
The ‘Sustainable Mobility Platform’, is one amongst various other platforms that 
together realise the Dutch ´energy transition`, which is the official name for the new 
approach by government to realise a sustainable energy system (Min EZ, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004). This energy transition is overseen and coordinated by the 
´Interdepartmental Programme Directorate of the Energy Transition` (consisting of six 
ministries) and a ´Taskforce Energy Transition` (composed of representatives from ´the 
top of business community, the government, research organisations, banking, and 
NGOs). The Sustainable Mobility Platform was created in 2005, to define transition 
paths and experiments towards sustainable mobility. 
The platform is composed of representatives from government, an environmental 
NGO, the ANWB, and business representatives (including Shell, BP Netherlands, 
Peugeot Netherlands and DaimlerChrysler). 
Within the platforms people investigated (technological) innovations for sustainable 
mobility. On the basis of the deliberations four transition paths were chosen, deemed 
interesting from a business and sustainability perspective: 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Mobiliteitsaanpak contains the new policy plan for action of the Ministry for Transport and Water. One 
important element is an investment agenda until 2020 of 7 billion euro, 4 billion more than the planned 
investments in the “Nota Mobiliteit” from 2006. 
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− Hybrid and electric vehicles 
− Biofuels 
− Hydrogen Vehicles 
− Intelligent transport systems 
 
The activities of the Sustainable Mobility Platform are part of the energy transition 
process. The chairs of the platforms meet with each other, in the Regieorgaan 
EnergieTransitie, to discuss cooperation and policy issues. For policy coordination a 
special ministerial working group has been set up: the aforementioned Interdepartmental 
Project directorate Energy transition (IPE), created in 2005. Within IPE issues of policy 
coordination are being discussed and dealt with by the secretary generals of six 
ministries: Economic Affairs responsible for innovation policy, energy policy and 
economic policy, Spatial Planning, Housing and Environment (VROM) responsible for 
the environment, Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) responsible 
for mobility, Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) responsible for agriculture, 
fisheries and nature development, Foreign Affairs (BuZA) responsible for foreign 
development aid and biodiversity, and Finance, responsible for the financial aspects of 
the energy transition. 
The platform’s choices are not limitative for innovation in the area of sustainable 
mobility. New initiatives may emerge outside the platforms through parliament or 
because certain powerful parties in society are able to secure policy support for it. An 
example is the programme for battery electric vehicles which was defined by a coalition 
of NGOs, business (Essent, Better Place), finance (ING, Rabo) and the Urgenda, a 
coalition for sustainability action, who successfully lobbied ministers and parliament to 
give special support to BEVs. The Sustainable Mobility Platform was critical about the 
programme; it considered the hybrid-route more promising given the present state of 
development of batteries and thought that the goal of one million battery electric cars in 
2025 was unrealistic. However, it is working constructively with this initiative 
(interview with secretary of Sustainable Mobility Platform Remco Hoogma on 23 July 
2009). 
On the whole it seems that policy coordination has improved in the last five years 
(between 2005 and 2010). For example, battery electric vehicles, hybrid electric 
vehicles and other low-emission vehicles are subject to special fiscal treatment.11 There 
is more cooperation between ministries and between government, business, research and 
civil society. There is also more cooperation between national initiatives and regional 
initiatives. 
The whole energy transition approach is set up as a vehicle for sociotechnical change 
and policy change in a coordinated manner. This is evident from the activities of the 
Regieorgaan and the platforms for 2009. 
                                                 
11
 In the Netherlands many vehicles are leased from companies. People driving a leased vehicle must add 
25% of the value of the car to their income before taxes and pay taxes over this extra sum. If you lease a 
battery electric vehicle, 10% of the value of the car is subjective to income taxes; for hybrid electric 
vehicles it is 14%. Charging points are up for a fiscal advantage of 20%. The tax incentives for cars 
proved very effective: in the first 5 months of 2009, 7456 hybrid electric cars were sold in the 
Netherlands, an increase of 63% compared to the same period in 2008. Between 2008 and 2009 the 
number of HEV doubled: from 11,000 to 23,000.  
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As one can see the platforms produce advice, they take stock of what has been 
achieved, they commission studies and they are involved in all kinds of institutional 
alignment activities (also between the platforms). The platforms are currently working 
with municipal authorities and national government to create pilots for energy neutral 
living districts to learn about alternative energy systems (with the systems going beyond 
particular technologies from the platforms) and to create visibility for the energy 
transition. 
Table 1: Planned activities of the various transition platforms in 2009. 
Platform Planned activities in 2009 
Regieorgaan 
− Production of an official advice on policy, in which they make recommendation 
for instrument choices 
Green resources 
− To follow the implementation of sustainability criteria for biomass  
− Position paper on CO2 allowances for biomass 
− To launch an explorative study into the macroeconomic effects of biomass 
production and use in the Netherlands 
− To develop a systematique for measuring green resources 
Sustainable 
mobility 
− To make recommendations for fiscal treatment of clean vehicles 
− To discuss the action plan on alternative mobility with leasing companies 
− To examine how natural gas and green gas may pave the way for hydrogen 
− Evaluate experiences with buss experiments funded in the first tender 
− To offer advice on how public transport concessions may be used for innovation 
− To assist in the implementation of 5 pilots about smart grids and electric mobility 
− To launch or stimulate pilots for sustainable biofuels (high blends and biogas) and 
hydrogen in five cities in cooperation with Germany and Flanders in Belgium 
New Gas 
− To investigate product-market-combinations for decentralised gas use 
− To commission or undertake a study into the potential of gas motors and 
absorption heat pumps 
Chain efficiency 
− Starting the first phase of the programme for precision agriculture 
− Working out a development plan for process intensification 
Sustainable 
Electricity 
Production 
− Formulate platform positions on off shore energy 
− Rules for co-burning of biomass, cogeneration, and conditions for coal-fired 
plants 
− Implementation the earlier formulated action plan Decentralised infrastructure 
(smart nets) 
− To examine and utilise opportunities in blue energy 
Built 
environment 
− Platform advice about the restructuring of existing business parks 
− Workplan (script) for achieving energy saving using a district-based approach. 
− Investigation of how local authorities may be involved, on a voluntary and less 
voluntary basis.  
Source: Energietransitie. Duurzaam doorgaan. 
 
As one can see the platforms produce advice, they take stock of what has been 
achieved, they commission studies and they are involved in all kinds of institutional 
alignment activities (also between the platforms). The platforms are currently working 
with municipal authorities and national government to create pilots for energy neutral 
living districts to learn about alternative energy systems (with the systems going beyond 
particular technologies from the platforms) and to create visibility for the energy 
transition. 
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Various initiatives for sustainable mobility have been undertaken and supported by 
the Sustainable Mobility Platform. It is interesting to see that in its own description of 
its purpose the Sustainable Mobility Platform does not speak about ‘the transition to 
sustainable mobility’, but rather about ‘the transition to a sustainable energy supply’. 
Next to that, the text on the platform’s website states that the platform aims to ensure 
‘affordable and independent mobility’ as well as ‘sustainability’ as two separate things, 
rather than mentioning ‘sustainable mobility’ as one goal. 
It is unclear to what extent the Sustainable Mobility Platform has impacted the Dutch 
mobility sector so far, and to what extent this points to an application of transition 
management and long-term sustainability goals. The platform does not have an explicit 
vision of what sustainable mobility is or should be. The stated goals of the platform are: 
 
− Factor 2 reduction in GHG emissions from new vehicles in 2015. 
− Factor 3 reduction in GHG emissions for the entire automobile fleet 2035 
 
This shows that it very much oriented towards cleaner cars and not so much to the 
other elements of sustainable mobility noted in Section 1. 
 
4.c. The innovation programme Transumo  
 
The third context in which transition thinking has been applied is the innovation 
programme Transumo. Transumo is an abbreviation for ‘TRAnsition to SUstainable 
Mobility’ and was founded in 2004. 150 organisations from the public, private and 
´knowledge` sectors collaborate in applied research within well over twenty innovation 
projects related to transport and traffic. On its website, Transumo describes its mission 
as follows: 
 
“(…) to accelerate/encourage the transition to sustainable mobility. This will 
be achieved by initiating, and establishing for the long term, a transition process 
that leads to the replacement of the current, supply driven, mono-disciplinary 
technology and knowledge infrastructure, with a demand driven, 
multidisciplinary and trans-disciplinary, participative knowledge 
infrastructure.”12 
 
The Transumo-organisation is part of a broader national programme to improve the 
´knowledge infrastructure` by encouraging and subsidising research programmes that 
specifically aim for applied, multidisciplinary science at the interface between 
knowledge and practice. 
Transumo cooperates with transition researchers from the KSI research programme, a 
20 million Dutch research programme about transitions (in which we ourselves are 
involved). Transumo organised various workshops and sessions on how to be open to 
learning processes and deal with the challenges of the transition to sustainable mobility 
and the application of transition management. During these workshops managers and 
participants from different projects presented their concrete challenges and dilemmas to 
each other, and ´transition researchers` were invited to help structure the discussion and 
offer suggestions on how to move on). For example, in a joint workshop project 
managers were asked to reflect on the following questions: 
                                                 
12
 http://www.transumo.nl/Nl/Organisatie/Missie.aspx 
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− Does the project offer a contribution to a societal problem (challenge)? Which 
challenge is this? 
− Is it informed by a vision of sustainable mobility? Is it designed to learn about this 
vision?  
− Is it part of a transition path? If so, what path?  
− Is it oriented towards demonstration or learning? Does it learn about sustainability 
aspects, markets, how various actors may be enrolled and how the project may be 
scaled up? 
 
Transition aspects are also addressed through a reporting format: project-leaders have 
been required to report whether and how their project ‘contributes to the transition to 
sustainable mobility’, and how transition management is applied. 
These questions and interactions with transition researchers helped people involved in 
Transumo projects to reflect on their project in a novel way. This was found a useful 
exercise by some but not by all. In general the transition concepts are still something 
project-leaders struggle with. In some cases it appears that they use transition 
terminology because they are expected to use it (by Transumo), rather than because they 
want to use it. Even sustainability, which is also in policy much more often used than 
transition, is often not a big concern to many project participants. Attention for 
sustainability has often been brought to the project by the efforts of Transumo and of 
the project-leaders. Transition is in many ways a ‘bridge too far’ for a share of the 
project-participants, and even for some project-leaders. Some project-leaders find it 
difficult to talk about future visions, and even more project-leaders struggle with the 
concept of ‘transition paths’. This does not mean that they are not working on a 
transition to sustainable mobility, but rather that their use of words and framing is not 
explicit about this. 
 
 
5. Summary 
 
In this article we offered a discussion on the question why despite of serious problems 
connected with the use of cars it has proved so difficult for policy makers to deal with 
these problems. It was stated that government officials could benefit from a “transition 
approach” which is informed by visions of sustainable mobility, with learning and 
adaptation as key element. Transition management is not so much an instrument but 
rather a new mode of governance for sustainable development, aimed at resolving 
persistent problems in societal systems, based on visions about how mobility needs can 
be met more sustainably. These processes of societal change, transitions, exist in a 
complex, multi-actor and multi-level setting with diverging time scales and actor 
interests. In these complex societal systems change is not simple a matter of planning 
and management. Transition management starts off from the premise that full control 
and management of societal problems is not possible, but that we can ‘manage’ these 
problems in terms of adjusting, adapting and influencing the societal system by 
organizing a joint searching and learning process, focused on long-term sustainable 
solutions (Rotmans, 2005; Loorbach, 2007). One of the ambitions of transition 
management is to connect innovative minds and enable them to integrate “long-term 
governance activities into the realm of policy-making” (Loorbach, 2007: 104). The 
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transition management literature offers several management principles and instruments 
to help organise such a process, including participative process tools such as integrated 
system analysis and scenario exercises (Loorbach, 2007: 114). These different 
instruments and principles are captured in a cyclical process model (as we described in 
Section 3). 
In recent years the transition management approach has gained a great deal of 
attention from policy-makers, managers and other practitioners in the Netherlands. It 
has been applied in various policy contexts, and to various programmes and projects 
(Loorbach, 2007). In 2001 the concepts of ´transition` and ´transition management` 
were presented in the 4th Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP4). In the 
last eight years, The Ministry of Economic Affairs started using it to change its relation 
with business and to have a more active agenda for energy innovation, aligned with 
climate policy and business creation goals. 
Despite of these developments, there has been relatively little active support for 
transition management within the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management (Nooteboom, 2006). In Section 4 we described that even though concepts 
such as ‘transition’ and ‘sustainable’ were initially addressed and discussed as an 
explicit aim of mobility policy, most of these ideas did not survive the last round of 
policy deliberations resulting in the ‘Officially adopted Policy Document’ in 2006. 
Despite of the relatively weak formal support for transition management within the 
Department for Transport, the idea of ‘a transition to sustainable mobility’ has emerged 
and spread throughout the Netherlands, amongst a variety of policy-makers, business-
representatives and NGO-representatives. Attention for a transition to sustainable 
mobility has primarily manifested in the context of ‘the Dutch energy transition’ (in the 
form of the Sustainable Mobility Platform) and in the context of the innovation 
programme Transumo. 
This article has shown that the transition storyline has some positive power, because it 
has been used in discussions about societal change and motivated several transition 
initiatives, but that the TM-approach so far has not been firmly rooted in policy and 
governance. TM requires a process of re-institutionalisation in which more attention is 
given to sustainability visions for mobility. The use of the term transition may help to 
articulate the complex challenge involved in moving away from present transport 
practices and assist in the creation of a bottom-up and top-down process of change. 
Details of what to do must be defined at different levels by different actors; TM is not a 
tool but a framework for thinking and decision-making. The transition perspective holds 
that policy should be less concerned with short-term outcomes and more concerned with 
long-term outcomes. Institutional capabilities and knowledge have to be created for this. 
Sustainable mobility is likely to require different knowledge and expertise than 
currently is being used. It helps to insert greater reflexivity in systems of governance 
which is a precondition for sustainability mobility. 
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Abstract 
 
Large reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are required in order to avoid the worst impacts of 
climate change. Road transport is a significant contributor to UK CO2 emissions, with the majority arising 
from personal road transport. This paper analyses Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) as a potentially 
powerful climate change policy tool and presents findings from an exploratory survey of public opinion. 
A working model of a PCT scheme with a fixed carbon cap was designed to achieve a 60% reduction of 
CO2 emissions from personal road transport by 2050. A proportion of the annual carbon budget would be 
given to individuals as a free carbon permit allocation. There is an opportunity to sell unused permits. 
Fuel price increases (FPI) were recognised as having the potential to achieve an identical emissions target 
at a much lower cost. 
A series of individual interviews were conducted to explore opinions related to the impacts, 
effectiveness, fairness and acceptability of both measures. Bespoke software was used to record 
behavioural response. The findings indicate that certain design aspects of the PCT scheme led to it being 
preferred to the FPI and suggest that the potential behavioural response to PCT may be greater than for a 
FPI. However, given that the sample was small and biased towards the highly educated and those with 
above average incomes, the findings should be considered as preliminary indications. Further detailed 
research is required. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Climate change is an urgent issue rapidly reaching the top of the political agenda. 
Based on the evidence available, the IPCC (2007) conclude with high confidence that 
the contribution of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to global warming over the last 
three decades has had a significant influence on many physical and biological systems. 
Due to existing atmospheric concentrations, lifetime and quantity of release, Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2) is classified as the most significant GHG (IPCC, 2007). In the UK, road 
transport alone currently accounts for 22% of CO2 emissions, the majority resulting 
from personal use (DfT, 2009). 
As a policy response to the challenges of climate change, the UK government set out 
aims in its 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003) to achieve a 60% reduction of CO2 
emissions by 2050. This target was revised based on recommendations from the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2008) which set out a series of carbon budgets 
designed to achieve an 80% reduction in UK carbon emissions by 2050. The UK 
Climate Change Act 2008 contains a legally binding 80% carbon reduction target to be 
achieved by 2050 (OPSI, 2008). In order to achieve such cuts, new policy instruments 
should be considered – particularly those which achieve the carbon reduction targets in 
a cost effective and acceptable way. Personal Carbon Trading (PCT), in which a total 
amount of transferable permits are issued to individual end users for the right to emit 
CO2, has raised interest in research and policy domains as an instrument with potential 
to reduce GHG emissions (DEFRA, 2006; Roberts and Thumin, 2006). PCT has the 
potential to deliver substantial carbon reductions with a high degree of confidence. 
However, an important question to answer is whether PCT can achieve sufficient social 
acceptance in order to be politically feasible. To this end, the research presented in this 
paper was a first step towards exploring the behavioural response and public attitudes 
towards a PCT scheme designed to significantly reduce carbon emissions from personal 
land-based transport. A further aim was to contribute to the growing debate regarding 
the application of pricing or trading measures to achieve emissions reductions (Keay-
Bright and Fawcett, 2005; Raux and Marlot, 2005). As a comparable instrument, a 
system of fuel price increases designed to achieve the same emissions target was also 
explored. The focus of the research reported in this paper is on public opinion as it is 
possible that this could highlight some key aspects for further investigation given the 
lack of in-depth empirical evidence regarding PCT. This paper provides initial empirical 
evidence from an explorative survey focusing on the behavioral response, impacts, 
fairness, perceived effectiveness and acceptability of both measures yielding a range of 
insights. 
After providing background information on the policies in the following section, the 
policies designed for use in the surveys are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 details the 
survey methodology with survey results presented in section 5 with discussion in 
section 6. Based on these findings, section 7 summarises the main issues that appear 
crucial in terms of influencing public perception and provides recommendations for 
future research. 
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2. Policy background 
 
Tradable Permit (TP) schemes are regulatory measures designed to achieve 
environmental targets at the lowest possible social costs. They have the potential to 
achieve targets set under traditional ‘command and control’ measures but at much lower 
economic costs (Verhoef et al., 1997) as pollution credits can be transferred amongst 
those who are better equipped to make the desired changes (a reduction in emissions 
produced) and those for whom the market prices are more economically feasible than 
abatement technology at that time. TP schemes therefore provide flexibility in meeting 
emissions targets, as those who pollute over their assigned amount of permits are able to 
purchase additional permits from those who pollute below their threshold and 
subsequently have excess permits. 
In a typical TP scheme, a target would be set (for example, an emissions reduction 
target), and the purpose of the scheme and the geographic area to be covered would be 
clearly defined. By distributing a certain amount of permits, the regulatory body is then 
able to control levels of pollution in line with the overall target, a process referred to as 
‘cap and trade’ (Crals et al., 2003). Those affected by the system would then have to 
acquire tradable pollution permits equal to an amount of pollution which could then be 
emitted. The amount of permits available would then be gradually reduced until the 
target is reached. 
To date, TP schemes have been applied to stationary emissions sources with the first 
scheme (the US Emissions Trading Programme) beginning in the US during the mid 
1970’s with the aim of adding flexibility to stationary sources in meeting the air quality 
standards required by the Clean Air Act 1975 (Tietenberg, 1985). More recently, phase I 
of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was introduced across Europe in 
2005, with phase II beginning in 2008, coinciding with the first Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period. The scheme was designed to “promote reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner” (DIRECTIVE 
2003/87/EC) and to therefore contribute to achieving Europe’s commitment to the 
Kyoto Protocol, a GHG emissions reduction of 8% below 1990 levels between 2008-12 
(UNFCCC, 1992). The post-2012 agreement is at least a 20% reduction below 1990 
levels by 2020. Currently the scheme includes high emitting industries, such as cement 
and steel, and power stations from the 15 countries that made up the EU before the 
expansion to 25 countries in 2004. The Commission states that limiting GHG emissions 
from aviation will form an essential contribution to the post-2012 commitment and in 
January 2009 published a directive to include air transport in the EU ETS 
(2008/101/EC). This will cover emissions from flights within the EU from all flights to 
and from EU airports from 2012. There is also a growing interest in the use of TP 
schemes to reduce emissions from land-based motor vehicles (Raux, 2002; 2004; 2005; 
SEPA, 2006; Grayling et al., 2006). The UK government have explored the prospect of 
including road transport in the EU ETS, concluding that the earliest possible date would 
be during phase III in 2013 (DfT, 2007). In addition, the Commission for Integrated 
Transport (CfIT) published a piece of research exploring the design of a TP scheme 
suitable for surface transport (Watters and Tight, 2007). 
To regulate emissions from individuals, a TP scheme could either be implemented 
upstream i.e. amongst fuel producers, or downstream i.e. amongst individual consumers. 
In an upstream scheme, individuals receive the incentive to reduce consumption solely 
through a price signal. The final distributional impacts of an upstream TP would 
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ultimately be determined by the use of any surplus revenues. A downstream scheme 
offers individuals a free permit allocation, therefore for those consuming below the 
initial allocation there would be a financial benefit. Alternatively it allows an amount of 
fuel to be purchased without any additional cost (while using the free permit allocation). 
The downstream TP approach might therefore attain greater levels of public support 
compared to a TP system based upstream amongst fuel producers or a FPI. However, a 
downstream TP scheme is likely to have higher implementation costs, given the large 
number of potential traders and the level of monitoring required, although it is possible 
that such costs can be largely, if not fully, offset by selling a proportion of the annual 
carbon budget. 
In terms of suggested mechanisms for PCT, there are two main approaches within the 
literature: Domestic Tradable Quotas (DTQs) and Personal Carbon Allowances (PCAs). 
DTQs were originally developed by David Fleming in 1996 based on the concept of 
contraction and convergence, proposed by the Global Commons Institute in 1990 
(Meyer, 2000). They are designed to achieve a significant reduction in CO2 emissions 
from domestic sources, including household energy and transportation (DTQs are also 
known as Tradable Energy Quotas (Fleming, 2007)). PCAs were proposed by Hillman 
and Fawcett (2004) and further developed by Fawcett (2005), also with the aim of 
significantly reducing carbon emissions in the UK. Also based on the principle of 
contraction and convergence, the PCA scheme uses a very similar structure to the DTQs 
scheme. A fundamental difference is the scope of the scheme as PCAs regulate 
emissions arising from personal energy use only, whereas DTQs cover all national 
emissions sources, thus organisations and individuals. Both schemes would be 
implemented at a national level with an annual limit placed upon the amount of carbon 
emitted from energy use. This ‘carbon budget’ could then be reduced each year in order 
to achieve the overall emissions target. All fuels would be assigned a carbon rating, 
corresponding to the quantity of carbon emitted on combustion per unit of fuel and by 
the generation of a unit of electricity. As, at the time, roughly 40% of energy 
consumption in the UK was for domestic purposes, it was concluded that for the DTQs 
scheme 40% of the annual carbon budget would be allocated free of charge to adults on 
an equal per capita basis, and the remainder auctioned to organisations. An equal per 
capita allocation of PCAs may be justified in terms of equity, where everyone is 
provided with equal rights to pollute. Dresner and Ekins (2004) note the potential of 
DTQs to be a more equitable measure compared to carbon taxes, due to the per capita 
permit allocation. Fawcett (2005) suggests that government subsidies for energy 
efficiency and/or renewable energy measures could be an appropriate way of addressing 
problems for groups adversely affected by a PCA scheme rather than allocating 
additional permits because the latter results in a reduced ration available for everyone 
else. The PCAs include a smaller allocation for children. 
A computer data base would contain a carbon account for each individual and all 
transactions would be recorded. Each person would have an electronic swipe card which 
would have to be used, for example, when purchasing petrol. Research has revealed that 
such a database is feasible using existing technology and could be linked to all fuelling 
stations in real-time, therefore allowing instant trading of carbon units. The carbon unit 
account could form part of a national identity card scheme, should this be introduced 
(Starkey and Anderson, 2005). Both schemes would include personal land-based 
transport. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 47 (2011): 47-70 
 
 
51 
Within the literature there are several suggestions for TP schemes to reduce fuel used 
for personal transport amongst individual consumers. For example, Keppens and 
Vereeck (2003) outline a system of Tradable Fuel Permits (TFP), while Raux and 
Marlot (2005) describe how a system of decentralised transferable permits could be 
used to reduce fuel consumed for transport, using the case of France as an example for 
potential application and Wadud et al (2008) examined the implications of a tradable 
carbon permit scheme for personal road transport in the USA. 
Public acceptance of policies such as PCT is a fundamental consideration when 
deciding whether a policy will become operational (Whittles, 2003; Schade and Schlag, 
2003; Jones, 1995; 2003). Several key determinants of acceptability of road pricing 
measures (defined as any measure that could impose additional costs on motorists) 
identified from the literature include fairness, policy effectiveness (ability to achieve its 
aim) and benefits received as a result of implementation (Rietveld and Verhoef, 1998; 
Viegas, 2001; Jakobsson et al., 2000; Fujji et al., 2004; Erikson, 2006; Bonsall et al; 
2007; Schade and Schlag, 2003; Rienstra et al., 1999; Jones, 2003; Whittles, 2003; 
Jaensirisak et al., 2003; Eriksson et al., 2006). Issues relating to infringement of 
freedom and exclusion from activities are common objections to pricing measures. It is 
possible that such issues will also be applicable to the acceptance of a PCT scheme for 
land-based personal transport. 
Raux (2002) anticipates that rationing the right to freedom of movement would be one 
of the main public objections to the introduction of a PCT scheme in the transport 
sector. Inequities within society already exist due to an unequal distribution of 
resources, but it is possible that a PCT scheme could be designed in a way that avoids 
exacerbating these inequities and potentially reduces them on the basis that each person 
would receive an equal amount of permits free of charge and therefore avoid a price 
increase whilst consuming within this free allocation. A per-capita subsidy could be 
introduced in a pricing scheme, although this could potentially somewhat negate the 
simplicity advantages compared to a PCT scheme. 
Fuel price increases (FPI) could potentially be an alternative approach to PCT. The 
fundamental differences between fuel price increases and PCT is that the former would 
not have a national limit on carbon consumption (physical cap). A FPI method would 
benefit from the relatively low implementation, monitoring and transaction costs, thus 
in theory achieving the emissions target at a much lower cost, and hence being more 
economically efficient. The ability to create large sums of public revenue could be a 
further benefit of fuel tax. Potential inequities resulting from tax increases (see e.g. 
Wadud et al., 2010) could be largely offset by revenue redistribution and the scheme 
could be made more attractive to the public by hypothecating revenue into supportive 
measures, such as public transport improvements. These would provide alternatives for 
those with the lowest willingness to pay for fuel. Given the potential merits of a FPI, it 
was included as a comparative measure. 
 
 
3. Survey methodology: Policy design 
 
In order to explore public response to a personal carbon trading scheme, it was first 
necessary to design a scheme in sufficient detail for such a purpose. This section 
outlines the Tradable Carbon Permit (TCP) scheme developed in this research. The fuel 
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price increase (FPI) is also described, however as fuel price increases are a far more 
familiar instrument, the focus here is on the design of the TCP scheme. Both policies 
were designed to be as realistic as possible and hence to serve as policy scenarios in 
order to measure public response, thus the policy outlines do not intend to fully explore 
all related technical and implementation issues. Here it is assumed that the transport 
sector takes an equal share of the reduction commitment, therefore both measures are 
designed to deliver a reduction in carbon emissions of 60% by 2050. A 2006 date for 
scheme implementation was used for consistency with the start date used in the surveys 
(see section 4) and to allow the use of actual data rather than a forecast starting point. 
 
3.1 The TCP scheme 
 
The main features of the scheme including estimated financial costs and permit prices 
are outlined in the following sections.  
 
3.1.1 Achieving the emissions target  
 
The emissions target would be achieved by placing an absolute physical limit on the 
amount of carbon available for road transport (converted into the fuel equivalent) each 
year, thus creating a carbon budget which would be gradually reduced by 1.34% each 
year from 1997 levels, for example by 2.68% in 2007; and 4.02% in 2008, 5.36% in 
2009 and so on until 2050. The gradual and known reduction in carbon availability 
allows society to steadily adjust. As the reductions become greater, dependency on 
carbon consuming modes could be reduced as alternatives, such as more fuel efficient or 
alternatively fuelled vehicles, became available. There might also be reductions in the 
need to travel by car if the provision of shops and services become more localised. 
 
3.1.2 Use and distribution of carbon permits 
 
Each year, half of the annual carbon budget would be allocated to individuals free of 
charge, with each UK citizen aged 17 and over receiving an equal allocation. The 
allocation method is likely to encourage individuals to reduce their carbon consumption 
in order to benefit from selling excess permits, thus providing monetary gains to those 
who change their behavior and to those who are already low carbon consumers. Permits 
would be traded in a central permit market, requiring a real time database with secure 
trading facilities. Access points could include fuel stations, post offices and the internet. 
Current information technology is considered adequately sophisticated to enable the 
administration of such a scheme (Grayling et al., 2006; Starkey and Anderson, 2005). In 
order to cover operating costs, replace lost fuel tax revenue, and provide investment for 
public transport improvements, the remaining 50% of the annual carbon budget would 
be sold through the central permit market by the government. Any surplus permit 
revenue would be invested into the provision of supportive measures, such as local 
amenities and services, telecommunication networks, cycle lanes and footpaths which 
would reduce the need to travel and would be particularly important in order to counter 
the potentially regressive impacts of the TCP scheme. 
The TCP scheme would work on the basis that carbon permits are required in order to 
purchase fuel for land based personal transportation modes (e.g., car, motorcycle). Each 
person would have an individual carbon account with an electronic swipe card that must 
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be used when purchasing fuel, and selling or buying permits. In order to reduce the 
possibility of carbon shortages, the permits for sale would be released gradually 
throughout the year, for example an equal amount released at each 3-month interval. In 
addition, there would be a limit on the amount of permits each carbon account could 
contain at any one point in time. This would reduce the potential to stockpile and thus 
distort permit availability. Carbon permits would not be required for public transport 
journeys thus providing an incentive to use such modes. Public transport would be 
covered by a separate trading scheme applying to public transport operators which 
would commence 5 years after the introduction of the individual permit scheme in order 
to allow operators some adjustment time. 
Each person would be able to access their account details in real time as all 
information would be stored on a national electronic database. Research suggests that a 
database could be based on current technology (Starkey and Anderson, 2005). Carbon 
accounts could be included in a national identity card scheme1 , as this would greatly 
reduce the implementation costs, in addition to providing extra security and therefore 
reducing the potential of fraudulent permit cards, hence the following section assumes 
the carbon accounts would be contained within individual identity cards. 
 
3.1.3 Estimated financial costs 
 
The TCP scheme has been designed to be self-funding with respect to operating costs 
and forgone revenues, see table 1. 
Table 1: Estimated financial costs of TCP scheme: £m 2006 and 2007. 
 2006 2007 
Lost fuel tax revenue 
Operating costs 
Scanning equipment 
Information campaign 
Public transport investment 
Total costs 
231.2 
175.1 
40.5 
8.3 
139.0 
594.1 
462.5 
175.1 
- 
- 
139.0 
776.5 
 
As the carbon budget is reduced, the amount of lost fuel tax revenue would increase 
each year, necessitating an annual increase in permit price. The amount of permit 
revenue required each year was estimated using the fuel taxation revenue in 2003 
(£17,259 million) and the annual reductions in carbon availability. For example, in 2006 
fuel sales would be reduced by 1.34%, resulting in a loss of £231.2 million. This loss 
would increase each year in line with the annual carbon reductions. 
The operating costs are based on those of the UK Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency, which was considered to be the closest in terms of the similarities in 
administration requirements and the monitoring of a national database. The estimated 
cost of scanning equipment would provide a chip and pin machine in each fuel station 
and post office outlet in the UK. These costs could be reduced if existing machines were 
adjusted to read the carbon cards. The cost of an advertising campaign conducted by the 
UK government ‘preparing for emergencies’ was adopted as the requirements (e.g., TV 
                                                 
1
 The new Coalition Government has announced that the planned UK identity card scheme will be 
scrapped (HM Government, 2010). 
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and radio advertisement, leaflets, website and national coverage) were very similar. The 
annual investment in public transport was derived from the estimated displacement of 
car journeys onto public transport. The amount of local government expenditure per 
annum was then used as a guide to estimate the revenue required. For example, if a 
corresponding reduction of 1.34% is assumed for car passenger kilometres, the 
displaced kilometres can then be added to public transport kilometres (it is unknown 
exactly how many car journeys would be displaced) as such: 1.34% of 678 billion 
passenger kilometres (DfT, 2006a) = 9.0852, causing a 9.46% increase in public 
transport km (9.0852 = 9.46% of 96 billion public transport passenger km). At the time 
when the PCT scheme was designed, local government expenditure on public transport 
was £1462 million (DfT, 2006a), resulting in the addition of £139 million from permit 
revenue (9.46% of £1462m = £139m). This estimate does not consider the potential 
changes in operators costs and revenues. 
 
3.1.4 Free allocation of carbon permits and estimated permit price 
 
Given that the fundamental requirement of the permit sales would be to cover the 
costs of the TCP scheme, the total annual cost of the TCP scheme (including the 
replacement of fuel tax revenue) was divided by the annual carbon budget, giving a 
price per kilogram of carbon. As the study focuses on personal land based transport, the 
carbon emissions from these modes have been used to calculate the initial carbon 
budget of 26,165 million kilograms carbon2. Thus, for example, in 2006 the total costs 
were £594.1 million and the annual carbon budget was 26,165 million kilograms, hence 
£594.1 million/26,165 million gives a permit price of £0.02 per kilogram carbon. It was 
assumed that half of the annual carbon budget would be allocated free of charge to 
individuals, the annual costs of the TCP scheme are therefore recouped from the sale of 
the remaining half of the carbon budget giving an initial price per kilogram of £0.04. 
For simplicity, a fixed permit price is assumed for each year based on the revenue 
requirements. 
To derive the annual free allocation of carbon permits, the annual carbon budget 
related to personal transport use (i.e. subtracting the proportion relating to bus and rail) 
was divided by 2 (to represent the half that would be given free of charge), then divided 
by the number of adults in the UK aged 17 and over (46, 161, 981 – ONS, 2001). This 
provided a free carbon allocation per person for each year of the scheme. For example, 
11,351 million kilograms/46, 161, 981 equates to 245 kilograms for each person aged 
17 and over in 2005. No allowance was given to those aged below 17 years. To obtain 
the monetary value of the free weekly carbon allocation, the annual allocation was 
divided by 52 e.g., 245/52 = 4.7 kilograms/week. This was then multiplied by the value 
of the permits per kilogram, for example 4.7 x £0.04 = £0.18 per week in 2005.  
 
3.2 The fuel price increase (FPI) 
 
The emissions target would be achieved by gradually increasing the price of fuel to 
the level required according to the fuel price elasticity used. Using current fuel prices, a 
short-range conventional elasticity of fuel demand of -0.25 (Glaister and Graham, 
                                                 
2
 68% of 39,000 million Kg carbon = 26, 520 million Kg carbon. This amount would be reduced by 
1.34% to provide the initial carbon budget: 26, 520 – 1.34% = 26, 165 million Kg carbon. 
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2000), was applied for the first five years, and then graduated up by -0.05 per year until 
-0.7 was reached. This elasticity was then applied thereafter up to 2050. It is recognised 
that this method has limitations as the long-term response is unlikely to remain the same 
each year over such a long time period. 
The FPI would provide revenue for an annual investment in public transport, an 
information campaign and also cover annual monitoring costs (regular monitoring of 
fuel sales would be required, which could result in the adjustment of fuel prices if they 
were not having the desired effect on consumption and/or in response to oil price 
fluctuations). Surplus revenue would be invested into the provision of supportive 
measures, such as localisation of amenities and improved paths and cycle lanes. As for 
the TCP scheme, it is recognised that such investment would be particularly important 
where regressive impacts are most apparent, for example for car dependent households 
in rural areas. 
 
 
4. Survey methodology: interview design and implementation 
 
For the purpose of this research, face to face interviews with individuals were 
considered the most appropriate method given the public’s (then) unfamiliarity with the 
concept of personal carbon trading. The survey was designed to be explorative, hence a 
range of open and closed questions were used following a formal structure which 
ensured that all respondents had considered each of the aspects included in the survey. 
At this stage of research on the issue of PCT it was decided that a qualitative approach 
would be most suitable in order to collect detailed information. 
A total of 60 people were interviewed between February and May 2006 with each 
interview lasting around 1.5 hours. It was recognised that a small sample would not be 
representative of the UK population, therefore the employed population were selected as 
the focus for the study given that they tend to do the most travel (DfT, 2006b), and 
could therefore be affected by the policies to a larger extent. Staff members from two of 
the largest employers in Leeds - the University of Leeds and Leeds City Council, were 
recruited via an email that provided a brief explanation of the study, details of 
participation and offered a small monetary reward on completion of the survey. In order 
to avoid over representation of particular groups, such as car users, males/females, and 
urban dwellers, a screening questionnaire was completed by all interested parties. 
Respondents then completed and returned a 7-day travel diary, at which point an 
interview was arranged. 
 
4.1 Interview procedure 
 
The interviews were designed to explore respondents’ views and opinions without any 
discussion with the interviewer i.e. the interviews were not designed to be an interactive 
discussion/debate as it was considered desirable to obtain uninfluenced responses. The 
interview was arranged into three sections, each having a different topic and purpose. 
The first section was designed to provide a measure of environmental concern, problem 
perception, and knowledge of transport issues as these personal attitudes were 
considered to be an important factor in terms of acceptability ratings (Fujji et al., 2004). 
Section 2 began with an explanation of either the TCP scheme or FPI (the order of 
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presentation was alternated between respondents in order to reduce bias). The 
explanation consisted of the scheme aims, how it would work and what the revenues 
would be used for. The relative benefits of each scheme were not presented as the 
intention was to measure respondents’ uninformed thoughts on such issues. 
Respondents were given an opportunity to seek clarification on any aspect of the 
scheme, followed by questions regarding the behavioural response. An existing 
computer based tool which calculated and displayed current weekly carbon 
consumption (calculated previously from the travel diary) and estimated weekly fuel 
expenditure (Tight et al., 2008) was adapted and used here. This provided two 
interfaces, one relating to the TCP scheme, the other relating to the FPI. The software 
calculated and displayed the free allocation of carbon permits at three points in time: 
2010, 2020 and 2030. In 2010, the free permit allocation equated to 4.4 kilograms of 
carbon per person per week, decreasing to 3.8 kilograms of carbon per person per week 
in 2020 and 3.1 kilograms of carbon per person per week in 2030. Carbon consumption 
(defaulted to current consumption) was displayed alongside each permit allocation, 
together with the total estimated price of fuel and permits. The use of these screen 
displays helped to raise respondents’ awareness in terms of the possible implications of 
the policies on their personal lifestyles. Table 2 shows the prices used in the software to 
calculate estimated spending in each time period. It should be noted that respondents 
were not shown the prices in this form – only in terms of their total estimated spending 
per week. 
Table 2: Fuel price (pence) and % increase from base3 in each time period for the TCP scheme and FPI. 
Year Fuel price/litre TCP scheme Fuel price/litre FPI % increase TCP scheme % increase FPI 
2010 88.2 90.7 3.8 6.7 
2020 96.7 106.8 13.8 25.6 
2030 115.2 137.4 35.5 61.6 
 
For the TCP scheme the estimated costs included spending on permits above the free 
allocation (price per kilogram of carbon based on estimated annual financial costs of the 
scheme and the amount of carbon available to sell from the annual carbon budget – see 
section 3.1). For the FPI the estimated costs included the increase in fuel price necessary 
to achieve the desired reduction in fuel consumption (derived by applying conventional 
elasticities of fuel demand to current fuel prices – see section 3.2). Respondents were 
asked how they would respond if the TCP scheme was introduced, and whether they 
would try to consume within their free allocation or buy extra permits as required if they 
were available. It was explained to respondents that there would be a limited availability 
of permits at the national level and therefore no guarantee that permits could be bought 
in addition to the free permit allocation due to potential carbon shortages on the market. 
They were informed that the prices displayed were based on minimum fixed permit 
prices which could increase due to the impacts of demand and availability. There was 
then an opportunity to alter individual journeys according to what respondents 
considered to be feasible, for example cycling to work rather than using a car (responses 
                                                 
3
 Base fuel price = 85 pence per litre for both the TCP scheme and FPI. 
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were unprompted). The changes were made within the software and the carbon 
consumption was recalculated and displayed alongside the corresponding time period. 
When discussing the FPI, respondents were asked if they would make any changes to 
their current travel behaviour as a result of the increased fuel costs and changes were 
made where they were considered to be feasible in each time period. For both policies, 
respondents were asked to assume that their current circumstances, for example in terms 
of age and income, would remain the same in each time period. They were told the 
prices derived by the software did not include inflation or fluctuating oil prices. 
After respondents had considered their behavioural response, a series of questions 
regarding the impacts on lifestyle, costs and benefits, fairness, effectiveness and 
acceptability followed for example in the form of ‘how acceptable do you personally 
consider the fuel price increase to be?’. In addition to providing a qualitative answer, 
respondents were also asked to quantify their response to most questions on a Likert 7-
point scale. To obtain comparable responses, the final section of the interview repeated 
the previous section for the policy not yet discussed (i.e. either the TCP scheme or FPI). 
The policies were discussed separately and respondents were not asked to compare their 
responses given in sections 2 and 3 of the interview. It should also be noted that the 
software and related price impacts were also presented and discussed separately in 
relation to each policy. A time period of around 40 minutes elapsed before respondents 
were introduced to the software for the second policy in section 3 of the interview, it is 
therefore unlikely that the cost implications of the policy discussed in section 2 were 
memorised and used as a comparison. There was no evidence of price comparisons 
being made during the interviews. Socioeconomic data were collected at the end of the 
interview. 
 
4.2 Response rate and sample characteristics 
 
The response rate of 5.9% was low in comparison with similar public surveys (e.g., 
Jakobsson et al., 2000). In consideration of the high level of commitment and input 
required from respondents, a low response rate was anticipated hence a large amount of 
emails were sent (>1000). In addition, it was expected that a proportion of the emails 
sent would not be viewed. 
All respondents lived in either West, South or North Yorkshire in the UK and worked 
in the city of Leeds. Table 3 displays the sample characteristics. 
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Table 3: Sample characteristics. 
Variable Respondents UK average 
Female 
Age 
18 – 35 
36 - 53 
>54 
Education 
Basic  
Further  
Higher 
Gross household Income/annum 
<£10, 000 - £20, 000 
£21, 000 - £40, 000 
>£41, 000  
Car availability 
0 
1 
2+ 
Annual car kilometres 
Below average (>0 – 8,000) 
Average (8,001-9,000) 
Above average (>9,001) 
Sample average: 12,064 km/person 
Average km travelled per mode4 
Car  
Bus  
Train 
Motorcycle  
Taxi  
Cycle 
Walk 
63% 
 
53% 
37% 
10% 
 
7% 
18% 
44% 
 
27% 
23% 
20% 
 
17% 
53% 
30% 
 
39% 
13.5% 
47% 
 
 
232 
28.7 
80.2 
1.1 
1 
4 
5.5 
51.2% 
 
38.6 years 
 
 
 
11% of population has higher 
education qualifications 
 
 
£28, 000 
 
 
 
72% households have access to 
1 or more cars 
 
 
8,796 km/person 
 
 
 
 
178 
10.9 
14.2 
1.1 
1.8 
1.1 
6.1 
 
The sample over represented females and younger age groups, with the majority of 
the sample aged under 36 years old. People with higher education were also over 
represented as only 11% of the UK population has higher education qualifications 
(ONS, 2001), however, the small sample size should be considered in addition to the 
strategic targeting of the employed sub-population. The majority of the sample were 
earning above the UK average income (ONS, 2001), which again was anticipated given 
the method of recruitment. As intended the sample exhibits higher than average car use 
and car ownership, which was expected to be higher still given the above average 
income levels. In addition, in comparison to the national average, the sample travelled 
almost 6 times further by train, more than twice as far by bus, and almost 4 times as far 
by cycle, whilst walking and taxi use amongst the sample was below the national 
average. The higher than average use of public transport was not anticipated, although it 
is plausible given that a proportion of the sample worked very close to the city centre of 
                                                 
4
 From the travel week recorded in the 7-day diaries. The UK figures are derived from Transport Statistics 
(DfT, 2006a) provided in distance travelled per person per mode per year, which were thus divided by 52 
to obtain a weekly figure and multiplied by 1.609 to convert from miles to kilometres. The data used in 
Transport Statistics is collected through the National Travel Survey, which is an annual survey using a 
7-day travel diary to record personal travel. 
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Leeds and the availability of a relatively good public transport system. This is discussed 
in more detail in section 5.2 together with the results recorded by the software. 
 
 
5. Survey results 
 
Illustrative quotes from the interviews are used, however it should be noted that these 
do not imply a consensus view amongst all 60 respondents.  
 
5.1 Concern for the environment, problem perception and knowledge 
 
Environmental concern was measured using 10 items on a 7-point scale, ranging from 
‘very strongly disagree’ to ‘very strongly agree’. In order to minimise the risk of 
response bias, the statements were randomly presented in negative and positive form. 
The average score of environmental concern was 5.7 (maximum score = 7), thus on 
average respondents were highly concerned about the environment. Cronbach’s Alpha 
is 0.76, indicating an adequate degree of internal consistency that is comparable with 
other studies reporting environmental concern (Weigel and Weigel, 1978; Dunlap et al., 
2000; Walton et al., 2004). The level of concern for the environment across the sample 
is consistent with other findings, despite the sample size and characteristics. For 
example, in a survey conducted amongst a nationally representative sample by the UK 
Department for Transport (DfT, 2006c), 84% of respondents were very or fairly 
concerned about environmental issues and 81% were very or fairly concerned about 
climate change. In addition, more recently in the UK Omnibus 2008 survey (Omnibus, 
2009) 81% of adults said that they were very or fairly concerned about climate change, 
with a quarter being very concerned. A similar proportion, said that they were very or 
fairly concerned about environmental issues. In terms of variations according to 
education levels, 90% of respondents with degree level or above qualification were very 
or fairly concerned about climate change compared with 73% amongst those with no 
formal qualifications. Thus, whilst the results are potentially biased by a high level of 
environmental concern, given the high levels prevalent across society, it is unlikely to 
be a significant issue i.e. could also be apparent in a representative sample and is 
therefore not a characteristic unique to this sample of 60 individuals. 
Problem perception was measured by asking if any problems were associated with 
current levels of road transport. On average, each respondent stated 2.6 problems, the 
main ones being congestion, air pollution and safety. These findings are consistent with 
those reported by CfIT (2002), where congestion was the most commonly mentioned 
transport issue with vehicle pollution affecting health and road safety rated as the next 
most important issues. 
A list of 10 individual statements regarding the environmental and health impacts of 
transport were presented with the options ‘true’, ‘false’ and ‘not sure’. Scores were then 
calculated for each respondent, with an average score of 3.8 (maximum score = 10), 
thus indicating a low level of knowledge amongst the sample. 
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5.2 Behavioral response 
 
The majority of respondents (37) would not make any changes in response to either 
scheme in any time period, although 26 of these people were consuming within their 
free permit allocation during one or more time periods and hence did not need to change 
in response to the TCP scheme. This group would mainly opt to either keep their excess 
permits for leisure trips, give them away to friends and/or relatives, or sell them to the 
national permit market if the price was high enough. Others that were willing to sell 
their permits to the national market were likely to wait until the market price increased 
to provide a substantial profit. The responses demonstrate that the concept of permit 
trading within the TCP scheme was understood and considered during the decision 
making process. Several respondents who did not travel by car stated they would keep 
their free permits unused to avoid them being used by car users, for example: 
 
“I think I’d keep my permits, I wouldn’t want someone who drives 50 miles to work 
and back every day to buy them and it would save even more carbon if I didn’t sell 
them”. 
 
“I’d only sell them to someone who I knew genuinely needed to use their car, I 
wouldn’t sell them to someone so they could drive their kids to school”. 
 
Hence there could be unused permits each year which would have an impact on 
supply, particularly prior to significant carbon reduction adjustments i.e. in the short 
term. It is likely that those consuming within their free carbon permit allocation did not 
respond to the FPI either because their consumption was low, hence the price increases 
could be absorbed. In addition, many respondents felt that their car use was already 
minimal and could therefore not be reduced. The respondents that were consuming over 
their free permit allocation but did not respond to either policy (11 in total) largely felt 
that their car use was essential and could not be reduced, the journeys they made could 
not be made by other modes, using public transport would be inconvenient, expensive, 
increase journey times and reduce their choice of journey origin, destination and travel 
times. These respondents felt that the car provided them with options and convenience 
that they were unwilling to substitute and instead would prefer to pay the additional 
costs. Over half (7) of these respondents were above UK average carbon consumers. For 
example: 
 
“I’d just pay that, I wouldn’t really notice to be honest and I’d just cut down spending 
on other things if the prices went up anymore”. 
 
“I wouldn’t care about the cost, I’d pay it if it meant I didn’t have to change” and “I 
wouldn’t like it but yeh I’d just pay it”. 
 
“I don’t want to hear about climate change, I just want to get on with my life to be 
honest”. 
 
In total, 12 respondents stated they would make changes to their travel behaviour only 
in response to the TCP scheme, 3 respondents stated they would make changes to their 
travel behaviour only in response to the FPI and 8 respondents stated they would make 
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changes to their travel behaviour in response to both policies. The types of changes 
stated by respondents were in response to an open question, hence suggestions were not 
provided by the interviewer. The main responses given in relation to the TCP scheme 
were the use of train to commute to work between 1 and 3 days per week, the use of bus 
to commute to work for 3 days per week, and walking for short leisure trips. For the 
FPI, the main response was to use the train to commute to work for 2 days per week. 
Other responses include using the bus to commute to work between 1 and 5 days per 
week; car sharing; telecommuting; changing vehicle; cycling to work and working 
locally (closer to home). Table 4 shows the impact of the changes on total kilometres 
travelled by the whole sample for each policy and time period. 
Table 4: Total distance (kilometres) traveled for the whole sample per mode5 per week (base) with % 
change in 2010, 2020 and 2030 for the TCP scheme and FPI. 
Mode Base 
2010 2020 2030 
TCP FPI TCP FPI TCP FPI 
Car 13921 -9.5 -0.6 -17.4 -4.4 -29.0 -11.0 
Bus 1719 0.0 0.0 +13.5 +5.0 +13.5 +12.0 
Train 4814 +17.4 0.0 +33.1 +8.2 +38.0 +23.5 
Cycle 241 +28.6 +20.3 +33.6 +20.3 +51.0 +20.3 
Walk 332 +8.5 +1.6 +11.2 +2.2 +16.0 +4.0 
Total 21780 -1.8 -0.1 -2.4 -0.3 -8.4 -0.4 
 
A paired t-test revealed significant differences between base kilometres and 
kilometres travelled in 2030 for both the TCP scheme (p<.02) and the FPI (p<.025). By 
2030, in relation to the TCP scheme, car kilometres were below the UK national 
average (per person) with walking increased to above the national average. Conversely, 
for the FPI car kilometres remained above UK average and walking kilometres 
remained below the UK average. The ratio of car kilometres to cycle kilometres 
declined as a result of the TCP scheme, going from 57 car kilometres per cycle 
kilometre in the base to 27 car kilometres per cycle kilometre in 2030. 
Table 5 shows the change in carbon consumption across the whole sample for each 
policy and time period. 
Table 5: Total carbon consumption from the whole sample (kilograms) per mode6 per week (base) with % 
change in 2010, 2020 and 2030 for the TCP scheme and FPI. 
Mode Base 
2010 2020 2030 
TCP FPI TCP FPI TCP FPI 
Car 512 -11.3 -0.4 -35.4 -5.9 -38.0 -21.3 
Bus 33 0.0 0.0 +32.0 +12.1 +33.0 +24.2 
Train 82 +10.0 0.0 +22.0 +4.9 +23.0 +20.7 
Total 647 -7.7 -0.3 -23.8 -3.4 -25.7 -13.1 
 
                                                 
5 Taxi and motorcycle did not change from the base level of 59 and 694 kilometres respectively. 
6
 Taxi and motorcycle did not change from the base level of 3 and 17 kilograms respectively. 
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The total carbon consumed per person during the base and 2030 was significantly 
different for both the TCP scheme (p<.02) and FPI (p<.025). The total change in carbon 
consumption from all modes shows that the increase in public transport offset some of 
the reductions from car use. For example, in 2030, the TCP achieved a 38% reduction in 
car carbon but the overall reduction from all modes was 25.7%. 
The percentage reduction in carbon consumed by car use is greater than the 
corresponding reduction in kilometres traveled by car (see table 4). This reflects the 
switch by one respondent to a smaller car that consumed less fuel, and by another to a 
zero carbon emissions car in 2030 for the TCP scheme. Hence, carbon consumption and 
demand for permits and fuel were reduced without having to reduce vehicle kilometres 
travelled. For the FPI, the largest reduction in car carbon from base consumption and 
the greatest increase in carbon consumed by public transport were achieved in the long 
term (2030), which reflects the higher long run elasticity applied (Glaister and Graham, 
2000). It is possible that greater reductions could be achieved before 2030 if supportive 
measures were made available, such as increased public transport quality and 
availability, cycle facilities and local shops. In response to the TCP scheme, the greatest 
reductions in carbon occurred in 2020, with a further change in 2030 but at a much 
smaller level. Thus, the capacity and/or willingness to change was almost exhausted 
after two rounds. However, long term supportive measures, such as clean-fuel vehicles 
at reduced costs and improved public transport, should have been implemented by this 
point therefore providing additional opportunities to reduce carbon consumption. Also, 
if sold on an open market, the increasing permit price could provide an additional signal 
in the long term. This was lacking from the survey due to the use of fixed permit prices 
(see section 3.1.4). 
 
5.3 Policy effectiveness 
 
The data in table 5 was used to assess the effectiveness of each policy in terms of 
achieving intermediate carbon reduction targets, shown in table 6. 
Table 6: Carbon emissions reduction targets (percentage change from current) and actual reduction for the 
TCP scheme and FPI in 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
Year 
TCP scheme carbon reduction % FPI carbon reduction % 
Aim Actual Aim Actual 
2010 8.0 11.3 1.7 0.4 
2020 21.4 35.4 10.6 5.9 
2030 34.8 38.3 25.3 21.3 
 
The emissions targets to 2030 were a 34.8% reduction for the TCP scheme, reflecting 
the linear reduction in carbon each year, and for the FPI 25.3% reflecting the assumed 
lower price elasticity in the early years. Table 6 shows that, up to 2030, the TCP scheme 
overachieved each intermediate target whereas the FPI failed to achieve any 
intermediate target despite having higher fuel prices than the TCP scheme (shown in 
table 2). This implies that the willingness to pay for fuel was higher than expected and 
that a quantity approach (limiting carbon availability) was a more effective method of 
achieving change amongst a group of above average carbon consumers. 
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In relation to the TCP scheme, the uncertainty of permit availability appeared to be 
the main driver for behavioural change, for example: 
 
“I’d want to make sure that I had enough permits for my leisure trips, there’re some 
places where you can’t use public transport, or it just takes too long. I’d cut back on the 
work trips and save the extra ones”. 
 
“It’s the not knowing whether you’d be able to buy what you wanted, and the price of 
them, so I might not even be able to afford it anyway. I’d have to stick to my free 
allocation and get what my parents don’t use, I wouldn’t like to risk having to buy more 
in case there wasn’t any there”. 
 
It is possible that people are risk averse and would prefer an option with a known 
price to an option with an uncertain price (Bonsall et al., 2007). Hence, the TCP scheme 
could actually benefit, in terms of effectiveness, from risk aversion, i.e., people try to 
minimise the risk of permit shortages by reducing their permit use. 
 
5.4 Impacts, fairness, perceived effectiveness and acceptability 
 
After considering how the policies might affect their travel behavior, respondents 
were asked a range of questions regarding perceived impacts on their lifestyles 
(including costs and benefits), policy effectiveness, fairness and acceptability. In most 
cases respondents were also asked how they thought society as a whole would rate each 
policy, for example in terms of acceptability. Table 7 shows the average scores for each 
attitude measure. 
Table 7: Sample average attitude scores for the TCP scheme and FPI (standard deviation in brackets). 
Variable  TCP scheme FPI P value* Scale 
Level of impacts on lifestyle 2.5 (1.6) 2.3 (1.6) p>.010 0 to 6 
Strength of impacts on lifestyle 0.4 (1.6) -0.2 (1.5) P<.005 -3 to +3 
Personal cost/benefit  0.3 (1.5) -0.4 (1.5) P<.005 -3 to +3 
Social cost/benefit  1.3 (1.6) 0.2 (1.8) P<.005 -3 to +3 
Personal fairness  1.3 (1.4) 0.5 (1.9) P<.005 -3 to +3 
Social fairness  -0.6 (1.7) -1.4 (1.5) P<.005 -3 to +3 
Perceived effectiveness  3.9 (1.4) 2.2 (1.4) P<.005 0 to 6 
Personal acceptability  1.1 (1.6) 0.3 (1.8) P<.010 -3 to +3 
Social acceptability  -0.3 (1.5) -1.2 (1.6) P<.005 -3 to +3 
Note: *A Wilcoxon signed ranks test (equivalent to a paired sample t-test for categorical data) was used 
to measure any significant differences between the ratings for the TCP scheme and the FPI. 
 
The extent of the perceived impacts on lifestyle were similar for both policies, 
however, the impacts resulting from the TCP scheme were perceived to be positive, 
whereas negative impacts were perceived to result from the FPI. In general, respondents 
felt that the TCP scheme would encourage them to think about the necessity of car use 
and find alternative modes, resulting in health and fitness benefits, whereas the fuel tax 
increases would result in increased costs without stimulating the same positive thought 
process and actions as the TCP scheme, for example: 
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“I think because you’ve got to use the carbon permits all the time it’d really make you 
think about what you were doing and the impact on the environment, whereas with the 
fuel prices you’d be told what the purpose was at the beginning but it’d be less obvious 
in an everyday way and people might easily forget and just get mad about paying more 
for their fuel”. 
 
On average, respondents thought the TCP scheme would provide personal benefits, 
whereas the fuel tax increases would result in costs. However, the FPI would provide 
social benefits, but to a lesser extent than those provided by the TCP scheme. The 
responses given to an open question regarding the ratings are closely related to those 
given in relation to the impacts ratings, with the TCP scheme having a greater impact on 
car use resulting in reduced levels of local air and noise pollution, and improved levels 
of personal health and fitness. In contrast, the increased price of fuel was by far the 
main response given in relation to perceived costs resulting from the FPI with reduced 
levels of air pollution being the most noted benefit. For example: 
 
“People only lose out from the fuel price increase but people actually benefit from the 
permit scheme”. 
 
“Not enough people will stop using their cars so there’d be little benefit from the fuel 
price, people would rather starve than stop using their cars”. 
 
The social benefits were rated to be greater than the personal benefits for both 
policies, as a result of environmental improvements being considered more as a wider 
social benefit rather than a personal benefit. 
The TCP scheme was considered more personally fair, and less unfair from a societal 
perspective than the FPI. In relation to the TCP scheme, the most commonly stated 
reason for considering the policy to be fair was the allocation of carbon permits on an 
equal per capita basis, with those using more than their free allocation having to buy 
additional permits and therefore incurring extra costs: 
 
“If it’s been divided up equally then I think that’s fair, I’d accept that that was my 
allocation and be happy to know that everyone else had the same amount”. 
 
“It’s like the polluter pays because if you use more than your free allowance you’ve 
got to start paying”. 
 
In contrast, most respondents thought society would generally consider the TCP 
scheme to be unfair, mainly due to a perceived restriction on personal freedom and car 
use, given the high level of importance placed on car use: 
 
“People see their car and freedom as a right. There’d be a lot of resistance and upset, 
the car gives people flexibility, freedom and safety. People need to be encouraged that 
it’s a good idea rather than being told”. 
 
However, many respondents thought that fairness ratings would increase over time as 
society became accustomed to the scheme and the benefits became visible. The FPI was 
considered to be less fair, mainly due to the perceived uneven impacts across society: 
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“There’d definitely be an uneven distribution of benefits depending on income. People 
living in rural areas would be hit badly by this”. 
 
“We’d have a situation where only rich people can afford to drive, it’d become really 
elitist, more than it is now”. 
 
Respondents thought that the price increases would be considered unfair by society, 
being largely viewed as an additional tax rather than a measure to reduce carbon 
emissions: 
 
“People aren’t concerned about the environment so they’d see this policy as an unfair 
tax increase”. 
 
“People don’t think they should pay more to use their cars because they can’t see why 
it’s wrong”. 
 
The TCP scheme was considered effective at achieving the emissions target with the 
most commonly stated reason being the national limit on carbon availability: 
 
“If you can’t go over the limit then it has to be successful”. 
 
“It’d make people think about what they were doing because you’ve got your own 
allowance with a figure on it”. 
 
The FPI was considered less effective with the majority of respondents feeling that 
the additional fuel costs would be absorbed by the majority, with costs needing to be 
much higher to incur change: 
 
“Putting the price up doesn’t work. People don’t stop smoking because the price goes 
up, they stop smoking for other reasons”. 
 
“It’d just be easier for most people to pay the extra cost and carry on rather than 
moving house or changing job”. 
 
In terms of personal acceptability, 78% of respondents considered the TCP scheme to 
be acceptable whereas 50% rated the FPI as acceptable. In terms of the FPI, this is 
greater than the average level of support (37%) expected for road pricing in the UK 
(Jaensirisak et al., 2005). The TCP scheme is less comparable with road pricing than the 
FPI and is instead more comparable with findings from the RSA (2006) who found that 
53% of respondents would accept limits imposed on their energy use if they helped to 
solve the problem of climate change. In addition, 61% supported penalties and rewards 
for above and below energy consumption. The findings were based on a nationally 
representative sample of 2465 individuals and opinions were consistent across gender, 
age, social group and region of residence. Bristow et al. (2010) review the limited 
available evidence and conclude that support for PCT from existing surveys (excluding 
small sample surveys) lies in the range 25 to 47%. Thus, in consideration of other 
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findings from more representative surveys, the acceptability of both the TCP scheme 
and FPI could be lower amongst a more representative sample. 
In relation to the TCP scheme, the most commonly stated reasons regarding 
acceptability were the benefits received: 
 
“It’s a fair way to reduce emissions, it improves public transport and encourages 
people to use it. I think the scheme would work well and has a target and aim to achieve 
and it’s a big scheme for people to take on which would help to make people realise the 
scale of the problem and what needs to be done”. 
 
The most commonly stated reason for accepting the FPI was the necessity to reduce 
carbon emissions: 
 
“We don’t have a choice, we’d have to accept it because it’d be law and it’s 
necessary”. 
 
In terms of social acceptability, the majority of respondents thought society would 
consider the TCP scheme to be unacceptable, the FPI even more so. The most common 
jointly stated reasons were related to monetary cost and unfairness: 
 
“People don’t want to pay more for fuel, they don’t want to pay more tax for the NHS 
and schools so they won’t want to pay more for fuel”. 
 
Before the interview ended respondents were asked which policy they considered to 
be more acceptable. The majority of respondents (40) considered the TCP scheme to be 
more acceptable than the FPI, whilst 18 respondents considered the FPI to be more 
acceptable than the TCP scheme. The main reason for considering the TCP scheme to 
be more acceptable than the FPI was the ability to achieve the carbon reduction targets: 
 
“The trading scheme has a bigger impact even though it’s more difficult than the fuel 
price increase. The trading scheme is the way we should go”. 
 
The most commonly stated reason for preference of the FPI over the TCP scheme was 
the ability to continue current behaviour, albeit at increased monetary costs. This was 
considered to provide an element of personal choice: 
 
“There’s no limit on consumption so there’re more options. I can still do the journeys 
I want and can afford to pay the extra. It’s more fair than the trading scheme”. 
 
 
6. Discussion of results 
 
The survey findings clearly indicate that certain policy design features influenced 
responses towards the TCP scheme and FPI. The perceived likelihood of achieving the 
carbon reduction target largely underpinned the difference in terms of behavioural 
response and attitudes towards the TCP scheme and FPI. The TCP scheme was viewed 
as largely unavoidable due to the imposed carbon budgets i.e. there would be little 
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opportunity for individuals to buy their way out. Respondents were thus convinced that 
substantial carbon reductions would be delivered. Whereas in relation to the FPI, given 
that price is the only limiting factor many respondents were unconvinced that it would 
deliver substantial carbon reductions based on the belief that the majority of individuals 
would continue their current car use and therefore not have to make any changes (other 
than increase their spending on fuel). The TCP scheme therefore offered people a level 
of reassurance that their efforts to reduce carbon emissions would not be in vain - the 
FPI did not have this effect. Hence, the perceived response of others appeared to be 
important in influencing the decision to change behaviour and particularly whether 
attitudes towards the policy would be positive or negative. 
Uncertainty of carbon permit availability was crucial in prompting the behavioural 
response to the TCP scheme. Hence, the TCP scheme could benefit from risk averse 
behaviour in that people reduce their consumption in an attempt to avoid a situation 
where they are unable to obtain permits. It is recognised that the response could be 
different if respondents were to consider a PCT scheme with links to other permit 
markets rather than being constrained to a national carbon budget and thus potential 
shortages of availability as explored in this research. Uncertainty regarding permit price 
was also an important factor in terms of response to the TCP scheme, but to a lesser 
extent. In this survey design, the mechanism for stimulating behavioural change for the 
FPI is very different in that it relies solely on willingness to pay and therefore does not 
benefit to the same extent as the TCP scheme in terms of stimulating risk averse 
behaviour. 
Interestingly, and perhaps, surprisingly respondents seemed to prefer a scheme with a 
hard cap and the possibility of permits not being available partly because it was 
perceived to improve policy effectiveness and partly because it was considered a fair 
mechanism due to the free equal per capita permit allocations and the limited 
opportunity for individuals to continue their current travel behaviour i.e. almost 
everyone would have to make changes. The benefits perceived as a result of the policies 
being introduced were a key factor in terms of acceptability – in this survey the TCP 
scheme was favoured mainly due to the belief that it could deliver significant reductions 
and co-benefits such as reduced levels of air pollution. 
During the survey a number of respondents felt that the limit on carbon availability 
and use of carbon permits would constantly remind them of the purpose of the scheme 
and suggested that the TCP scheme could make people aware of their environmental 
impacts resulting from all aspects of their lifestyle and ways to reduce them, therefore 
further increasing policy effectiveness and subsidiary benefits through the uptake of 
environmentally astute behaviour (also noted by Starkey and Anderson, 2005). This 
impact was not suggested for the FPI, which could possibly be a result of negative 
preconceptions of fuel tax as a means to raise revenue rather than to improve the 
environment. Hence it is possible that perceptions of the FPI could be changed by 
introducing it as a carbon tax, to help remind people of the policy aim and also stimulate 
environmentally astute behaviour. However, DEFRA (2008) found a largely negative 
response to the concept of a carbon tax and respondents remained sceptical about the 
ability to stimulate the carbon reductions required. 
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7. Conclusions and future directions 
 
This research has provided an initial insight into public attitudes and potential 
behavioural response to a PCT scheme and FPI both designed to achieve significant 
reductions in carbon emissions from the transport sector. Overall, there was a clear 
difference in attitudes towards the policies – respondents were much more positive 
about the TCP scheme in every aspect compared to the FPI. However, given that the 
sample was small and biased towards those with high education levels, high concern for 
the environment and above average incomes, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions. 
The investigation into the role of PCT remains an emerging area with many avenues 
to explore. One important issue to explore in terms of the impact on acceptability and 
behavioural response is the different types of cap or limit on permit availability. The 
findings also suggest that it would be valuable for future research to include: larger 
scale and more representative attitudinal surveys; an exploration of the influence of 
personal and social norms on behaviour; the application of deliberative techniques for 
further exploration of specific issues; the impact of varying permit allocations to 
account for actual barriers to change; and efforts to explore behavioural change in a 
more realistic setting perhaps using longitudinal studies and/or carbon trading games. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper is aimed at filling the gap between the already well structured literature on the 'car regime' 
and the debate on policies for sustainable transport. 
Two main results emerge from the literature on the past and current evolution of the car regime: 
- the car regime was established thanks to the ability of purposeful private actors to use the 
technology of internal combustion to influence markets and institutions, and finally society as a 
whole; 
- previous attempts to make urban and regional mobility more sustainable fail because multiple - 
and mutually reinforcing - path-dependence phenomena lock the society into the car regime. 
For the future, the dominant scenario appears to be the internal transformation of the existing car 
regime, which is currently driven by the automotive industry and based on hybrid technology; the 
emergence of an alternative electric car regime - driven by producers of batteries and managers of electric 
utilities - remains a secondary option. 
Further research is needed to understand how - starting from the existing alternatives to the car and the 
innovations in the car itself - a coalition of public and private actors may be promoted and sustained to 
create a new regime of sustainable mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper shares the diffused perception that a new approach to transport policy is 
needed to meet the challenging goals of long-term sustainability of human activities, at 
both the global and local level (Akerman and Hojer, 2006; Köhler, 2006; Hickman and 
Banister, 2007; Moriarty and Honnery, 2007; Bristow et al., 2008; EEA, 2008; 
McCollum and Yang, 2009; Stanley et al., 2009). It also agrees on recognizing that the 
institutional, technological and economic dimensions of transport activities should be 
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considered, in order to design and implement effective policies for their sustainability. 
Two strands of transport research on this topic can be identified in the literature1. The 
first one is based on neoclassical and new institutional economics: authoritative 
researchers acknowledge the need to extend the theoretical apparatus in order to include 
institutional and technological issues into the analysis of transport policies. But results 
are somewhat disappointing: institutions are considered nothing but barriers to be 
overcome by integrating policies or by increasing their acceptability (Rietveld and 
Stough, 2005; Vieira et al., 2007; Banister, 2008; May et al., 2008; Hickman et al. 
2010); technologies are relevant - especially when considering environmental impacts - 
but they still remain exogenous (Litman, 2005; Goldman and Gorham, 2006; Johansson, 
2009); even competitive mechanisms - both spontaneous and policy-driven - are not 
part of a genuinely dynamic process of change, but rather the only available way to 
escape market and state failures (Button, 2005; Raux, 2007). The second research strand 
considers the co-evolution of institutions, markets and technologies as the core process 
of the dynamics of transport activities. A structural approach to the analysis of 
endogenous process of change is developed, with reference to: past radical and 
incremental transport innovations (Geels, 2005b); technological, economic and 
institutional niches where transport novelties can take the first steps (Hoogma et al., 
2002; Ieromonachou et al., 2007; Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008); transitions towards 
more sustainable ways of moving freight and passengers (Schot et al., 1994; Kemp and 
Rotmans, 2004; Kohler et al., 2009). 
More recent insights from institutional (North, 2005; Hodgson, 2006)2, 
Schumpeterian (Metcalfe, 2010; Dosi and Grazzi, 2010; Perez, 2010) and Hicksian 
(Amendola and Gaffard, 2006) theories of endogenous change - helps to show that past, 
on-going and future dynamics of transport activities can be analysed by using the 
concept of 'regime': i.e. a system which is able to meet overall societal demands and 
whose structural components (rules, artefacts, services, preferences, interests, etc.) are 
reproduced and changed through individual and collective actions and learning. 
Consistently, policies for sustainable transport are conceived as actions to 'unlock' the 
existing car regime and to trigger and to make viable its change by ensuring the 
dynamic alignment of new structural components.  
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections: in the next one a simple 
conceptual model is used to represent the structure and the dynamics of a regime; the 
following section reviews the relevant literature, showing that such a model has already 
been used to successfully analyse the evolution of the car regime. The last section takes 
stock and suggests that - if one wants to unlock the existing car regime and create a new 
regime of sustainable mobility - the issues of public and private agency deserve a better 
understanding. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 As always happens with theoretical taxonomies, boundaries are not clear cut. For example, the paper of 
van den Bergh et al. (2007) is very difficult to classify and should be considered as a 'bridge' between the 
two strands discussed. 
2
 Is under dispute if Douglas North is an institutional or new institutional scholar, but most studies agree 
on considering its work as a theoretical evolution from the latter to former (see, among others, Zweynert, 
2009). 
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2. What is a regime and how it changes: a simple conceptual model 
 
Regimes are systems that have a pervasive (or dominant) effect on reality, by 
fulfilling an overall social function (feeding, housing, production, transportation, etc. ): 
“(...) a societal function encompasses the expression of a human need 
and the way in which this need is met. Thus a regime consists of all 
actors and elements that are involved in originating, shaping, fulfilling 
this need and/or in regulating how this happens.” (Holtz et al., 2008, 
pp. 626-627) 
The functioning of regimes can be conceptualized as structured agency (Giddens, 
1984): a structure of three interrelated dimensions - that is, institutions, technologies 
and markets - is replicated and changed through individual and collective action and 
learning. Because each of these structural dimensions has its internal dynamics and a 
relative autonomy, they can be considered as sub-regimes which are linked by a co-
evolutionary process and generate bi-lateral and tri-lateral relations (Geels, 2004; Holtz 
et al., 2008)3. Change at the regime level is coordinated by its structure and it is driven 
by cumulative agency; in other words: action and learning are enabled and constrained 
by structural variables. Strong uncertainty and irreversibility are ineradicable features of 
the dynamics of regimes. Each of these concepts needs to be better explained. 
 
2.1 The structure 
 
Let us start from a thorough analysis of the three structural constituents of a regime: 
institutions, technologies and markets. 
Institutions are nothing but general rules that structure social interaction4; both tacit 
and explicit rules can be observed only through manifest behaviour (i.e., ignored formal 
laws are not rules) (Hodgson, 2006). The enforcement of rules and the sanction of 
violations is driven by legal or social mechanism. New rules may emerge from 
intentional and unintentional action; obviously it is easier and quicker to change formal 
rules than informal ones. 
Technologies are “configurations that works” (Geels, 2005b, p. 11): they are made of 
artefacts (if any) and routinised knowledge, and they fulfil one or more functions. 
Technologies are invariably systemic and almost always embedded in a specific 
environment of economic and non-economic organizations and networks (Cimoli et al., 
2009). Technological change is mostly cumulative, it is driven by a collective heuristic 
(a 'paradigm') and it is shaped by several factors, among which learning (by doing, by 
using and by interacting) plays a crucial role (Dosi and Grazzi, 2010). 
Markets are more than mere exchange mechanisms: they act as the selective 
environment of technological innovations (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and play a 
relevant role in coordinating all economic decisions during innovation processes 
(Amendola and Gaffard, 2006). In these cases it is not possible to say ex-ante that 
mutually consistent changes in producers' expectations, financial resources, labour 
                                                 
3
 Similar interacting sub-dynamics (though between industries, universities and governments) are at the 
heart of the so-called 'triple helix' approach (Leydesdorff and Meyer, 2006). 
4
 Actually, each sub-regime has its internal rules; here we are considering rules that are relevant at the 
regime level. 
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skills, consumers' preferences - and so forth - will make the innovation process viable 
(Amendola and Gaffard, 1998; Metcalfe, 2010; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010a). 
Now we can analyse the three mutual relations between the above mentioned 
components of the regime: 
1) Institutions and technologies. As suggested by the huge literature on innovation 
systems, institutions and technologies co-evolve: 
“Some institutions provide the broad background conditions under which 
technological advance can proceed, and others come into existence and 
develop to support the important new technologies that are driving 
growth.” (Nelson, 2008, p. 2) 
Institutions technologically relevant are both explicit (laws and regulations about 
patents, innovation policies, standards, etc.) and tacit (how universities and firms 
cooperate, how venture capitalists evaluate potential innovations, etc.). 
2) Technologies and markets. The analysis of this interaction is rooted in the 
Schumpeterian theory on innovation and competition: the emergence of new 
technologies and the structure of markets are strictly linked and give place to 
pervasive effects of 'creative destruction'. The innovation process influences and it 
is influenced by almost all economic variables: the internal organization of firms, 
the competitive structure of industries and markets, the matrix of vertical and 
horizontal inter-firms and inter-industries input-output relations, the dimension 
and the structure of innovation networks of economic and non-economic agents, 
etc. (Freeman and Soete, 1994; Pavitt, 1999). This mutual influence is heavily 
conditioned by the main features of the changing technology (Silverberg et al., 
1988, p. 1033). 
3) Markets and institutions. This interaction has been studied by institutional 
economists: Coase and Williamson have stressed the relevance of transaction 
costs; North has studied how institutions influence economic performance; 
Buchanan and Stigler have analysed how deregulated markets may reduce the risk 
of both market and State failures. But it is only with the latest studies of Douglas 
North that a really dynamic approach is proposed: institutions and markets are 
explicitly considered as interdependent dimensions of the process of economic 
change, and the misalignment of institutional and market adjustments is proposed 
as the main cause of economic crises and stagnations (North, 2005). 
 
2.2 Agency and change 
 
Agency is an essential element of the dynamics of regimes: individual and collective 
action replicates the structure of the regime, whilst generating - directly or indirectly, 
intentionally or unintentionally - the variation of structural variables. Evaluating the 
ability of actors to build or strengthen coalitions and to influence actual changes, it is 
possible to discriminate among core actors, non-core actors and outsiders (Smith et al., 
2005; Hajer and Laws, 2006; Zweynert, 2009). Strategic action is not the only element 
that distinguishes the dynamics of regimes from a genuine Darwinian evolution, the 
other one is the iterative process of learning: actors found future actions on current 
results (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006). Both action and learning can be individual and 
collective; through learning: a) groups and coalitions update shared discourses, visions 
and agendas; b) individuals change their attitudes, beliefs and expectations; and c) they 
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may decide to migrate between groups (Ostrom, 2000; Witt, 2008; Safarzynska and van 
den Bergh, 2010b). 
Thus the functioning of a regime is genuinely dynamic and path dependent, featuring 
irreversibility and strong uncertainty5: future changes are neither completely uncertain 
(as the potential developments of the existing regime are limited by its structure) nor 
completely certain (as the interaction of structural variables and agency may generate 
unpredictable outcomes). As brilliantly stressed by North, the dynamics of regimes is 
more than uncertain: it is non-ergodic (North 2005, ch. 2): even changes in the 
fundamental structure of the regime are usual features of its dynamics. In such a context 
it is no longer possible to consider agency as driven by complete information: on the 
contrary, agents' rationality is bounded and adaptive, and their behaviour is not 
optimizing, but satisfying (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Simon, 1987). The cumulativeness 
and irreversibility of regime changes - together with network interdependencies and the 
externalities they bring about - often generate lock-ins, that is, the creation of new 
regimes is an exceptional case. These phenomena have been thoroughly studied with 
reference to technologies and markets (Unruh, 2000); actually they may also generate 
behavioural conformism (Maréchal, 2010) and institutional sclerosis (North, 2005). The 
lock-in of regimes can not be fully understood without explicitly considering core actors 
implementing conservative strategies; the 'capture' of public organizations and the 
'entrapment' of policy agendas is probably the more relevant way for them to resist 
change (Unruh, 2000; Walker, 2000; Berkhout, 2002). 
Several scholars have tried to select the essential elements of the dynamics of regime 
change and to propose a taxonomy of regime changes, but a shared and stable 
framework has not yet been reached (Geels, 2005a; Smith et al., 2005; Geels and Schot, 
2007; Bergek et al., 2008; Genus and Coles, 2008; Markard and Truffer, 2008). 
However, some theoretical hints may be given starting from a basic question: which are 
the sources and the outcomes of regime change? Sources of regime change can be both 
internal and external to the regime itself. In the former case, change is more often driven 
by internal (core and non-core) actors; in the latter, outsiders usually play a relevant 
role6. Outcomes of regime change may be grouped into two large families: the 
adaptation of the existing regime and the creation of a new regime. Adaptation can be 
conceptualized as an homoeostatic process: cumulative changes in institutions, markets 
and technologies take place along a dominant trajectory, without altering the internal 
consistence of the regime itself. Things radically change in the case of the creation of a 
new regime: no structure is available to coordinate a new process of multidimensional 
alignment, because the structure itself is created through change. Homoeostasis is 
replaced by complexity (Arthur, 1999). In such a situation, one can even doubt if the 
creation of a new regime is possible without the purposeful and increasingly 
coordinated action of powerful 'prime movers' - or 'enactors' - committed to change 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Suurs et al., 2010). This is why some scholars - 
especially in the context of transitions to a low carbon society - have suggested that the 
creation of new regimes must be adaptively managed through reflexive governance and 
societal learning ( Voß et al., 2006; Loorbach, 2007; Foxon et al., 2009; Nill and Kemp, 
2009; Voß et al., 2009). Niches are essential in the case of the creation of new regimes, 
not so much to incubate market and technological novelties, as to gradually build up - 
                                                 
5
 Strong uncertainty is equivalent to the game theory concept of 'ambiguity'.  
6
 As stressed by Smith et al. (2005) outsiders in a regime may be core actors of a competing regime. 
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and legitimate - a coalition of actors sharing a vision and a political discourse, and 
advocating all changes needed to create a new regime (Schot and Geels, 2007). A trade-
off between the opening of several niches and the pursuit of only one innovative path is 
apparent; in the former case there is a risk of not achieving the critical mass necessary to 
establish a new regime, in the latter of reinforcing lock-ins in an unsustainable regime 
(Berkhout, 2002; Rammel and van den Bergh, 2003; Sartorius, 2006). The more recent 
critical literature on the approach of transition management calls for more attention to 
political and institutional issues, especially to the ability of supporters of transitions to 
promote new discourses and broader coalitions for social change, with the aim of 
overcoming incumbent powers and generating a radical change in everyday politics and 
policy (Shove and Walker, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2009; Smith and Kern, 2009). 
 
 
3. Retrospect, status and prospect of the car regime 
 
This section is aimed at analysing the literature on the car regime; but, before starting 
the review, one should answer a preliminary question: does the relevant literature 
recognize the car as a regime? Yes, it does. First of all, one may notice that, in a recent 
paper aimed at a better specification of the concept of regime, authors explicitly refer to 
the 'car-based mobility' as a regime: 
“We consider the currently dominant mobility system to be a regime 
which is based on individually owned cars, gas, service stations, streets, 
traffic regulations, preferences like flexibility and the perception of cars 
as being also life-style objects. Its main societal function is to satisfy the 
need for mobility. It is coherent: the technological elements like cars, 
streets, service stations, the kind of gas provided etc. are strongly 
adapted; the design of cars is not only defined by technical aspects but 
also through consumers' preferences; laws, taxes and insurances guide 
and bound the usage of cars. It is dynamically stable: there have been 
some trends like technological improvements (e.g. anti-locking systems, 
catalytic converters and navigation computers, just to name a few), or an 
increasing number of cars per household; but the general pattern 
remains stable. It shows non-guidance since many and diverse actors are 
involved: car manufacturers, oil companies, various national ministries, 
car owners, associations etc.” (Holtz et al., 2008, p. 629) 
Moreover, one may add that scholars from different disciplines recognize that the car 
is a regime (even though they may name it differently). Frank Geels - an expert of the 
history of radical innovations (whom we will refer extensively in the following 
paragraph) - reports that in the early 20th century: 
“The diffusion of cars was accompanied and made possible by the 
creation of a new socio-technical regime that was tailored to its 
demands. New regulations were one element of this regime, often 
reformulated in favourable ways. (...) Another element of the new socio-
technical regime was the improvement of road infrastructures. (…) As 
the car diffused it had wider impacts on society. It facilitated the 
emergence of a ‘car culture’, supported by new institutions such as fast 
food restaurants on highways, shopping malls on the edge of cities, 
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drive-in movies. (…) The car developed many forward and backward 
linkages in the economy of the 1930s. The automobile industry was a 
huge consumer of sheet steel, glass and paint, components (tyres, lamps, 
generators, etc.), and machine tools. The use of the car boosted the 
petroleum industry and construction and public works (roads, bridges 
and tunnels). In sum, the car became strongly embedded in society.” 
(Geels, 2005b, pp.467-8) 
Michael Best - an economist that pioneered the issue of the societal lock-in in 
suboptimal patterns of production and consumption - argues more directly that: 
“If the car, for example, were simply a commodity, then it could be taken 
or not with a minimum of social consequences. But it is more than a 
commodity, for it is part of a way of life. Once it has become the 
dominant mode of transport then housing, family, work, shopping and 
recreation patterns are designed around it. Not consuming the car is like 
rejecting a religion into which one was born. It disconnects a person 
from the social fabric of society.” (Best, 1982, p. 61) 
John Urry - an authoritative sociologist of mobility - adds that: 
“(...) automobility is a self-organising, non-linear system that (…) 
generates the preconditions for its own self-expansion, including 
elements, processes, boundaries, and other structures, and the unity of 
the system. (...) billions of agents co-evolve and adapt to form a system of 
interdependent agents and relations—a complex assemblage or system 
that ‘constitutes’ the ‘steel-and-petroleum’ car.” (Urry, 2008, p. 343-4) 
Paul Nieuwenhuis and Peter Wells - two of the most authoritative experts on the 
automotive industry - may then consistently stress that: 
“(...) it is important to recognise the car as part of a system (…) which 
we have called the ‘automobility paradigm’. It is often not appreciated to 
what extent our modern culture is integrated with the car and its systems: 
we have literally built our world around the car in its current form (…).” 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004, p. 10) 
Starting from this basic considerations, in the following paragraphs a specific 
attention will be given to those contributions that explicitly make reference to the salient 
constituents of the car regime, that is: a) the interaction of institutional, technological 
and economic variables in the history of the car regime; b) the crucial role of agency, 
with a specific attention to the ability of core agents to establish the car regime; c) the 
existence of path-dependence and lock-in phenomena in the current evolution of the car 
regime; d) the consequent need of powerful actors and factors to trigger a process of 
radical change and to make viable the (re-)alignment of institutional, technological and 
economic variables (that is, to create a new regime or to adapt the existing one). 
 
3.1 When the car was born: a multidimensional history 
 
The advent of the car has attracted several scholars; but it is only with Frank Geels 
that the interaction of institutional, technological and socio-economic variables is 
explicitly and systematically considered. It is then natural to start this literature review 
with his study about the transition from horse-drawn carriages to cars that took place 
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during the period 1860-1930 (Geels, 2005a,b)7. The main aim of Geels's work is to 
show that the historical dynamics of such a transition was neither a simple substitution 
process, nor was the result of a competitive battle that the gasoline car won against the 
already existing steam and electric cars. Geels explicitly considers “other aspects such 
as policies and regulations, user preferences, infrastructures, cultural and symbolic 
meanings” (p. 448). 
Four main results emerge from his work. The first one is that societal pressures and 
needs ('landscape changes' in Geels's terminology) weakened the existing regime of 
horse-powered transport. Probably the main cultural pressures came from “the 
increasing attention in public debates for health and hygiene” (p. 456) in expanding and 
more and more crowded, congested and dangerous cities. Obviously, the horse manure 
was perceived as one - maybe the worst - enemy for this salvationist movement. The 
second main result of Geels' studies is that several alternatives to the horse carriage 
developed before the internal combustion car become the dominant mode of urban 
transport of passenger (that is, a new regime). Some, like the electric tram, diffused 
rapidly: “In 1890, 16% of American street railways were electrified (…). By 1902, 97% 
of American street railways were electric” (p. 458). Others conquered market niches: 
the electric car in the urban niches of taxies and promenading in parks; the bicycle in the 
niche of touring; electric and gasoline cars in the niche of racing. The gasoline car 
started in a niche too: that of touring in the countryside; only gradually it gained new 
market segments: urban taxies, businessmen (doctors, travelling salesmen, insurance 
agents, etc.), farmers, middle-class suburban residents. The third relevant conclusion is 
the recognition of agency, especially with reference to the role of economic and social 
actors, both in creating new markets and in promoting the rules and policies consistent 
with their development. First of all it must be said that the option of an electric car 
system (made of batteries, vehicles and a recharging infrastructure) was abandoned well 
before its technological and commercial feasibility was tested: “the electric vehicle was 
sabotaged not by its competitors, but by its custodians, that is, the Electric Vehicle 
Company” (Black, 2006, pp. 80-81). EVC jumped from electric to internal combustion 
cars when it found out that only in the latter technology one basic patent was enough to 
control the market and earn royalties from all car producers.8 But no intentional action 
can be compared to the prolonged and multi-fold policy effort that accompanied the 
diffusion of the gasoline car, after its initial promotion. The car was increasingly 
regulated (car tags, driving license, speed limits) but, at the same time, it became the 
exclusive 'king of the road', confining pedestrians to side-walks (and children to newly 
built playgrounds). Urban streets were first improved, using concrete and asphalt; then 
they were widened and connected through bridges and underpasses; finally “the first 
highways were built in and around cities, e.g. on Long Island in 1914 and the Bronx in 
1923” (p. 467). Changes in norms and institutional bodies took place too: “the 
traditional local right of local residents to administer their streets was gradually eroded 
and transferred to local authorities” (p. 459) and “in 1916 President Wilson signed the 
first Federal Aid Road Act into law, creating the new Bureau of Public Roads (BPR)” 
(p. 468). The last - and probably most important - result of Geels's analysis is that many 
                                                 
7
 All following quotations are taken from Geels (2005b). 
8
 Actually this happened until - more than twenty years after - Henry Ford did not convince the US patent 
office that his car was based on another technology (the Otto engine instead of the Brayton, developed by 
the EVC). 
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of the above factors mutually reinforced: new social values and attitudes, new rules and 
new institutions, new actors and new coalitions of actors, new forms of urban 
development and new infrastructure, and an increasingly refined artefact for individual 
transport, gradually aligned, thus paving the way towards the creation of the internal 
combustion car regime.9 
 
3.2 The car as a regime: the role of core actors 
 
Actors whose main interests were directly dependent on the diffusion of the car - that 
is, 'core' actors - were among the more powerful factors for the establishment, 
reinforcement and reproduction of the car regime. The role of core actors is particularly 
apparent in three moments of the American history of the car regime: the dismantlement 
of the trolley system in the 1930s; the creation of the federal highway system after 
World War II; the radical amendment of the first Californian mandate for low- and zero-
emissions vehicles in the 1990s.10 
About the abandonment of the electric tram as the main urban transport mean in the 
USA, it is worth referring directly to the words of two scholars of the issue: 
“In the 1920s the US had rather extensive trolley, transit and rail 
systems. But the competition among product forms was short lived, as 
documented by Snell11. First, General Motors (GM) gained control of all 
forms of ground locomotion in the country. Then during the middle of the 
decade GM, often in conjunction with Standard Oil of California and 
Firestone Tyres, launched an investment programme enabling it to 
control and dismantle the electric trolley and transit systems of forty-four 
urban areas in sixteen states. The three corporations acquired electric 
rail systems, uprooted the tracks, and substituted diesel powered bus 
systems.” (Best, 1982, p. 58)12 
“(…) Snell asserted that GM's true motives were not just to convert 
electric trolley systems into bus lines so it could sell more diesel buses 
and eliminate competitive electric systems, but also to then cause the 
abandonment of those very bus companies, thus killing mass transit 
altogether.” (Black, 2006, p. 200) 
Also in the case of the US highways program, to describe the role of core actors is 
best to refer directly to scholars of the issue: 
“US government officials were lobbied for road building projects by a 
large network of institutions that included the Portland Cement 
Association, the American Automobile Association, the American Road 
Builders Association, the Association of Highway Officials, the Rubber 
Association of America, the National Paving Brick Association, the 
                                                 
9
 On this specific point see also Unruh (2000) and Rao (2004). 
10
 The role of core actors in the US car regime is just an example of what has been experienced in several 
industrialized countries. About the Italian case see Maggi (2005) and Paolini (2007). 
11
 Bradford Snell was the staff attorney of the US Senate sub-Committee on Antitrust and Monopoly that 
in 1974 accused GM of a deliberate action against mass transit systems. 
12
 It must be said that the action of GM was facilitated by the negative public image of trolley systems, 
which was due to a greedy private management and a too strict public regulation. On this point see again 
Geels (2005b, pp. 463-4, 466). 
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National Automobile Chamber of Commerce and scores of others.” 
(Unruh, 2000, p. 825) 
“The United States federal government, responding to these pressures, 
diverted its entire transport budget to roads between the years 1944 and 
1961.” (Best, 1982, p. 58) 
“The secretary of defence13 marshalling the great new highway 
expansion was Charles Wilson, who from 1941 to 1952 had served as 
president of GM.” (Black, 2006, pp. 248-9) 
The Californian mandate for zero-emission vehicles was adopted in 1990 in order to 
improve air quality14. Before its adoption, there was no strong opposition from auto-
makers and oil companies, because the mandate was considered a minor part of a more 
general policy; the preliminary debate dealt more with other and more immediate 
requirements, such as less polluting fuels and low- and ultra-low emission vehicles 
(Sovacool and Hirsh, 2009). But in a few years things changed: 
“General Motors and Honda responded by initiating research aimed at 
mainstreaming electric vehicle production. (…) Other automobile 
companies and the American Automobile Manufacturers Association 
(AAMA), however, mounted a two-pronged attack on the CARB mandate. 
First, the AAMA claimed that alternative vehicles would be too costly for 
consumers, (…). Automotive companies also claimed that Evs provided 
no significant environmental benefits. (…) In concert with these moves, a 
consortium of major oil companies (including Exxon, Shell, and Texaco) 
contributed in 1994 and 1995 more than $1.1 million to legislative 
candidates in California in an attempt to weaken the state’s push towards 
electric vehicles; the Mobil Oil Corporation spent an additional $3.5 
million in advertisements aimed at discrediting potential alternative fuel 
vehicles. The oil industry did not limit itself to mere advertising, 
however; it also resorted to 'greenwashing’ and ‘Astroturf lobbying’ (a 
strategy by which corporations attempt to conceal their involvement in 
lobbying behind the façade of faux grassroots groups) by establishing 
three organizations designed to influence public opinion against 
alternative vehicles. These efforts apparently convinced CARB to 
capitulate, and in 1996, it rolled back the electric vehicle mandate by five 
years. Further reviews by CARB have delayed introduction of electric 
vehicles, with emphasis on the development of hydrogen fuel-cell cars 
instead. But even the promise of such vehicles has recently faded (...).” 
(Sovacool and Hirsh, 2009, p. 1101)15 
 
3.3 Locked into the car 
 
Seminal studies on path-dependence and lock-in phenomena in innovation processes, 
explicitly refer to the success of the gasoline car as the result of cumulative events 
                                                 
13
 After World War II the interstate development came under the portfolio of the US secretary of defence. 
14
 A detailed analysis of the mandate can be found in Kemp (2005). About other European initiatives to 
promote electric vehicles see: Hoogma et al. (2002, ch. 4), Calef and Goble (2007), Kemp et al. (2011). 
15
 On this issue see also Calef and Goble (2007). 
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triggered in the early years of automobility. For example, this is how Brian Arthur 
introduces one of its first papers on the subject: 
“It is possible, of course, that gasoline possessed hidden engineering 
advantages that were only slowly uncovered. But another, quite different 
explanation can be but forward. Very often, technologies show 
increasing returns to adoption - the more they are adopted the more they 
are improved, and the more attractive they become. (…) When increasing 
returns are present, it is often a mistake to explain adoption by the 
'superiority' of the technology (…) an industry (or economy) can get 
'locked-in' to a technological path that is difficult to get away from.” 
(Arthur, 1984, p. 10) 
Such an approach has recently been applied to environmental matters by Unruh 
(2000), who considers the car regime as a relevant example of a multidimensional 
'carbon lock-in'. The creation of the internal combustion engine (ICE) dominant design 
and the existence of network interdependencies and externalities play as relevant factors 
of a cumulative process which involves markets, technologies and institutions. But 
many other scholars refer - both explicitly and implicitly - to lock-in phenomena to 
explain the past, current and foreseeable evolution of the car regime. John Urry (2008) 
agrees with Arthur's and Unruh's vision, using similar words: 
“The complex system of automobility stems from the path dependent 
pattern laid down in the 1890s. Once economies and societies were 
‘locked in’ to the ‘steel-and-petroleum’ car, (…) massive increasing 
returns resulted for those producing and selling those cars and their 
associated infrastructure, products and services. Social life came to be 
locked in to the mode of mobility that automobility both generates and 
presupposes.” (p. 344) 
Inter alia, this implies that mobility behaviour too is locked in to the car: consumers 
prefer the car also because the built environment (cities and infrastructures) is tailored 
to the car itself (Sanne, 2002) and they are not able to evaluate the potential benefits of 
alternatives. The latter consideration has significant impacts on both the modelling of 
mobility behaviour and the effectiveness of policies aimed at introducing transport 
innovations. Marco Diana (2010) states very clearly that: 
“(...) the mode choice scheme is particularly challenged because we 
simply cannot collect revealed preferences data from field if the service 
is not existing (…). An even greater concern can arise when the new 
service is not well known by potential users because of its technological 
content, so that usual theoretical assumptions concerning the knowledge 
of the alternative in the choice set are hardly met and methods such as 
stated preferences experiments may prove ineffective.” (p. 430) 
And this is confirmed by several surveys on the purchase of a new vehicle showing 
that: 
“(...) how consumers improperly assess future savings and discount rates 
can serve as a powerful impediment to investing in new technologies. 
(…) [One of these surveys also] “(...) discovered a negative social stigma 
against more fuel-efficient vehicles, which were consequently resisted by 
middle and upper classes purchasers who wanted to avoid any 
association with 'econoboxes'.” (Sovacool and Hirsch, 2009, pp.1098-9) 
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Such a result is consistent with what was recently stressed by Christen Sanne (2002): 
the preference for the car is also caused by the embedding of mobility patterns in a more 
general consumerist culture, which in turn results not only from pervasive marketing, 
but also from an individualistic ideology.16 Brown (2001) carries further this approach 
and suggest that even policy makers are embedded in the ideological context of 
'automobility'.17 
The automotive industry is not only acting to lock-in policies, but itself suffers from 
lock-in. In recent years, the car regime has been able to respond to the societal quest for 
sustainability demands (and to specific public policies18); but the even relevant - and 
largely successful - efforts to both reduce local air pollutants and increase energy 
efficiency, now seems not sufficient to fulfil the new demanding targets of CO2 
reductions. Orsato and Wells (2007) explicitly argue that a dominant design effect is 
limiting the ability of the automotive industry to access radically new technologies. 
Such an argument is further developed by Oltra and Saint Jean (2009) who explain that 
the hybrid propulsion is chosen not because of its technological and environmental 
performance, but because of its modularity, that is because - at the same time - it is 
compatible with the actual core competences, sunk investments and interdependencies 
of the automotive industry and it is flexible enough to allow the (alternative or 
sequential) access to many other technological options, including battery and fuel cell 
vehicles. Moreover, the problem of both fast-charging and hydrogen infrastructures is 
significantly postponed and reduced. (Avadikyan and Llerena, 2009; van Bree et al., 
2010). 
A more general conclusion is that different lock-in phenomena mutually reinforce; in 
particular this applies to innovation policies in the transport sector: 
“(...) policy makers define the main objectives and research areas on the 
basis of the current technology and research directions, while the 
research proposals, which mainly come from leading automotive firms, 
are determined by the characteristics of the technological regime and the 
prevailing trajectories. This tends to create a dynamics in which 
technologies, institutions and industry structure co-evolve within the 
dominant technological paradigm.” (Oltra and Saint Jean, 2009, p. 578) 
 
3.4 Looking for a transition 
 
It should now be apparent why the car regime has continued to develop and 
strengthen in an unsustainable way, despite relevant and persistent policy efforts: both 
the ability of core actors to resist to change, and the existence of pervasive lock-in 
phenomena are at the heart of the resilience of the car regime. Many scholars share 
these considerations and consequently suggest that new policy approaches are needed to 
make viable radical changes in mobility. With reference to the transport sector, Kemp 
and Rotmans (2004) proposed to experiment several transport alternatives with the aim 
of learning about the transition towards a new land-based transport system. Societal 
deliberation about long-term goals, the establishment of partnerships with new actors 
                                                 
16
 Through a national survey in Japan, Shen et al. (2008) confirmed that the individual environmental 
consciousness has an influence on transport mode choice. 
17
 On a similar topic, see also Heffner et al. (2007). 
18
 Such as the European programs CAFE, Auto-Oil I and II. 
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and the creation of supportive institutions (such as the 'transition arena' and the 
'transition council') are crucial elements of the proposed approach. Elzen et al. (2004) 
analysed two alternative routes for the mobility domain in 2050: 'High-tech individual 
mobility' (mainly based on new electric vehicles) and 'Customized mobility' (that is, a 
new transport regime based on the integration of - both new and old - individual and 
collective transport services). Results are not in term of foreseeable impacts (as is often 
the case in scenario-based studies), but in term of strategies for transition policies. Other 
scholars share a similar approach, but with a more explicit use of a backcasting 
technique as a tool to facilitate higher order learning, that is “a new and radically 
different way of seeing the problem of individual mobility and of the role of various 
stakeholder in finding a solution” (Vergragt and Brown, 2007, p. 1106). This approach 
was simulated in Boston and in Rotterdam, where scenario and long-term visions were 
proposed and backcasting was developed jointly with stakeholders and public bodies, in 
order to: ease societal learning, catalyse innovative actors and influence step-by-step 
policy making (van den Bosch et al., 2005; Vergragt and Brown, 2007). A more 
quantitative use of transition management is proposed in the EU project 'MATISSE' 
(Kohler et al., 2009). Here a dynamic model is used to represent transitions and to 
identify broad policy implications. Simulations confirm the difficulties of pervasive 
social changes in transport attitudes and behaviour and suggest that - even in the case of 
simpler technological shifts - continuous and long-lasting support (20-30 years) is 
needed to establish a stable alternative to the existing gasoline car regime. 
All these studies have two relevant points in common. The first one is about the 
importance of niches, as protected places where the several dimensions of transport 
innovation can start to align, without being exposed to the competition from the car 
regime. Several scholars have studied this issue, albeit using different terminologies. 
Hoogma et al. (2002) pioneered the approach of 'strategic niche management' in the 
domain of sustainable transport. Many niches were considered, in both the scenarios of 
''Electrifying mobility' and 'Reconfiguring mobility'19, and the following flaws emerged 
in their management: the insufficient involvement of users, the excessive focus on 
technological aspects, the predominance of first-order learning, the minimal 
involvement of outsiders, the absence of an explicit link with sustainability visions. 
Brown et al. (2004) used a similar approach, studying 'bounded socio-technical 
experiments' in the domain of personal mobility and focussing mainly on the occurring 
of higher order learning and the negative impact of incongruent visions and interests 
among participating actors. Nykvist and Whitmarsh (2008) present empirical evidence 
and indications of on-going development of niches within the UK and Sweden, with 
reference to three transition routes: technological change, shift from car use and 
ownership, and mobility management. Among the results, worth mentioning that: 
“retaining the diversity of niche development (via incentives, fiscal measures, etc.) and 
avoiding new lock-ins is again confirmed by our study” (p. 1385). The second common 
point among these studies on mobility is the consideration of outsiders as a crucial 
element of transitions. It is argued that the participation of outsiders is crucial to resist 
pressures to follow conservative paths, coming from actors who are part of the existing 
regime and have an interest in the status quo (Hoogma et al., 2002; Kemp and Rotmans, 
2004). Moreover, outsiders are the main promoter of incremental and radical 
                                                 
19
 These scenarios are similar to those proposed by Elzen et al. (2004); see above. 
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technological changes of the car regime: relevant innovations in components (such as 
batteries), vehicles (such as full-electric cars), fuels (such as natural gas) and business 
models (such as battery-swap schemes) have been developed by actors external to the 
regime (van Bree et al., 2010); new companies are planning to enter the market with full 
electric vehicles - the more relevant case is probably BYD20, a Chinese firm whose core 
competence is not in the production of cars, but in the technology of batteries. Also 
local and national electric operators are interested in the diffusion of electric vehicles, 
not only because they already own or manage an essential facility, but also because they 
aim at the new frontier of 'vehicle-to-grid'; some of them have already started joint 
commercial programs with dominant automotive companies (Deloitte, 2009). It is 
apparent that niches and outsiders are interdependent, as outsiders can strengthen and 
build coalitions more easily if - especially during transitions - they operate in niches. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The main thesis of this paper is that a new approach to policy for sustainable transport 
should be based on evolutionary and institutional theories of change, and especially on 
one crucial concept that emerged from their recent cross-fertilization: the concept of 
regime. A regime is a relatively stable assemblage of rules, technologies and markets 
which fulfils an overall societal function; the regime as a whole - and its structural 
constituents - are reproduced and changed through agency, that is by individual and 
collective action and learning. Preferences, discourses, resources and policies, are other 
essential endogenous components of a regime; strong uncertainty and pervasive path-
dependence and lock-in phenomena are the main features of its dynamics. 
To understand if the concept of regime may be useful - both as an analytical tool to 
understand the evolution of transport activities, and as a heuristic for further research on 
the issue of sustainable transport - a review of the literature on car-based mobility was 
realized. It was worth it. The concept of regime (or whatever definition is used by 
scholars) is already widely used in the literature, especially with reference to four 
relevant domains: 1) The understanding of the early history of the car regime as the 
result of the co-evolution of cumulative innovations and the ability of 'enactors' to gain 
an increasing influence on markets and institutions; 2) The role of core actors in the 
successful effort to establish the gasoline car as a dominant regime. 3) The limiting 
effect on the future evolution of the car regime (and even more so on the advent of a 
completely new transport regime) that is generated by multiple and mutually reinforcing 
lock-in phenomena; 4) The consequent need for a purposeful action to align visions, 
interests and actions, in order to unlock the car regime. 
The concept of regime proved useful as a heuristic tool too. The role of private and 
public agency is a crucial area that needs further research in order to both envisage and 
pursue future scenarios of sustainable transport. Inter alia, two issues deserve better 
understanding: 1) Will the electric car result from the innovative efforts of the 
automotive industry? Or will it be part of a completely new regime, enacted by 
managers of electric utilities and producers of batteries? 2) Which public action is 
                                                 
20
 BYD stays for 'Build Your Dreams'. 
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needed to transform the producers of both alternatives to the car21 and innovations in the 
car itself into a coalition enacting a new regime of sustainable transport? 
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Abstract 
 
This article explores the potential role of culture in relation to policy-making and planning activities, 
exemplified through a discussion on how it may influence sustainable transport policy and planning. It is 
recognised that discourses and institutions play an essential part in framing problems and solutions, 
however an improved understanding of barriers and potentials in policy and planning deliberation is 
likely to be reached if underlying layers of values and perceptions are considered and illuminated more 
explicitly. Culture is also changeable, which means that it becomes relevant for policy-making and 
planning to search for opportunities to strategically identify and bring into play cultural resources. The 
article debates political-administrative cultures and broader social or local cultures, as well as the 
circumstances that might influence them, in order to search for transformative potentials and barriers. In 
conclusion, a culture focus recognises diversity inside and outside normal policy and planning settings 
and procedures and attempts to bring different cultures to interact and to learn from each other. A 
transport policy-making and planning process based in a culture approach may illuminate a so-called 
‘value-action gap’ concerning the possibility of more sustainable transportation. A closer cultural 
interaction may point out some of the divides between professionals on how to deal with transport-
environment issues. Moreover, a more culturally oriented deliberation would provide room for underlying 
sets of values and norms to enter the policy process more freely and explicitly. However, do we then have 
the cultures and moral force to build effective sustainable transport policies and plans? The article 
therefore also looks into a range of overlapping approaches that may potentially aid in rethinking and 
rebuilding transport policy-making and planning processes in terms of cultural learning processes. 
Finally, the role of the planner as a ‘cultural entrepreneur’ and ‘cultural story-teller’ is presented as 
potential tool to push through new agendas or ideas, such as more sustainable transport solutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When presented with the challenge of writing an article for this special issue, the 
initial idea was to delve into political discourses, deliberation and transport policies in 
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order to identify some contemporary decision-making and process-oriented challenges 
to the aim of sustainability. The basic outline was to discuss: ‘where do we stand?’ 
Surely, the last couple of decades have offered a multitude of studies and discussions 
on the relevance and role of argumentative and more networking and deliberative 
approaches in trying to achieve similar aims. In particular, the attention to discourse and 
‘language-in-use’ (Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005) has significantly contributed to 
an improved understanding of the dynamics of policy-making processes, as well as in 
understanding the complexity and messiness of environmental integration (Richardson 
& Sharp, 2001). As a consequence, very few seem to doubt the relevance of digging 
into ‘the how’s’ of policy and planning. This has also been reflected in my own 
previous work on discursive struggles in cases of local sustainable transport policy-
making and planning (Hansen, 2002) and in more detail concerning the central role of 
interdependence and trust in such processes (Hansen, 2006). 
However, what often turns out to be the case in such studies is that, in the attempt to 
try to understand process dynamics and struggles, attention is drawn to the specific 
situational logic, e.g. the historical, cultural and political context (Hajer & Versteeg, 
2005). When going through such studies there is often an almost habitual reference to 
the relevance of deeper cultural aspects and layers. But it is also quite interesting to 
notice the general vagueness of such references. Despite having identified culture as 
being of decisive importance, a further and more thorough conceptualisation of the 
implications of this has often been put aside or left for others to debate. The reason for 
this may be that it would imply the crossing of disciplinary boarders, mainly from 
policy studies into more socio-cultural and anthropological studies. Another reason 
could be that culture is a phenomenon that is often described or referred to in very broad 
terms, which also makes it very difficult to research. 
Interestingly, recent publications in the broader spatial planning research literature 
now seem to advocate for the (re)emergence of a cultural turn in planning, see for 
instance Knieling & Othengrafen (2009a). Furthermore, ‘cultural planning’ seems to 
have emerged as a recent strategic and collaborative process for mobilising cultural 
resources to improve community well-being (Rose, 2006; Evans, 2001). A few studies 
have taken on this challenge in relation to transport, such as Hendriks (1999) who in a 
pioneering work showed the role of culture in traffic policy by applying cultural theory 
to analyse the negotiation of traffic problems. 
There is little doubt that language and discourse changes mind-sets and world-views 
and plays a cornerstone part in policy formation and implementation. Thus, it is not the 
intention here to disregard discourse but rather to attempt to illuminate one of the ‘new’ 
frontiers of transport research: the underlying or interrelated role of culture in processes 
of transport policy and planning. How may such a focus contribute to both the 
understanding and practices of sustainable transport policy and planning? 
Hence, this article attempts to debate and facilitate ideas on the possible role that a 
more culture-oriented focus could play in transport policy-making and planning 
activities. It does not intend to do so with a base in new critical or additional empirical 
studies. Instead, it draws on a variety of sources to attempt to establish an approach that 
aspires to recognise and deal with the sensitivity of transport policy and planning to 
underlying and deeper layers of values, norms, beliefs and attitudes. 
Thus, the article tentatively explores conceptualisations, challenges and potential 
pathways offered by a culture-based approach in relation to policy-making and planning 
processes, and in particular in relation to the aim of achieving more sustainable 
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transport solutions. It mainly attempts to do this by borrowing into recent literature and 
studies on how cultural aspects may underpin, influence and interact with policy and 
planning activities from both inside and outside. The article is structured in a step-by-
step approach in searching for and building conceptualisations of culture aspects and 
policy-making and planning processes. The issue of sustainable transport is used as a 
helpful means to contextualise and focus this search - thereby it also becomes 
increasingly evident that a culture approach could be of relevance to policy-making and 
planning activities. Finally, it is tentatively debated what possible consequences a 
culture-oriented approach may have to society’s ability to work towards more 
sustainable transport solutions, as well as to future research in this and related fields 
concerned with spatial development. 
 
 
2. An introductory perception of culture in spatial development and planning 
 
This section suggests an initial understanding of culture in relation to interaction on 
spatial aspects, in order to be able to begin to recognise and further develop an 
understanding of cultural aspects in (transport) policy-making and planning activities in 
the following sections. 
Culture is a widely used concept with various meanings, depending on the context in 
which it is used. It has often been used with reference to high arts (fine arts, literature 
and music) but also to lifestyles, value systems and patterns of knowledge and beliefs. 
Culture is not only referring to the arts, it also refers to a way of life or collective set of 
values (Miles & Hall, 2004, p. 53). In order to be applicable, the culture concept needs 
to be focused and more specific. In this article, culture is seen in relation to spatial 
development, policy-making and planning activities. It means that special attention is 
given to place-based aspects and to how spatial policy-making and planning processes 
are also filtered by people’s perception of reality - e.g. how they make sense of the 
world and share common understandings, as reflected in manners, customs, morals, 
institutions, etc. (Rose, 2006, p. 139). 
Values, norms, identities, etc. related to localities can become an influential cultural 
factor in spatial development when they are shared by many. For instance, city cultures 
or ‘cultures of cities’ (Zukin, 1995) seem to imply the existence of shared sets of values 
connected to urban living, which may accumulate into collective influences or become 
vehicles of action or agency in urban development and spatial planning. Cities are 
‘cultural crucibles’ where art, science, commerce and ideas that matter erupt out of 
urban life (Rose, 2006, p. 140; Hall, 1998, p. 7). 
This article will view culture in terms of shared sets - by a group, an organisation or 
an institution - of values, assumptions, meanings, mentalities, etc. that underpins, or is 
reflected in, the traditions, habits and practices of processes of spatial development, 
policy and planning. It may, for instance, show through narratives, stories and perceived 
signature of places as well as through typical/habitual interaction patterns, procedures 
and processes by which spatial development is debated and decided upon. Hence, the 
culture dimension referred to in this article is mostly an intangible ‘agency with/through 
culture’ (Bianchini, 1999, p. 42) perspective. It is a process-oriented viewpoint that will 
be pursued below in order to move towards debating a culturized planning. 
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Culture is the production, expression and transmission of meaning, value and identity 
(Rose, 2006, p. 139). It may therefore resemble institutions, which can be viewed in 
terms of, for instance, belief systems (North, 2005) or the kinds of structure, in terms of 
overt or implicit rules, that matter most in the social realm (Hodgson, 2006). Institutions 
may be defined as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social 
interactions - they enable ordered thought, expectation, and action by imposing form 
and consistency on human activities (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2). Institutions distribute 
resources and dependencies, which may strengthen or weaken the power position of 
particular actors and organisations displaying particular cultural biases (Hendriks, 1999, 
p. 92). In this sense, the focus on culture implies that attention is given to various values 
and conceptions that lie behind such systems of believing and thinking as well as acting 
and distributing. 
Cultural aspects may potentially work across divides between sectors, interests and 
institutions and thereby aid in creating unexpected alliances and ‘windows of 
opportunities’. On the other hand, cultural aspects may as well be (partly) a reason 
behind conflict and a lack of interaction. For instance, when parties, that may otherwise 
share an interest, are cut off from exploring mutual benefits because of a cultural divide, 
in which values, assumptions and perceptions of ‘appropriate’ actions are not shared or 
supplementary to each other. This often seems to be the case between planning 
authorities, developers, NGO’s and citizens, but also more internally in formal policy 
and planning settings and activities between administration levels and sections of a 
planning authority. In any case, culture interacts with spatial development, policy-
making and planning activities, and the perception of culture is used here to call to 
attention the significance of values, norms, assumptions, meanings, identities, 
mentalities, etc. In particular when they accumulate into collective influences or even 
become drivers or vehicles of action or agency in such activities. 
The above perception of culture is not limited to professional actors - it also refers to 
the broader public and more or less organised civic entities. As such, attention should be 
given to both: 1) ‘political-administrative cultures’ related to professional actors 
(planners, politicians, consultants, developers, etc.), and 2) a wider ‘local culture’ based 
in local history and social life, local socio-economic characteristics, local decision-
making habits, etc., and therefore related to the broader public and more or less 
organized civic entities. A similar distinction has been presented by Sanyal (2005b, pp. 
13 and 22) who argues the existence of a ‘planning culture’ and a larger ‘social culture’ 
in which it is embedded. 
Furthermore, culture is not considered to be a stand-alone and static underlying factor. 
Neither is it as homogenous and all-encompassing as it may sometimes be portrayed. 
Culture is both diverse, dynamic and dependant on a range of other factors, e.g. 
‘planning culture, much like the larger social culture in which it is embedded, changes 
and evolves with political-economic changes, sometimes becoming more democratic 
and participatory, but at other times changing in the opposite direction’ (Sanyal, 2005, 
p. 13). Culture may change and vary with more tangible changes in economic 
geography, material pressures (e.g. environmental), specific social patterns, basic 
institutional as well as legal-constitutional structures, procedures and formal rules, etc. 
Moreover, it is the complex interconnections between both local and global processes, 
which account for the particular ways in which an area’s history and culture is made 
available and transformed into a resource for local economic and social development 
within a globally evolving economy and society (Urry, 2004, p. 170). As such, culture 
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and its influence on actions changes over time and across scales, and actions may 
themselves change culture; however it may be doing so in more slow processes than for 
instance changes in discourses. More on this later in the article. 
If culture is understood as heterogeneous and changeable, there emerges not only 
room for deliberate choice, but also for strategic action of political entrepreneurs 
(Zweynert, 2007, p. 10). It means that culture becomes open to interests and political 
agendas. Hence, an increased understanding of cultural aspects in spatial development, 
policy-making and planning practices can then be assumed to be beneficial - either in 
order to further develop, transform or support institutions and interaction potentials, or 
in order to improve the capacity to take into account conflict and resistance. 
Furthermore, it may be claimed that attempts to understand cultural diversity and a 
polycentricity of worldviews may be the decisive prerequisite for a society’s ability to 
adapt to changes in the environment (Zweynert, 2007, p. 9). 
 
 
3. Transport and environment - the ‘value-action gap’ and professional divides 
 
Having formulated an initial concept of culture in relation to spatial development, 
policy-making and planning, our attention can now be directed more specifically 
towards the issue of transport and its relation to the environment. It turns out that at 
least a couple of significant and illustrative culturally-oriented aspects can be identified 
in this relationship - both outside and inside planning. This helps to contextualise the 
discussion and to further develop an understanding of policy-making and planning 
cultures in the following sections. 
Undoubtedly, and as demonstrated throughout this special issue, the transport-
environment challenge is both an obvious one, and mostly a longstanding unresolved 
one. At the core of this challenge is, on the one hand, a broad recognition of transport 
and mobility needs in relation to social and economic development, and on the other 
hand, an equally broad recognition of the need to reduce the environmental 
consequences of transport. It has resulted in a ‘value-action gap’ (Vigar, 2002, pp. 184 
+ 193-198) in society’s ability to deal with environmental aspects of transport - the 
broader public agrees that less traffic is preferable, but they are not willing or able to 
address their own travel patterns and demands. 
It implies strong values in favour of sustainable transport solutions, but at the same 
time also strong values that poses a barrier to the implementation of those. According to 
Bannister et al. transport problems are not a conflict between the mobility-rich and 
mobility-poor, but essentially the outgrowth of a conflict of interest between prevailing 
multi-faceted values of the inhabitants. This makes it ‘difficult to change the travel 
patterns of modern man, as these movements mirror their socio-economic and cultural 
values. Consequently, sustainable transport policy should not only be concerned with 
travel in a strict sense, but increasingly with lifestyles, time management of people, 
social interaction, and perhaps with cyberspace.’ (2000, p. 231) 
Moreover, the difficulties are not necessarily due to a lack of concern, information or 
understanding, but rather the result of a clash of time horizons. People desire a much 
more environmentally friendly future as a long term goal, but the instruments to achieve 
it often interferes with day-to-day objectives and necessities in travel patterns. (Vigar, 
2002) For instance, the use of the car has become too embedded in peoples own 
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lifestyle and activity patterns (Sheller & Urry, 2000). And, together with a globalisation 
and network society induced ‘shift toward a more instantaneous culture’ this contribute 
‘toward people’s expectations of the distances they can cover and the trips they can 
make within given time horizons’ (Vigar, 2002, p. 195-196). 
Hence, it may not necessarily be underlying ‘wrong’ values of people that constitute 
the main problem, instead it seems to be a challenge to reach into the long-term values 
of people and activate those in trying to bridge the gap to action. Hence, ‘discrepancies 
between values and actions must be addressed’ (Vigar, 2002, p. 194), and in order to 
achieve this a better understanding of and attention to underlying values and culturally 
embedded aspects of people’s movement is necessary in transport policy processes. 
In addition, another significant culture-based discrepancy can be identified. It 
concerns the way in which transport-environmental issues are dealt with among 
professionals. In general, it seems to be well-established within political and planning 
studies how professionals, such as planners, may sometimes share a common interest in 
the same overall goals, but cooperation and action fails because of significant 
differences in professional values and assumptions on how the goals should be reached. 
This is often also the case in transport policy and planning activities. It has been richly 
demonstrated in many studies, for instance in Bøgelund’s (2003) thesis concerning 
administrative power struggles between Danish ministries over the issue of the 
‘greening’ of car taxation. Similar, in discussing local barriers to environmentally 
sustainable transport planning, Vigar has also emphasised ‘cultural factors’ in claiming 
that individuals and professions carry ‘cultural baggage’ ingrained in traditional ways of 
thinking about and solving given problems (2000, p. 25). 
Hence, sustainable transport policy processes are faced with significant challenges, 
both from inside and outside, concerning the way in which transport-environment 
problems are handled, and it is clear that some of these challenges have roots at the 
cultural level. Thus, the next section will debate policy processes further in order to 
continue the search for how ‘deeper’ cultural aspects may be embedded in and dealt 
with in such processes. 
 
 
4. Policy processes and cultural aspects 
 
The challenge of dealing with various and conflicting perceptions, interests and issues 
has been the focus of policy studies for decades. In particular, the emergence of an 
increased attention to environmental issues has resulted in an impressive amount of 
literature and studies concerned with the dynamics and capacity of policy processes to 
discuss and actually deal with ‘new’ problems and agendas. As environmental issues 
typically did not have well-established power bases or institutions to grow from - but at 
the same time were able to pose an identifiable, arguable and continuous problem 
pressure - such issues have often become the centre of attention in relation to a 
remarkable shift in policy studies. This shift is now widely labelled a shift from 
government to governance (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Dryzek, 2000; Kooiman, 1993). 
It is, in its essence, concerned with the opening up of more problem-oriented, 
interactive, networking and deliberative ways of dealing with collective problems, in 
response to the apparent failure of traditional formal government bodies to do the same. 
It implies increased attention to the how’s of policy processes, and in particular to 
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discourse, and since the early 1990s analysts have therefore talked of an ‘argumentative 
turn’ (Fischer & Forester, 1993) in policymaking and planning. 
Undoubtedly, the attention to discourse as well as to institutions (as debated earlier in 
this article) has made it easier to discover and discuss cultural aspects in policy and 
planning processes. Values, norms and beliefs are embedded in language and discourse 
(Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). A policy discourse is not just the language 
used in policy debates, although this is important. It also refers to the cultures, practices 
and the ‘frames of reference’ of those engaged in policy debates (Vigar, 2002, p. 26). 
By studying discourse in policy processes it becomes possible to reveal in more detail, 
between involved actors, their differences in problem formulation, conflicts of interest, 
their institutional basis and often also various underlying values. Discourse approaches 
then seem to capture important contradictions, ambiguities and discrepancies at play. 
According to Healey (1999) discourses may operate at three levels: at the ‘surface 
level’ of discussions; at the level of a ‘system of meaning’; and at deeper cultural levels 
(see also Vigar, 2002, pp. 28 and 184). Here, at the middle level of a ‘system of 
meaning’, discourses, issues and discussions become structured in a manner that 
resembles the view and definition of institutions presented earlier in this article. 
It is not the intention, in this article, to go deeper into possible layers of discourse, but 
rather to illustrate, and further draw attention to, that culture underpins policy formation 
processes, and that it may therefore be worthwhile to understand culture aspects better. 
In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that underlying collective values, e.g. shared 
professional values, norms and traditions, are not as fluid and prone to change as (more 
superficial) discourses may be. The cultural signature of actors and groups of people, 
e.g. the collective set of preferences, assumptions, ideas, values, norms, identities, etc, 
tend to change only slowly. (Vigar, 2002; Healey, 1999) For instance, underlying 
political and bureaucratic/administrative cultures often seem to endure over time, and 
the same can be argued concerning wider local cultures in an area. 
This is important as there are often cultural biases and differences in how groups of 
people perceive the same things, e.g. the environment, nature, development, transport 
and mobility, etc. It results in particular ideas and beliefs, and ultimately also 
institutions, concerning the character of the specific issue at stake as well as what to do 
about it. In addition, the slow-changing character of culture means that it becomes 
reasonable and useful (in analysis and practice) to assign it a somewhat structuring role 
in policy processes. As such, it becomes possible to identify some of the structural 
aspects that privilege certain discourses over others, thus making it an approach less 
vulnerable to what some critics have emphasised as a weakness or even ‘lost from view’ 
of discourse analysis, (Murdoch, 2004, p. 50). Hajer (1996) has suggested something 
similar by debating discourse as cultural politics, bringing attention to the underlying 
(cultural) bias of discourses. 
However, as indicated earlier values are sensitive to the specific situation or context 
and therefore also to the discursive interplay in which they are part of. Discursive 
interaction may alter cognitive patterns and create new cognitions and new positioning’s 
(Hajer, 1995, p. 59). Underlying cultural biases may also be relational and subject to 
change and interpretation - discursive interaction and active agency may support or 
transform this structural context. ‘Social relationships produce shared values and norms, 
but, conversely, these values and norms also legitimise and strengthen those 
relationships’ (Hendriks, 1999, p. 36). This opportunity for cultural change, whether 
through discourse or more tangible structural pressures, further strengthens the earlier 
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mentioned claim that ‘culture turns into an important strategic factor of policy-making’ 
(Zweynert, 2007, p. 17). It is therefore also relevant to debate how policy actors or 
communities might pursue this. 
According to Vigar (2002, p. 22 + 37), groups of actors who share common beliefs 
and operate in tandem in relation to issues may be termed either ‘policy communities’ 
or ‘cultural communities’. Cultural communities refer to the existence of a community 
of interest that has no direct connection to policy development or implementation - they 
may simply be an expression of wider social networks that feed indirectly into policy 
debates. An emphasis on wider networks of interest, on cultural communities, serves to 
highlight the importance of other communities of interest beyond a core community 
focused on formal government (Vigar, 2002, p. 33). Such cultural communities may 
centre on professional allegiances, geographical areas, organisational responsibilities, or 
a combination of these, which can bind actors together around common systems of 
meaning. When such a coalition becomes directly connected to policy debates they 
become policy communities. (Vigar, 2002, p. 32) 
As such, policy communities may be primarily associated with the previously 
mentioned planning culture or political-administrative culture, and cultural communities 
with the more or less organised and wider social or local culture. Both can be diverse 
and fragmented in the manners mentioned earlier, and they may therefore not 
necessarily work as specific analytical categories, but rather as indications of two sets of 
varying cultural foundations or inputs into policy processes. This is relevant, however, 
because the widespread attention to the development of more deliberative approaches 
implies the broad and early involvement of various interests and (communities of) 
actors. The assumption is that it will release unknown potentials of interaction and 
resources as well as improve the legitimacy, efficiency and implementation of policy 
processes. The ‘cement’ of such processes is the establishment of relations of trust and 
perceptions of interdependence (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hansen, 2006). The question 
is then whether a culture-oriented focus can be of any difference to this? It seems that 
establishing trust and interdependence between different parties will imply that they 
recognise each other’s values, beliefs, norms, etc. to a certain necessary extent and 
judge those relevant to the process as a whole. 
Hence, it is suggested that aspects of culture seem to be of such significance and often 
more long-term relevance that they should be taken more thoroughly into account in 
policy-making and planning processes. Mainly because it offers another deeper layer of 
opportunity for analysing, clarifying, learning in, and perhaps resolving debates, e.g. 
through illuminating hidden value-based barriers or potentials. If focusing on 
institutions or discourses fails to help to clarify matters to any significant extent, then it 
may be worth exploring and understanding the deeper cultural basis, or bias, of such 
conflicts. 
 
 
5. Spatial policy-making and planning based in culture? 
 
Having attempted to understand cultural aspects in relation to policy processes this 
section will now debate more explicitly how a cultural approach may be useful and 
integrated into spatial policy-making and planning activities. It will form the basis for a 
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discussion, in the following section, of how this may inform and further qualify debates, 
decision-making, planning and actions towards sustainable transport. 
According to Healey, by the turn of the century, both advocates of a new strategic 
thrust from within the planning policy community, and the external critics of planning 
concepts, were making demands for a ‘culture change’ within the planning community. 
This was aimed at changing both the ‘mind-sets’ of planners and the practices of 
interaction between a broader range of actors related to urban development and planning 
(2007, p. 179). The demands were partly related to the previously mentioned increased 
attention to governance settings and more deliberative modes of approaching policy-
making. And partly due to expectations that planners should become more 
entrepreneurial and situation-specific in relation to development, less focused on 
simplified physical views of cities, and more focused on the interplay of economic, 
socio-cultural, environmental and political/administrative dynamics as these evolve 
across and within an urban area (Healey, 2007, p. 3). 
The demands and changes referred to enduring arguments (during the last couple of 
decades) that ‘top-down, state-centred planning is inflexible, unresponsive to the needs 
of people, and alien to local culture’ (Sanyal 2005b, p. 7). In addition, since the 1970s 
and 80s it has been increasingly recognised that value-free planning is impossible in 
principle and practice (Klosterman, 1983). Planning itself is full of pluralistic and 
sometimes conflicting positions and norms, e.g. planners may be oriented towards 
different parts of the policy process, such as bureaucratic-legal, techno-rational, 
consultative and politico-rational aspects (Allmendinger, 2009, pp. 162-163). It 
typically shows in different policy and planning styles, in which the common 
denominator of the ‘style’ is a collective set of values, norms and assumptions shared in 
a group of policy-makers or planners or maintained through strong institutions. In 
response to an increased recognition of such aspects and tendencies, more bottom-up, 
integrative and seemingly culture friendly approaches have been debated and searched 
for. 
In other words, planning and planners are increasingly expected to more proactively 
embrace spatial complexity and facilitate interaction of actors and people in multiple 
networks in order to improve the identity and quality of places, and ultimately the 
quality of life. The appropriate variables and parameters of quality in people’s lives are 
hardly reached behind the desks of planners (or inside closed and limited policy 
communities), but instead in improved interaction with, and between, those to whom a 
problem is relevant (larger social networks / cultural communities). It implies the 
recognition that planning and development are both ‘strongly rooted in and restricted to 
the cultural contexts or traits of a society’ (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009b, p. xxiii). 
And, it suggests that a planning which is oriented toward values, norms, expectations, 
etc., both inside and outside formal policy and planning institutions, may be useful in 
creating better place-based urban and transport environment qualities, as well as better 
conditions and support for its implementation. In sum, it seems to illustrate an overall 
increased recognition of, attention to, and merging of, spatial diversity and cultural 
diversity (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009b), and it implies increased recognition of 
‘the spatiality of discourse’ (Murdoch, 2004). 
This invokes a focus not only on varieties in basic spatial policy and planning 
conceptions and values but also on cultural diversity in relation to the various traditions, 
modes and roles of planning and of its institutions, actors, networks, stakeholders, etc. 
For instance, policy and planning processes may be hampered by cultural differences 
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due to conflicting mutual expectations, different cultures of participation, different ways 
of addressing and resolving conflicts (Fürst, 2009, p. 23) and different ways of creating 
trust and interdependence (Hansen, 2006; Bogason, 2000). Hence, such processes rely 
on cultural assumptions through which the rhetoric’s and practices of those involved in 
‘doing governance’, in significant collective action, derive their meaning and legitimacy 
(Healey, 2007, p. 22). 
Thus, cultural assumptions feed into both the contents of spatial development, policy 
and planning activities as well as their approaches, forms and modes. It implies that 
broader social networks, or cultural communities, may form a cultural basis, e.g. 
through local mentality and history, for the opportunities of specific spatial strategies, 
plans and projects to emerge and succeed. (As discussed earlier, such a cultural basis is 
also dependent on variation or changes in local geography, political-administrative and 
socio-economic realities, etc. Furthermore, over time it may itself be changed through 
action and activities.) And, it implies the existence of policy-making and planning 
cultures that may or may not work actively with this broader and varied local culture as 
well as with their own embedded sets of differing values and norms. 
In the following, the focus will therefore be on policy-making and planning cultures, 
in order to further suggest how they may be viewed and analysed. Drawing on political 
and organisational theory, Hendriks (1999, p. 35) establishes a concept of policy culture 
that refers to: 1) values, norms and customs exhibited in public policy regarding a 
specific subject, 2) a focus on enduring patterns of preferences and aspirations, and on 
patterns of behaviour that go with them, and 3) both the level of individual policy actors 
and of policy arenas. 
Hendriks thereby situate policy culture in-between, on the one hand broader political 
cultures, referring to general conceptions of e.g. the role of the individual and 
authorities and the effectiveness and legitimacy of systems. And, on the other hand 
narrow organisational cultures, referring to values, norms and customs regarding the 
distribution and coordination of tasks within the confines of an organisation (p. 34). In 
addition, Hendriks argues that policy culture should be viewed as ‘layered’, describing 
‘an onion’ with practices on the outside and the values, norms and meanings that 
dominate thinking inside it. Hence, it illustrates the previously mentioned approach to 
both culture and policy-making that contains both acting and thinking (or reflection), 
and an approach to policy culture that deals with both patterns of behaviour and of 
conception (p. 35). 
Such distinctions and dimensions are also reflected in the more specific and agency 
oriented discussions over how (spatial) planning cultures may or could be perceived. 
Knieling and Othengrafen suggest that planning culture should be referred to as 
 
…the different planning systems and traditions, institutional 
arrangements of spatial development and the broader cultural context of 
spatial planning and development. It consists of more than planning 
instruments and procedures; it is the aggregate of the social, 
environmental, and historical grounding of urban and regional planning 
(Young, 2008, p. 35) describing the specific ‘cultural contexts’ in which 
planning is embedded and operates. (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009b p. 
xxiv) 
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Hence, planning cultures emerge as a result of accumulated attitudes, values, rules, 
standards and beliefs shared by the group of people involved (Knieling and Othengrafen 
2009c, p. 43). Knieling and Othengrafen (2009c) move on to establish an actual model 
for ‘culturised planning’. The model implies attention to the above mentioned layered-
ness of culture as well as to both wider social networks and communities and the more 
formalised settings and practices closer to the planners. Inspired by the discussions in 
this article, the model (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009c, pp. 54-58) can be condensed 
and adjusted into the following culture-based approach towards viewing and analysing 
spatial policy-making and planning: 
 
- Attention to planning settings, procedures and processes. This includes planning 
legislation, organisation, actors and networks, specific instruments and 
(formal/informal) products, and division of tasks and competences. It is about 
giving attention to ‘who is doing what’ - formally/informally and 
external/internal. 
- Attention to what planners, politicians and other key actors in planning are ‘taking 
for granted’ (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009c, p. 56-57). What dominant or basic 
planning assumptions, values and cognitive frames can be identified among those 
who do planning? Do they vary across sectors and/or administrative levels? It is 
about bringing attention to various norms and perceptions of ‘what planning 
should do’, as well as ‘how it should do it’. It illuminates the specific planning 
traditions, habits, ideas and principles that govern planning practices. Hence, it 
primarily brings attention to the formalised policy communities and cultures. 
- Attention to the underlying norms, values, traditions, interests, resources and 
(often unspoken) rules that runs in the local community. It influences planning 
directly or indirectly, for instance through the specific focus (contents) and ways 
of interacting (process) of groups of citizen’s in participatory processes. It can be 
about the citizen’s perception of ‘the good life’, local identity, and mentality 
(‘who are we’ and ‘how do we do things’). Hence, it brings attention to the 
diversities of the broader local culture and its potential resources. In relation to 
this, attention should also be given to how such underlying norms, values, 
traditions, etc. are intertwined with and conditioned by local geography and socio-
economic realities, etc. 
 
This approach brings into attention an ‘agency with culture’ (Bianchini, 1999, p. 42) 
perspective or a cultural approach to spatial policy-making and planning that combines 
political-administrative cultures with broader local cultures. It implies that a planning 
discourse, which is attuned more with local values, norms, expectations, etc. both inside 
and outside formal policy and planning institutions, may be useful in creating better 
place-based quality as well as better conditions and support for its implementation. 
Change and variability are more accepted when decisions go with the flow and grain of 
a local culture (Landry, 2006, p. 244). People are much better able to change such 
elements of their behaviour and thought they are aware of than those they are not. In 
societies in which cultural factors seem to hamper economic and/or political 
development, it is thus important to ‘un-lock’ cultural legacies by making them the 
object of public debate. (Zweynert, 2007, p. 17) A policy-making and planning process 
based in a culture approach would then tend towards being less standardised or 
mainstream, and more open, problem-oriented and situation-specific. It respects and 
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works with local differences and resources not only concerning ‘what should be done’ 
but also ‘how it should be done’. 
 
 
6. Sustainable transport policy-making and planning based in culture? And a few 
remarks for future studies  
 
How could this be of relevance to the attempt to aim for a more environmentally 
sustainable future for transport? What opportunities as well as limitations do a more 
culture-oriented policy-making and planning approach offer in relation to transport and 
environment integration? And finally, what may be worth looking for in future 
research? 
It seems that a stronger cultural focus in relation to transport-environment issues 
would illuminate and bring into play the ‘value-action gap’ mentioned earlier, for 
instance if this focus is turned towards wider social networks (cultural communities). 
This may help analysts as well as policy-makers to further identify and deepen debates 
on mobility needs, aspirations and life-style choices of groups of people. Thereby, it 
may improve the ability to be able to recognise the actual character and extent of 
mobility challenges and broader possibilities of interaction in trying to shift towards 
alternative transport solutions. It is hard to imagine sustainable transport solutions 
without debating and including the specific mobility needs and patterns of people. There 
may be plenty of generalised research on car use and mobility, but in order to reach 
effective solutions it is likely that a focus on the actual needs and values of the people 
meant to be affected by solutions would be useful. It may have a range of advantages, 
such as discovering unknown transport behavioural patterns and preferences as well as 
barriers and potentials to implementation. 
In a similar fashion, it may be useful for transport planning itself (and its policy 
communities) to focus on the underlying assumptions and values of transport politicians 
and planners, concerning their perception of how transport planning should go about 
solving environmental problems. This may bring attention to different political-
administrative cultures that may vary, for instance, between technical-rational and 
sociological and behavioural viewpoints and systems of meaning. Identifying and 
debating the specific values and traditions of transport planners may illuminate some of 
the professional divides concerning transport issues. This may be a revealing exercise 
that brings out old and very settled patterns and habits among and between planners in 
different departments and at different levels. If you have been building roads for cars for 
30 years, then what would you want to do next year? Some may welcome change, but 
many would stick to what they know and are capable of. 
In order to illuminate further the possible variety and potential of looking into 
underlying assumptions and values concerning transport policy and planning we turn to 
the example of car use. Hendriks (1999, pp. 48-54) uses the example of car use policy to 
illustrate how different types of (policy) cultures may imply different ideas about 
transport problems and solutions. For instance, if an ‘individualistic’ way of life or 
perspective on car use is applied, the central values tend to be accessibility, freedom of 
choice, speed and privacy, resulting in a focus on traffic jams, bottlenecks and supply-
oriented strategies. To a ‘hierarchical’ way of thinking and acting the core values would 
centre on orderliness, transparency and control, and supply-oriented, bureaucratic and 
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technical fix solutions would be preferred over demand-oriented. A more ‘egalitarian’ 
approach would imply the favouring of values of liveability, sustainability and fairness, 
and would be likely to favour demand-oriented solutions building on raising people’s 
environmental consciousness as well as discouraging car use. Finally, Hendriks holds 
that a passive ‘fatalist’ view would go for minimalisation of commotion and would 
seem to have no clearly delineated problem definitions, and few ideas, if any, on how to 
solve problems. 
This already illustrates a significant variety of values, norms and approaches that are 
all likely to come into play in policy-debates and planning related to sustainable 
transport. In similar ways, it would be possible to debate value-based issues related to 
policies and plans concerning cycling, pedestrianisation, and public transport as well as 
to a range of integrated approaches. Typologies are, however, of course sensitive to 
being what they are - categories in which people and issues are boxed and simplified. 
Thus, it is the diverse and often much more fragmented and complex settings and 
interactions of specific real-life transport policy processes that illuminate and produce 
actual patterns of values and norms around specific problems. The typologies and 
categories should then grow from the situation and the specific problems and issues at 
hand, as indicated in the previous section. 
A closer interaction between cultural communities and policy communities then 
seems to be called for in transport policy-making and planning activities. By taking the 
car use policy example of Hendriks closer to the policy-making and planning culture 
approach presented in the previous section, it can be illustrated further how in particular 
policy-makers and planners might apply a more culture oriented approach for the 
benefit of more sustainable transport. This is important, as the ability of policy-makers 
and planners to manage or facilitate the policy-making process (more or less in co-
operation with interest parties and the public in general) in a direction towards increased 
strategic capacity is assumed to be decisive. 
For instance, it would most often imply a need to identify and involve a wider range 
of relevant actors in relation to be able to revise policies and plans concerning car use. 
This may seem unnecessary, as there are often planning authorities or technically 
oriented administrations who would automatically consider this to be their job. 
However, this may already be a first failure. Planning authorities and administrations 
are mostly good at what they do, but the question is whether an effective policy-making 
process towards more sustainable car use would emerge from such sources - it may have 
been the same administrations that were, at least partly, responsible for the problems in 
the first place. Plenty of studies, alongside the already mentioned by Vigar (2002) and 
Hendriks (1999), have demonstrated that planning and administrative organisations 
related to transport, national as well as local, are deeply intertwined in politics and 
positioning, e.g. in setting and maintaining certain agendas and in upholding or 
developing powerbases (see Tengström, 1999; Hansen, 2002; Bøgelund, 2003, 
Flyvbjerg 1998 and 2001). They are not value-neutral or free from political as well as 
cultural bias, and, in particular, those studies (along with many others) have shown how 
environmental issues rarely seem to get the upper hand in formal or traditional transport 
policy and planning processes. 
Hence, the recognition and inclusion of other actors seems to be relevant, and not just 
the ones favouring reductions in car use, as one-sided processes often risks losing 
legitimacy and capacity to act. For instance, other parts or levels of public 
administration may have useful knowledge on people’s behaviour that may have 
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specific relevance to mobility needs and demands - for instance concerning school 
children and various social groups. Or it could be the local chamber of commerce, 
associations of bicycling, bus companies, car owners and commuters, etc. Local citizen 
groups, larger companies, sports associations or other local groupings and organised 
communities may also prove useful in providing knowledge and insight into the values, 
norms, assumptions and behaviour that guide and characterise car use and peoples 
mobility patterns - as well as insight into the actual (local) potentials and barriers to 
actively pursue more environmentally oriented changes in those patterns. In some cases 
such a focus may not only turn out to clarify important values and norms - it may also 
bring into attention unexpected more tangible potentials and barriers, e.g. unknown 
physical, social or economic barriers to movement by foot or bicycle. A focus on the 
values influencing people’s transport choices and behaviour should also be observant 
towards the specific geographical and socio-economic context. 
In similar manners a culturally oriented attention could be given to processes, 
procedures, ways of organising, split of tasks and competences, formal rules, etc. and 
how it may limit and create opportunities for a revised more environmentally friendly 
transport planning. Again, it seems to be interaction and situation-specific approaches 
that matters. As indicated, the example of car use policy and planning does not 
necessarily imply a certain top-down or bottom-up approach in how to go about with 
working towards more sustainable transport solutions. Some political-administrative 
organisations may have strong, effective and widely accepted procedures, matched by a 
visionary and respected political elite. In such cases it may prove legitimate and even 
widely expected and valued by those affected that new path-breaking initiatives emerge 
from the top. Hence, government may still matter, and reliance on and further 
improvement of specific political-administrative cultures may prove useful. In other 
cases there may be a wider range of strong and resourceful public, private and civil 
actors who, from issue to issue, enters in varied and flexible governance settings and 
practice. Here, they may negotiate both interests and values in manners that go well 
with local mentality on ‘how to go about with things and decisions’. 
In any case, the choice of approach should be considered in relation to cultural aspects 
and biases. In Hansen (2002 and 2006) it is exemplified and discussed how it is not so 
much the specific local transport policy and planning aims and means that matters, 
rather it is how policy and planning debates are carried out and how that matches local 
styles and cultures in policy making and planning. In particular in the cases of 
Groningen (NL) and Aalborg (DK), those studies illustrated that failure to attune 
political-administrative cultures with the values, norms and expectations to local 
decision-making as mirrored in broader local cultures had drastic negative consequences 
- in particular in relation to be able to maintain, over time, broad support for more 
environmentally friendly transport solutions. The same studies also showed that in 
(other) situations of careful and culturally sensitive deliberation, such as in the Lund (S) 
and Groningen cases, it was in fact possible to build, maintain or reestablish broad local 
support for more environmentally friendly transport solutions. 
Whether more deliberative and interactive culturally oriented processes will, in 
general, lead to more sustainable transport solutions is, however, still rather unclear. 
Deliberation does not necessarily lead to the ‘right solutions’. Deliberation and 
argumentative approaches imply that a process of contesting of discourses and learning 
takes place. ‘People learn to see policy choices through each other’s eyes’ (Bingham, 
2006, p. 823). This may well provide opportunities for broader agreements on and 
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support for transport-environmental solutions or environment-economy win-win 
situations, as indicated above. However, the same approaches may as well lead to 
confuse and complicate the process to the extent that a more permanent political 
struggle is established, or that interests opposing more environmentally friendly 
solutions are being supported (Petersen et al, 2007; Rydin, 1999). 
A more culturally oriented deliberation would provide room for underlying sets of 
values and norms to enter the policy process more freely and explicitly. As such, it may 
imply a more authentic, rather than rhetoric, basis for dialogue and interaction (Innes & 
Booher, 2003), and it may therefore illuminate and challenge the ‘constructedness’ of 
discourse, interests and practical formulations of problems and solutions. But ultimately 
it would imply questioning whether we have the cultures and moral force to build 
effective sustainable transport policies and plans? It brings into attention change and 
learning at the level of cultures, and how it may be brought about. 
Loosening up or changing transport planning ideas, values, norms and traditions is of 
course a difficult task. However, as indicated earlier cultures do change, and action may 
be part of the reason why it does, alongside changes in organisational settings and more 
general socio-economic and geographical conditions. Active and explicit attempts to 
identify and pursue possibilities for cultural learning and change may be a useful 
approach. Vigar also suggests that, in order to care better for health and environmental 
issues related to transportation, ‘there is a need to engage stakeholders in policy 
development and learning processes’ (Vigar, 2002, 197). By being included 
stakeholders or groups of people may enter into collective cultural learning processes, 
which may be helpful in bridging the ‘value-action gap’ towards achieving more 
sustainable transport solutions. 
Through a study of sustainability, mobility, mobility needs, and processes of cultural 
learning, Læssøe (1999) has also made this quite clear. Læssøe focuses on the inherent 
socio-cultural dynamics of the causes, conditions and resources underlying transport 
and environment problems (1999, p. 16). Furthermore, Læssøe identifies a range of 
overlapping possible approaches that may aid in rethinking and rebuilding transport 
policy-making and planning processes in terms of cultural learning processes. These 
approaches (Læssøe, 1999, pp. 16-18) are referred to below, and they help to 
supplement and further specify the discussions and aspects dealt with in the above. 
First, Læssøe brings into attention a need to look across instruments and search for 
much more combined and synergetic approaches and policy packages. Cultural 
transformation is neither simplistic nor easily calculable in cause-effect terms; instead it 
is highly dependent on aggregated influences. Attempts to change mobility patterns, and 
hence transport-environment implications, may therefore involve an approach of, for 
instance, combined and mutually reinforcing measures of urban and infrastructure 
planning, financial incentives, labour market policies, campaigns, etc. 
Next, the production of attractive alternatives becomes important. If changes are to be 
expected in mobility patterns and life style, people must be presented with the 
opportunity to learn about attractive quality-of-life alternatives, as for instance reflected 
in the Slow City or ‘Cittaslow’ movement that originated in Italy in 1999. 
Furthermore, resistance may be resolved by applying its own dynamics against it. 
Hence, policy-making and planning may for instance facilitate cultural transformation 
and learning processes aiming at ‘releasing and relieving the dynamics underlying the 
need for mobility’, e.g. by accommodating more possibilities for shaping local 
environments. 
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Læssøe also argues that creative and practical 1:1 experiments are useful in cultural 
learning processes, simply because they are then made available to human senses and 
experience. Practical experiments, such as car-free neighbourhoods or city-bikes, may 
for instance illustrate and perhaps convince people about possible mobility alternatives. 
Furthermore, they may help in creating increased support for similar transport solutions 
and further development. 
However, such (relatively individual) experiences must also be conceptualised and 
processed in wider circles, in order to have an influence on collective knowledge, values 
and social standards concerning mobility and transport issues. Hence, time and space 
must be provided for collective processing of experience. Moreover, cultural learning 
processes require more long term process horizons than usually applied in policy and 
planning processes. If changing culture is slow, then the learning processes that attempt 
to achieve it should be adjusted accordingly. In doing so, such processes may also find 
it useful not to start out in too abrupt or challenging manners, e.g. the speed as well as 
the manner of progression should match the transformative capacity of the wider social 
cultures it attempts to interact with. 
Finally, Læssøe suggests increased attention to open democratic processes. Learning 
processes are about providing opportunity for people to transform themselves, e.g. their 
views on mobility and their transport behavior. ‘There is not just one, but a number of 
potential ways of solving problems of transportation and environment, and their 
selection should be determined by our values and goals - and with due considerations 
for other social issues that would be affected by the solution. To allow for that the 
learning process needs to be organized to catalyze a broad democratic debate.’ (Læssøe, 
1999, p. 18). 
As such, Læssøe’s attention to cultural learning offers several opportunities and 
directions that illuminate how political-administrative cultures and communities may 
reorient themselves and attempt to interact with wider social cultures and cultural 
communities in order to work towards more sustainable transport solutions. 
In the remaining part of this section it is the intention to present a few concluding as 
well as supplementary remarks and insights that may be worth pursuing in future 
attempts to understand and work, in particular as planners, with policy and planning 
cultures oriented towards sustainable transport, but also spatial development in general. 
In general, the discussions and examples above build to the claim that ’careful 
planning of an integrated package of state interventions must recede in favour of more 
spontaneity to adapt political ideas to the situational vogues’. Decisions based on reason 
and rational decision-making must be ‘replaced by constructive use of imagination, 
which follows the signals received from a multitude of sources’. (Bogason, 2000, 26). It 
means, for instance, that policy-makers and planners pursuing a sustainable transport 
agenda must be more observant of wider social cultures and take great care to listen to 
other sources than the analysts and researchers that document the character and extent 
of environmental problems derived from transport. 
What may this imply to the role of planners? Zweynert (inspired by Kubik, 2003) 
suggests the term ‘cultural entrepreneur’ (2007, p. 10) because the activities of such 
strategic actors increasingly seem to aim at a search for and definition of the cultural 
heritage of a society. The cultural entrepreneur is an entrepreneur who, for strategic 
purposes, produces novelty by recombining elements already existent in the cultural 
toolkit of society. (ibid. p. 10) Hence, if a transport or spatial policy-maker or planner 
intends to pursue new ideas, it can be assumed that the chances of success will increase 
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if this person manages to ‘sell’ those ideas as compatible with the cultural heritage of 
the society in question (ibid., p. 10). 
Zweynert goes on to suggest an even more enabling (and some might perhaps argue 
manipulative) approach to culture - that history may be purposefully reinvented or 
reinterpreted to fit new ideas. Hence, Zweynert draws attention to ‘cultural story-telling’ 
that sounds familiar to the audience but also introduces new messages, in order to push 
through a new political agenda. In order to do so, the cultural entrepreneur has to be 
perfectly familiar with the society in question. Therefore, the participation of local 
actors seems to be a prerequisite for successful institutional transplantation. (ibid., p. 12) 
Finally, the discussions in this article in many ways point towards the importance of 
elements of ‘recognition’, e.g. recognition of diversity in values and norms, of diversity 
in interests, and ultimately of multiculturalism. Recognition is implicitly considered as 
central to the attempts (of planners) to overcome cultural barriers, and to be able to 
exploit cultural resources. However, policy-making and planning is still very much 
about making or enabling choices and action - so what is it, in this process, which ends 
up being recognized? Sustainability? Democracy? Or other aspects? Equally distributed 
recognition would seem to result in tensions, for instance between sustainability and 
democracy (similar to what has been debated in the governance literature, e.g. Hajer and 
Wagenaar, 2003). 
In the case of transport, moral doctrines and ideas (moral cultures), such as the ones 
expressed around sustainability, can easily be claimed to be in conflict with a 
‘democratic public sphere’ (Thompson, 2006, p. 185) that allow the values of groups to 
roam freely. ‘It does not seem likely that the awareness of a common fate would provide 
a good enough reason for citizens to allow democratic values to trump their own.’ (ibid., 
p. 153) Hence, by allowing certain views, ideas, values, and the particular groups 
representing them, to be prioritised, such processes of deliberation might destabilise or 
create unwanted imbalances in the on-going struggle for recognition, which again might 
disturb basic conditions of democracy. 
Therefore, there is simply no easy way out. It implies, for instance, a call for debating 
the ‘legitimacy of allowing groups to defend their cultures so long as they are not 
offered guarantees of survival’ (Thompson, 2006, p. 187) Recognition may be 
important, but hardly as overruling democracy or the ‘common good’. In policy-making 
and planning activities, cultures can be valued and recognised, but not without 
mechanisms of continued critique and frameworks of interpretation that takes into 
account, for instance, significant material conditions such as climate change and 
endangered environments.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article has explored the potential role of culture in relation to policy-making and 
planning activities, exemplified through a discussion on how it may influence 
sustainable transport policy and planning. It is recognised that discourses and 
institutions play an essential part in framing problems and solutions, however an 
improved understanding of barriers and potentials in policy and planning deliberation is 
likely to be reached if underlying layers of cultural aspects are considered and 
illuminated more explicitly. 
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Here, culture is viewed in terms of shared sets - by a group, an organisation or an 
institution - of values, assumptions, meanings, mentalities, etc. that underpins, or is 
reflected in, the traditions, habits and practices of processes of spatial development, 
policy and planning. However, culture is also understood as heterogeneous and 
changeable, which leaves not only room for deliberate choice, but also for strategic 
action of political entrepreneurs. Culture then becomes open to interests and political 
agendas, and therefore it also becomes relevant for policy-making and planning to 
search for opportunities to strategically identify and bring into play cultural resources. 
The article has established an understanding that brings into attention both political-
administrative cultures (and policy communities) and broader social or local cultures 
(and cultural communities). It is, in particular the interaction within and between those 
cultures, as well as the circumstances that might influence them, that are discussed in 
order to search for transformative potentials and barriers - mainly with respect to 
transport-environment challenges but also in relation to spatial development in general. 
However, transport becomes a particularly useful example to the discussion because of 
a well-defined and longstanding ‘value-action gap’ that implies significant 
discrepancies at the cultural level. 
To actual situations of policy and planning, an increased attention to culture implies a 
focus on both the formal and informal arenas, systems and processes of interaction in 
debating both problems and solutions. It brings attention to both organisations, rules, 
standards, values, norms, traditions, attitudes and practices. It deals with the 
professional entities or actors who usually ‘do planning’ as well as those wider forces, 
or communities, in society who indirectly influences planning. Most of all, a culture 
focus recognises diversity inside and outside normal policy and planning settings and 
procedures and attempts to bring different cultures to interact and to learn from each 
other. As such, a culture focus assumes and builds on processes and mechanisms of 
learning and recognition. A policy-making and planning process based in a culture 
approach then tend towards being less standardised or mainstream, and more open, 
problem-oriented and situation-specific. It respects and works with local differences and 
resources not only concerning ‘what should be done’ but also ‘how it should be done’. 
In discussing how a cultural focus may be useful in relation to understanding and 
dealing with sustainable transport issues, it is illustrated how this may imply different 
ways of organising the process and of involving different actors and groups of people. It 
is argued that a culture focus makes more visible the’ value-action gap’ concerning 
people’s general approach to the possibility of more sustainable transportation. In 
general, a closer interaction between cultural communities and policy communities may 
prove to be useful in transport policy-making and planning activities. Moreover, a more 
culturally oriented deliberation would provide room for underlying sets of values and 
norms to enter the policy process more freely and explicitly - which may improve 
transformative potentials because it may illuminate and challenge the ‘constructedness’ 
of discourse, interests and practical formulations of problems and solutions. 
However, it would also lead us to question whether we have the cultures and moral 
force to build effective sustainable transport policies and plans? Hence the article has 
also looked into how change and learning at the level of cultures may be brought about. 
It results in the presentation of a range of overlapping approaches that may potentially 
aid in rethinking and rebuilding transport policy-making and planning processes in 
terms of cultural learning processes. 
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Finally, ideas for further qualifications of the cultural approach in policy-making and 
planning are presented, namely the role of the planner as a ‘cultural entrepreneur’, and 
that ‘cultural story-telling’ may be a useful tool for the planner in the attempt to push 
through new agendas or ideas, such as for instance more sustainable transport solutions. 
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